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Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in
American Indian Religious Freedoms
KRISTEN A. CARPENTER
Employment Division v. Smith was a watershed moment in First
Amendment law, with the Supreme Court holding that neutral statutes of
general applicability could not burden the free exercise of religion.
Congress’s subsequent attempts, including the passage of Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, to
revive legal protections for religious practice through the legislative and
administrative process have received tremendous attention from legal
scholars. Lost in this conversation, however, have been the American Indians
at the center of the Smith case. Indeed, for them, the decision criminalizing
the possession of their peyote sacrament was only the last in a series of
Supreme Court cases denying American Indian Free Exercise Clause claims.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Indian cases share a common and previously
overlooked feature: in all of them, the Court assessed the Indian claims as too
broad or too idiosyncratic to merit Free Exercise Clause protection and
instead denied them through a succession of bright line formulations.
Identifying the unrequited search for a “limiting principle” as a basis for
analysis, this Article reassesses the religion cases and underlying theoretical
questions of institutionalism and equality, in their Indian context. It then
identifies two contemporary policy shifts—namely Congress’s decision to
entrust accommodation of Indian religious freedoms to federal agencies and
its decision to do so at the tribal, versus individual, level—that have, in some
respects, facilitated an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian
religious liberties in the post-Smith era. Taking a descriptive and contextual
approach, the Article illuminates opportunities for additional law reform in
the American Indian context and also larger questions of institutionalism,
equality, and pluralism in religious freedoms law.
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Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in
American Indian Religious Freedoms
KRISTEN A. CARPENTER
I. INTRODUCTION
The [Supreme] Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise
claim in part because it could not see a stopping place. We
uphold the RFRA claim in this case in part because otherwise
we cannot see a starting place. If Appellants do not have a
valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any
Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA
claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land that they
hold sacred.1
Employment Division v. Smith2 was a transformative moment in First
Amendment law, with the Supreme Court holding that states may impose
burdens on the exercise of religion through neutral states of general
applicability.3 Departing from previous case law holding that states had to
demonstrate a compelling interest to sustain such infringements on
religion, Smith inspired a groundswell of interfaith coalition building,4
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act5 (“RFRA”), the


Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Associate Professor of Law, and Director of the
American Indian Law Program, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to the AALS Section on
Law & Anthropology, NYU, Pepperdine, and Colorado Law Schools for workshop opportunities, and
to Richard Allen, Amy Bowers, Alan Brownstein, Fred Cheever, Rick Collins, Perry Dane, Allison
Dussias, Leslie Griffin, Chris Eisgruber, Marie Failinger, Matthew Fletcher, Greg Johnson, Sonia
Katyal, Kati Kovacs, Sarah Krakoff, Steve Moore, Helen Norton, Angela Riley, Wenona Singel, Alex
Skibine, Rebecca Tsosie, Deward Walker, Jace Weaver, Phil Weiser, Charles Wilkinson, Thatcher
Wine, and Ahmed White, for comments and support.
1
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
2
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3
Id. at 888–89.
4
See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 n.9 (1994) (listing dozens of secular and religious supporters of RFRA
including Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Muslim, and Humanist organizations).
5
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4 (2006))
(restoring the substantial burden–compelling interest test to government activities that burden the
exercise of religion, including through neutral statutes of general applicability).
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and
an entire body of legal scholarship.7 Lost in this conversation, however,
have been the American Indians who actually lost the right to practice their
religion in Smith.8 Some commentators have gone so far as to
affirmatively deny an American Indian context for Smith.9 Yet, for
American Indians, the decision criminalizing the possession of sacramental
peyote was devastating both on its own10 and as the culminating case in a
series of Supreme Court decisions denying American Indian Free Exercise
Clause claims.11 Moreover, in addition to RFRA’s general restoration of
6
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) (extending free
exercise protections to property owners and prisoners and adjusting certain definitions under RFRA).
7
There is a great deal of scholarship surrounding the Smith case and the legislative responses to
it. A number of these articles and books are cited throughout this Article. For criticism of Smith and
support for RFRA, see, e.g., Doug Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994). For defense of Smith and criticism of RFRA, see, e.g., Marci A.
Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the
Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2011). While this Article engages seriously with the
Indian religion cases and others relevant to its analysis, it does not delve more broadly into the history
or theory of the First Amendment, which is treated in an exceptionally rich literature by numerous
experts in the field of constitutional law, and law and religion. For a few of the many sources see, e.g.,
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES,
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 415–523 (3d ed.
2011); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). Scholars have considered
questions that are relevant to, but beyond the scope of, this Article, including the meaning of “religion”
vis-à-vis a theory of the First Amendment. See Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A
General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996). For a treatment of
religious minorities beyond American Indians, see Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the
First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003).
8
Consider, for example, the three symposia devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the Smith
decision. Of the twenty-five symposium articles, many of which were authored by leading scholars in
law and religion, only two pieces focused on Indian religious freedoms and these two were authored by
practitioners or students. See Symposium, Criminal Law & the First Amendment, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1 (2011); Symposium, The Twenty Year Anniversary of Employment Division v. Smith:
Reassessing the Free Exercise Clause and the Intersection Between Religion and the Law, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 385, 385 (2010) (dedicating the symposium to Smith not because “the decision actually changed
free exercise doctrine that much, but rather because the responses to it changed history”); Symposium,
Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth Century’s Landmark Case
on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011)
(viewing the symposium as “an occasion to request new thinking to help chart doctrinal paths through
the First Amendment’s own real thicket of ambiguity and conflict in the Religion Clauses”).
9
In a recent article, the former Oregon Attorney General affirmatively denied any Indian context
for Smith. See David B. Frohnmayer, Employment Division v. Smith: “The Sky That Didn’t Fall,” 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1657–58 (2011) (“This was not an Indian law case . . . . Galen Black was not a
Native American. No discernible tribal treaty or general tribal interests were remotely involved. In
fact, as an anthropological matter, the Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest did not utilize peyote at all,
because the substance is not indigenous to the climate or culture of the region.”).
10
See WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN
LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 317 (2010) (“The injustice of Smith slapped many Native Americans in the
face.”).
11
See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (holding federal government did not
violate Free Exercise Clause by conditioning welfare benefits upon practice, use of social security
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the substantial burden–compelling interest, there has been a virtual
explosion of federal legislative and regulatory law directed specifically at
accommodating American Indian religious freedoms.
These legal
developments have been largely unexplored by the law and religion
scholars who aim to assess religious freedoms in the post-Smith era.12
The Indian religion cases may be explained by a number of factors,
including the Court’s narrowing of Free Exercise Clause protections
generally after the high water marks of Sherbert and Yoder13 and the
Court’s expansion of government property rights in the same era.14 These
points have been addressed in other scholarship, including my own work in
the past.15 But there is another point, so far under-theorized in the
literature, that sheds light on the pre-Smith cases and post-Smith reforms:
the unrequited search for a “limiting principle” in American Indian
religious freedoms jurisprudence. In every Indian religion case, the
Supreme Court assessed the Indian claims as too broad or too idiosyncratic
to merit Free Exercise Clause protection and, instead, denied them through
a succession of bright line formulations. For example, in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Association,16 the Court rejected Free Exercise
Clause objections to government plans to build a road through an Indian
sacred site, in part because the suit implicated “rather spacious tracts of
number, prohibited by Abenaki Indian’s religion); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988) (holding federal government did not violate Free Exercise Clause by
approving Forest Service plan that would destroy Indian sacred site); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 888–89 (1990) (holding that state government did not violate Free Exercise Clause through statute
denying unemployment benefits to individuals discharged from work for possession of peyote).
12
One exception is the very insightful article by my Colorado Law colleague Professor Richard
Collins who evaluates accommodation of sacred sites claims through a comparative study of the United
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia and concludes that indigenous peoples have fared better in
political strategies than judicial review. See Richard B. Collins, Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom
on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 241, 269 (2003) (discussing costs of religious
accommodation on American Indians and others in society).
13
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990) (criticizing Smith on a number of grounds including its “troubling” use
of precedent); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. L. REV. 145, 154 (2004)
(arguing that Smith marks a “crucial divide in free exercise law” and “sharply restricts the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause”).
14
Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for
Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062–67 (2005) (arguing that courts have failed to
recognize Indian property rights at sacred sites and evaluating a real property law approach to sacred
sites cases); Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENV. L.J. 313, 324–40
(2008) (arguing that First Amendment cases have failed to recognize the constitutive relationship
between tribal nations and sacred sites, and proposing that federal administrative policy should
recognize the non-fungible nature of sacred sites in tribal identity and culture); Kristen A. Carpenter et
al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1113–24 (2009) (criticizing judicial decisions on
sacred sites under the First Amendment and RFRA and arguing for a cultural property approach
grounded in indigenous stewardship and cooperative governance).
15
See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1087.
16
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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public property.” While the Indians attempted to “stress the limits” of
their claim, the Court could see “[n]othing in the principle for which they
contend” that would prevent them from seeking “to exclude all human
activity but their own from sacred areas of the public lands.”18 Instead, the
Court held, the Indians would only have an actionable case if they could
show that the government had “coerced” them into violating their religion,
through the denial of a benefit or imposition of a sanction.
Similar concerns plagued Bowen v. Roy,19 in which the Court said the
plaintiff could not prevail on his objection to the use of a Social Security
number on the grounds that it would “harm [the] spirit” of his daughter.
The Court held that this claim, attributed to Abenaki Indian beliefs, was no
more actionable than a “sincere religious objection to the size or color of
the Government’s filing cabinets.”20 And in Smith, Native American
Church (“NAC”) members failed on a challenge to a state statute
prohibiting the possession of peyote, their religious sacrament, in part
because of fears that widespread claims for religious drug use would
follow.21 Here, the Court held that states need not grant religious
exemptions to neutral statutes of general applicability like this one.
It appears, then, that the Court’s inability to discern a limit on the
Indian religious practices in Bowen, Lyng, or Smith was a common factor
leading to its outright denial of the claims in each. Of course, American
Indians are not the only ones who face the slippery slope problem in free
exercise cases. As Ira Lupu evocatively put it, “Behind every free exercise
claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge,
and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands
from religious deviants of every stripe.”22 The confounding question is
whether and how to draw the line between the legitimate claim and the
deviant one.23 In many religion cases, judges are able to rely on their
17

17

Id. at 452–53.
Id.
19
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
20
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452–53.
21
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990); see also Brief for Petitioner, Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846 at *6, *21 (stating that peyote is
“dangerous” and that “accommodating religious drug use would necessarily mean that highly
dangerous drugs . . . could lawfully be in private hands, for use at private discretion. Each exemption
. . . would compromise the regulatory goal of eliminating the presence, use and availability of
dangerous drugs in our society”).
22
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) (emphasis added).
23
Compare Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sam Deloria: San Francisco Peaks Could Be the First Test
of the Obama Administration’s Support of the UN DRIP, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:45 PM),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/01/05/sam-deloria-san-francisco-peaks-could-be-the-first-test-ofthe-obama-administrations-support-of-the-un-drip/ (“[Is] anyone . . . taking a stab at formulating a way
for the executive branch . . . to give principled accommodation to Indian religious concerns without
running afoul of the Establishment Clause? [I] think we need to write the formula ourselves instead of
18
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personal experience and common sense. Courts typically know that a
Christian individual’s claim not to work on the Sabbath is a legitimate
religious observance, will take just one day per week, and will not cause
the working economy to grind to a halt.24 But when it comes to the
particulars of minority religions, it may be more difficult for the courts to
evaluate the legitimacy and scope of particular practices, leading them to
question both their own judicial competence and equality among plaintiffs,
and to prefer bright line rules over nuanced analysis.25
American Indian religions perfectly illustrate this challenge.26 From
the perspective of many American Indians, the judicial concerns about the
scope of their religions appear specious because the religions themselves
specifically dictate and limit the practices. 27 These traditions are ancient in
origin, tracing back to creation stories that place human beings on the earth
and set forth values that will enable the people to thrive in their
waiting for them to do it, and I think we need to understand their bewilderment and their need to
understand the scope of any accommodation we ask for.”).
24
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause
when it denied unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to accept Saturday work in
violation of her Seventh Day Adventist beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Flor., 107 S.
Ct. 1046, 1048 (holding that Florida violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment
benefits to an individual who, after conversion to Seventh Day Adventist church, was fired because she
could not work on her Sabbath). Judicial notice of the practice does not, however, guarantee that the
plaintiff will prevail. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601–09 (1966) (noting that “[e]ach of the
appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of their places of
business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each
Saturday,” and then rejecting First Amendment challenges to a state statute penalizing work on
Sundays).
25
See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion
as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2631 (2009) (“The practical result
of this attitude is that crucifixes may be displayed in the public schools because secularized Christianity
represents a structural element of the western constitutional identity, while the wearing of Islamic
symbols is either banned or restricted because it represents values and practices that are cast as illiberal
and undemocratic.”).
26
Walter Echo-Hawk has argued that, in light of judicial protection for other minority religious
practices, including the ritual slaughter of Santeria, the Indian religion cases should not be viewed
narrowly as “products of an insensitive court system that experienced inordinate difficult understanding
and protecting a set of religions vastly different from those more familiar to American judges” but
rather as “a form of discrimination and intolerance … propelled by forces of conquest and the mind-set
of colonialism.” ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 274–75. Somewhat in contrast, Professor Richard
Collins has argued that indigenous sacred sites claims:
[R]eflect the extraordinary difficulty of committing the final say on issues of
religious accommodations to judges. Lacking a workable metric to determine the
importance and authenticity of religious claims, judges rest their decisions almost
entirely on the adequacy of secular justifications for denying religious claims, and
most contested claims lose.
Collins, supra note 12, at 269.
27
See Justin B. Richland, Hopi Sovereignty as Epistemological Limit, 24 WICAZO SA REV. 89,
92–105 (2009) (describing limits on Hopi ceremonial knowledge and property among individuals,
families, and clans within Hopi society).
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28

surroundings. Whether the religion calls for peyote, eagle feathers, burial
rites, or access to sacred sites, the religions set forth the season, location,
sacraments, prayers, and other aspects of ritual practice.29 Tribal religious
leaders, academic experts, and even, in some cases, published legislative
constitutions and codes, can attest to these practices.30 Contrary to the
Court’s fears in Lyng, for example, the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indians
were not trying to reclaim the entire public lands or to exclude anyone
from entry, but rather to protect the sacred “High Country” and “Medicine
Rocks.”31 And contrary to the fears in Smith, the NAC carefully dictates
the ritual ingestion of peyote and forbids extra-religious use as a
sacrilege.32 If taken seriously and understood, the tribal religions could
provide at least some of the answers that the courts seem to seek.
Yet, the Court sees two problems with this approach to the question of
where to draw the line: the problem of institutional competence and of
equality. Institutionally, an assessment of limits based on religious tenets
would engage the courts in theological inquiry beyond their competence. 33
Prior to Lyng, state and federal courts alike often used a “centrality” test to
limit Free Exercise Clause relief to burdens on religious practices that were
central to the religion.34 Justice O’Connor rejected this test on grounds that
it would require courts to “weigh the value of every religious belief and
practice” allegedly threatened by a government program and to hold that
“some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to
certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious
objectors who brought the lawsuit.”35 Such an approach would “cast the
Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.”36 Justice
28
See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 133–46 (3d ed. 2003) (“The
Navajo legends begin with an account of the emergence of the Navajos or First People from the
underworlds . . . .”).
29
See Amy Bowers & Kristen A. Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest: The Story of
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 489, 491–97
(Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011) (describing Yurok tribal rituals and cultural covenants).
30
See, e.g., General Provisions, Navajo Nation Code Tit. 1 (1995), § 205 (B)–(D) (identifying by
name six sacred mountains and describing Navajo obligations to them); see also Carpenter, A Property
Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1112–19 (providing examples of tribal law
and custom on religious treatment of sacred sites in Zuni, White Mountain Apache, and Navajo tribes);
see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional
Law, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 168–78 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M.
Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012) (reviewing tribal constitutional provisions on religious
freedom); Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Toward an Indigenous System of Cultural Property
Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 106–08 (2005) (providing examples of religious law and custom
embodied in legislative codes of Yankton Sioux, Pawnee, Eastern Cherokee, and Absentee Shawnee).
31
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
32
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33
Id. at 890 (majority opinion).
34
Lyng at 457 (rejecting “centrality” analysis).
35
Id.
36
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458.
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O’Connor’s reasoning resounds with a rich body of theoretical work in law
and religion, noting that courts are generally encouraged to take a “handsoff” approach to substantive questions of religion, both because judges
may not be experts in religious matters and to preserve the separation
between church and state.37 It is for these reasons that courts generally
assume the sincerity of religious practice and do not delve into theological
merits, this includes everything from church property to clergy hiring
cases.
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that concerns about
judicial competence in the religion arena may be overstated, much to the
detriment of religious practitioners.38 In this view, judges must often make
decisions about complex areas outside of their legal training—from
scientific to financial matters—and the religious nature of First
Amendment cases should not obscure the judicial capacity to make
reasoned decisions based on the trial evidence or appellate record. In the
American Indian context, state and federal judges often made perfectly
thoughtful decisions in the cases39 leading up to Lyng and Smith, making it
difficult to see the Supreme Court’s unilateral denials of religious freedom
as preferable to the earlier nuanced analyses. Moreover, as described in
greater detail below, the federal government has for over two hundred
years inserted itself into American Indian religion—originally through
policies designed to eradicate tribal culture and more recently to reverse
those policies.40 Given federal regulation of religious peyote, eagle
feathers, and sacred sites, it is rather late in the day to disclaim a judicial
role in American Indian religious freedoms cases.
On the equality point, scholars have argued both that courts should not
privilege religion itself over other fundamental liberty claims and that they
should not indicate any preference among religious sects or individuals. 41
One can see strands of both equality arguments in the Indian religion cases.
As Justice O’Connor said in Lyng and as Justice Scalia said in Smith, the
American Indian plaintiffs in those cases were entitled to the same access
to public lands and controlled substances as every other citizen.42 The Free
Exercise Clause does not provide a basis for extending special rights,
37

This scholarship is discussed in more detail in Part IV.
See generally Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009).
39
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (evaluating peyote religion claims of NAC
members); Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (evaluating funeral practices of Athabascan
Indians).
40
Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV.
773, 774–75 (1997). For additional discussion, see infra Part II.
41
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REV. 571 (describing some of the scholarly debate on this issue).
42
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
38
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which could violate the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.
Instead of privileging religion, the Constitution only prevents the
government from coercion or discrimination based on religious belief.
Under this view, Smith may have been decided correctly.43 Other scholars
argue, however, that even if Smith correctly treated religion as nonexceptional, it was still wrongly decided because it discriminated against
American Indians vis-à-vis other groups that enjoy access to their
sacraments.44
While laudable, even these nuanced views of equality often fail to
capture the interests at stake in the American Indian context, in part
because they remain grounded in the First Amendment’s individual rights
paradigm. To be sure, religious legal theory has begun to conceptualize
group rights through a number of models, including, among others, the
aggregated interests of members, minority rights, and church autonomy, all
of which suggest important points of intersection for the American Indian
context.45 But these accounts of institutional and group rights do not
recognize the unique status of history of Indian tribes.46 While Indian
tribes share some similarities with racial minorities and religious
institutions, they are more properly described as pre-constitutional
sovereigns with reserved rights over their citizens and territories.47 Tribes
are not bound by the Bill of Rights and may—as some tribes do—maintain
theocratic forms of government.48 Indian tribes generally retain rights of
self-government and an ongoing, unique political relationship with the

43
See, e.g., Leslie Griffin¸ Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1835
(hailing Smith as necessary for women’s rights and equality as against the oppressive practices of
religious groups).
44
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 95–96 (2007).
45
See discussion infra Part IV.
46
See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 802 (2007)
(arguing that “American Indian Tribes do not neatly fit into existing legal paradigms”); Sarah Krakoff,
Inextricably Political: Race, Membership and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169402 (observing that “courts uphold
laws and policies that further the separate, and constitutionally based, political status of American
Indian tribes”).
47
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832) (categorizing the Cherokee Nation as an
independent territory, subject to the treaties with the United States, within which the laws of the state of
Georgia can have no force); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831) (stating that the
Cherokee Nation can more accurately be described as “domestic dependent nation” than a foreign state
or state of the union). For a discussion of contemporary federal Indian policy implementing these
holdings, see infra Part IV.
48
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–82 (1896); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429
(D.N.M. 1954); see generally Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian
Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1596 (2004) (discussing how the Constitution does not regulate the conduct
of Indian tribal governments).
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49

United States. Congress, in turn, has plenary authority in Indian affairs
and an obligation to protect tribal resources under the federal Indian trust
responsibility.50
This special relationship between Indian tribes and the United States
has historically been a double-edged sword in the religion arena. In many
American Indian communities, the traditional Indian religion is at the root
of the tribal culture, social structure, subsistence practices, and even, in
theocratic tribes, government.51 Understanding that tribal survival was
linked to these religious practices, the federal government actively
suppressed American Indian religions as a means of eradicating tribes and
assimilating their members into the Christian citizenry in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.52 Today, as tribes recover from this legacy,
Indian leaders have described the ability to practice their religion as critical
to tribal “self-determination,”53 and on the flip side, have decried threats to
their religious practices as “genocide.”54 As the Indian legal and religious
scholar Vine Deloria Jr. wrote, “There is no salvation in tribal religions
apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”55 In this regard, Indian
religious claims against the federal government are not only about
defending individual beliefs against government intrusion, but also about
preserving tribal societies from extermination.
If the meaning of equality must be re-assessed in the Indian religion
context, so too must the question of institutional role. Smith is famous for
shifting religious accommodation from the judiciary to the legislature. 56
49
See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17–18. For a discussion of
contemporary federal Indian policy implementing these holdings, see infra Part IV.
50
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) 398,
438–40 [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
51
DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 211 (“The obvious
benefit of a tribal religion is its coextensiveness with other functions of the community. Instead of a
struggle between church and state, these become complementary aspects of community life.”).
52
See Dussias, supra note 40, at 773, 774–75.
53
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[The]
traditional religious uses of [Devils Tower] are . . . vital to the health of our nation and to our selfdetermination as a Tribe. Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain sacred
knowledge from the spirits that helps us to preserve our Lakota culture and way of life. They become
leaders. Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue to determine our destiny.”).
54
After the district court decided against the tribes in Navajo Nation, the Navajo Nation’s
President, Joe Shirley, was quoted as saying: “It is another sad day . . . [when] in the 21st Century,
genocide and religious persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo people [and] other Native
Americans . . . who regard the [San Francisco] Peaks as sacred.” Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents
Now Targeting City Council, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Jan. 13, 2006, available at
http://azdailysun.com/snowmaking-opponents-now-targeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f98461-63548e54cfb5.html (emphasis added).
55
See DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 194.
56
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal
of Roles, 2001 BYU L. REV. 611, 613–15 (2001) (discussing Congressional attempts to protect minority
religious interests in the wake of Smith). Compare Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
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As Justice Scalia wrote: “[A] society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of
that value in its legislation as well.”57 Smith and its defenders argued that
the legislature is better suited than the courts to balance sensitive questions
of religion and politics.58 Yet critics argued that Lyng, Smith, and other
decisions abdicated the judiciary’s traditional role as a protector of
minority rights, leaving religious minorities vulnerable to a political
process in which they are, at worst, poorly represented, and at best, forced
to use valuable community resources to vindicate rights that others take for
granted.59 This critique is surely apt in the American Indian context, where
tribes have had to go it alone, lobbying for peyote, eagle feathers, and
sacred sites protection.60 Indeed, when the large inter-faith coalition
famously pushed for the passage of RFRA to restore the traditional Free
Exercise Clause test following Smith, it expressly declined to push the
agenda of the NAC on grounds that peyote use was too controversial for a
broad-based legislative effort.61
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 (1997) (arguing that
Congress should be permitted to adopt a more robust, protective interpretation of free exercise rights
than those articulated by the Court), and Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 690–92 (1992) (defending the
legislative accommodation model), with Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 600–03 (1991)
(arguing that adjudication is preferable to legislation to address free exercise issues), and Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 776–79 (1992) (criticizing permissive
accommodations under the legislative-accommodation model).
57
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
58
See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 56, at 600–02 (discussing the
benefits of judicial adjudication of free exercise claims).
59
See Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger
When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1725 n.74 (2011) (discussing the
difficulties that religious minorities face in protecting their rights through the political process).
60
The Obama Administration’s Indian policy has been critiqued on precisely these grounds. See
Andrew Cohen, If Obama Is Serious About American Indians, He’ll Offer More than Just Eagle
Feathers,
THE
ATLANTIC,
Dec.
2,
2011,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/if-obama-is-serious-about-american-indians-helloffer-more-than-eagle-feathers/249311 (criticizing President Obama’s focus on clarifying the rules of
eagle feathers, while failing to address other major issues in American Indian policy).
61
See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1016 (1998). As Epps writes:
[T]he NAC was kept at a distance from the ecumenical coalition that formed to push
for passage of RFRA—a fact that NARF staff recall with resentment. Walter EchoHawk recalled that NAC was: “asked to pretty much please go away, get your own
separate legislation. We’re going to get ours, and once our rights are fixed, we’ll be
there to support you on yours. And they asked the Church to basically get their own
coalition [and] get their own law, and not try to get their own amendment in this
legislation. [NAC was] considered controversial and the whole drug politics and
that sort of thing-and we felt snubbed and let down.” The Church did not receive its
legislative protection until nearly a year later, with the enactment of a statute
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Yet the shift from judicial to legislative-regulatory accommodation
also has particular ramifications in the American Indian context that
scholars have not fully considered. Since the 1970s, Congress has
repudiated its historical suppression of Indian religions and mobilized its
plenary power and trust duties in support of tribal self-determination and
religious freedoms.62 Enactments and amendments to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Bald Eagle
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act now make it federal policy to preserve and
accommodate the traditional religions of American Indians.63 These
statutes delegate to agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Forest
Service, Park Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife
Service, the obligation to manage resources—such as sacred sites, eagle
feathers, human remains, and peyote plants—which are critical to
American Indian religion.64
This legislative-regulatory framework in Indian religious matters has,
in many respects, achieved what First Amendment litigation could not.
Today, Congress and the agencies treat tribes as governments for whom
religious cultural traditions are constitutive elements and work with them
to negotiate accommodations.65 The Clinton, Bush, and Obama
administrations have ordered agencies to develop procedures and policies
for accommodating tribal needs, and have issued special directives on

protecting religious use of peyote by members of Indian tribes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
62
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006); American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
63
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 provides, “it shall be the
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom
to
believe,
express,
and
exercise
the[ir]
traditional
religions.”
42 U.S.C. § 1996. The National Historic Preservation Act declares that “the historical and cultural
foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development.”
16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006). The Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle Protection Act “permit[s] the taking,
possession, and transportation of specimens . . . for the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. §
668a (2006). The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act provides that inventory for
human remains and associated funeral objects “shall be . . . completed in consultation with tribal
government and Native Hawaiian organization officials and traditional religious leaders.” 25 U.S.C. §
3003(h)(1)(A) (2006).
64
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668b (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to enter into
cooperative agreements with State fish and wildlife agencies or other appropriate State authorities to
facilitate enforcement of [The Bald and Gold Eagles Protection Act].”).
65
See Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 329–35, 364–38 (considering
agency expertise in sacred sites matters); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 109, 111 (1999) (acknowledging the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs’ expertise in American Indian affairs and
President Clinton’s Executive Order calling for increased collaboration between agencies and Indian
tribal governments).
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66

Indian sacred sites and eagle feathers. The administrative process offers
several mechanisms—consultation, notice and comment, hearings,
accommodation plans, and co-management—by which tribes and the
agencies engage in that process. Indeed, over the years, agencies and tribes
have developed mutual relationships of trust and shared information with
respect to lands and natural resources,67 and have used those common
interests to negotiate several notable religious accommodations over sacred
sites, peyote, eagle feathers, and burial grounds.68 Because of the political
and secular nature of the relationship with tribes, Indian religious
legislation is subject to rational basis review and thus often withstands
challenges brought under the Equal Protection or Establishment Clauses.69
For all of these reasons, I identify the current legislative-regulatory
framework as an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian
religious freedoms.
Still challenges remain. In the final analysis, Indian religious freedom
is subject to Congressional authority and agency discretion, and sometimes
the agencies decide to subordinate Indian religious needs to other
stakeholder interests.70 Moreover, the courts have struggled to determine
how to interpret RFRA’s substantial burden–compelling interest test in
these cases.71 Thus, while acknowledging the transformation of American
Indian religious freedoms law, this Article highlights both successes and
failures under the post-Smith legislative-regulatory framework.
In
particular, this Article acknowledges and identifies a number of
opportunities for additional improvements to federal policy and judicial
review in American Indian religious freedoms cases. These are important
issues at a time when the United States has just recently adopted the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, with its many

66

See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country, supra note 65, at 111 & n.244.
68
See infra Part IV.B.
69
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553, 555 (1974) (applying rational basis review,
not strict scrutiny, to federal legislation benefiting American Indians because it is a political rather than
a race-based classification); United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 2011)
(upholding eagle permit program against challenge by a non-Indian on the grounds that Congress has
“a compelling interest” in “protection of the culture of federally-recognized Indian tribes”); Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that NAC
membership is a political classification).
70
See Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 324.
71
Compare Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting tribal RFRA challenge to Forest Service decision to use treated wastewater on sacred site
under standard enunciated in Lyng), with Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008
WL 4426621, at *20 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the
federal government from constructing a “training support center” on lands sacred to the Comanche
people, on the strength of the tribe’s RFRA and NHPA claims, and noting disagreement between Ninth
and Tenth Circuits on test for substantial burden under RFRA in sacred site cases).
67
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provisions for indigenous religious, spiritual, and cultural freedoms, and
President Obama has called for legal reform to bring the United States into
compliance.73 In this regard, American Indians press the United States not
only to deal with tribal issues,74 but also to assess what it means to
guarantee religious freedom in our intercultural society of overlapping
identities and diverse world views.75
The Article aims to elaborate a new perspective on the cases, statutes,
and regulations as a bridge to deeper understanding at the intersection of
American Indian law and religious freedoms law. In this regard, the
objectives of this Article are largely descriptive and contextual, rather than
normative or strategic.76 More specifically, I argue that with a better
appreciation of the equality and institutional arguments, the truly
transformative potential of the recent Indian religion statutes and
regulations becomes clear. In the Bowen-Lyng-Smith era, American Indian
religious freedoms were litigated primarily within an individual rights
framework wherein the problem of “limiting principles” was an
insurmountable hurdle. In the post-Smith statutes, an entirely new model
has emerged. After centuries of religious oppression, the United States has
finally promised religious liberty to Indian tribes and their citizens. With
tribal governments and federal agencies at the table, the questions of scope
and legitimacy that previously torpedoed Indian religious freedoms claims
outright are now vetted and discussed by authorized parties as they work
72
See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (providing Articles 11 and 12, which assert the right to practice
indigenous cultures, religions, and ceremonies; Article 25, which asserts the right to strengthen spiritual
relationships with traditional territories; Article 31, which asserts the right to indigenous cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge, and cultural expressions; and Article 34, which asserts the right to
indigenous spiritual, cultural, and other institutions).
73
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the White House Tribal Nations
Conference
(Dec.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference.
74
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953) (“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to
poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of
other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”).
75
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2d ed. Oxford U.
Press 2004) (stating that “in a world of increasingly overlapping and integrated political spheres,” we
should consider the interests of “peoples,” a term that “should be understood to refer to all those
spheres of community, marked by elements of identity and collective consciousness, within which
people’s lives unfold—independently of considerations of historical or postulated sovereignty”).
76
In past work, I have advanced the normative argument that federal courts provide insufficient
recognition of tribal property rights at sacred sites and suggested strategic approaches in several
different models of advocacy grounded in property theory. For further discussion, see the articles cited
supra note 14. Other scholars have suggested litigation and legislative approaches grounded in
constitutional theory. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Toward a Balanced Approach for the
Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2012) (calling for
intermediate scrutiny in Indian sacred sites cases).
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toward meaningful religious accommodations. The post-Smith era thus
reveals an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian religious
freedoms.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on
American Indian religious practices and the law. Part III identifies the
problem of “limiting principles” in Indian religious free exercise
jurisprudence, arguing that the courts’ inability to find a satisfactory
limiting principle led them to establish bright lines denying American
Indian religious freedoms in sacred sites, peyote, and other cases. Part IV
suggests that recent developments in the legislative and administrative
process empower agencies and tribes to advance religious freedom;
although more is needed, these “empowering practices” offer a partial
solution to the problem. This Article concludes in Part V with reflections
on the broader lessons that the American Indian experience offers for
questions of religious freedom and pluralism in the United States.
II. AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIONS AND THE LAW
American Indians have rich spiritual traditions in which they
conceptualize their place in the world, experience a connection with the
supernatural, and develop values to order their communities.77 In many
native cultures, religion is interwoven with relationships, rituals, stories,
and places.78 Navajos, for example, have many practices identified as
elements of the Navajo “religion” such as a spiritual ethic, cosmology,
deities, creation story, ceremonial chantways, daily rituals, and sacred
sites.79 But in the Navajo language, it may be more meaningful to describe
these practices as an entire way of living in harmony with one’s
surroundings, relatives, and circumstances.80 James Zion explains that one
of the fundamental principles of Navajo life is the phrase “sa’ah naaghai
bik’eh hozho, which states that ‘the conditions for health and well-being
77
See DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 67 (“[T]he gulf
between religious reality and other aspects of community experience is not . . . wide.”); Inés
Hernández-Ávila, Mediations of the Spirit: Native American Religious Traditions and the Ethics of
Representation, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 11, 13–14 (Lee Irwin ed.,
2000) (discussing sweat lodge traditions in various Native American cultures).
78
WILMA MANKILLER, EVERY DAY IS A GOOD DAY, REFLECTIONS BY CONTEMPORARY
INDIGENOUS WOMEN 11–16 (2004).
79
See LELAND C. WYMAN, THE RED ANTWAY OF THE NAVAHO 20–25 (1965) (detailing the
ceremonies and traditions of the Navajo associated with the myth of the Red Antway); WILLIAM A.
YOUNG, QUEST FOR HARMONY: NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS 246 (2006) (delineating
the beliefs of traditional Navajo spirituality and declaring that “[t]he Navajo world is a unity; no
separate sphere of life denoted by a word equivalent to religion exists”).
80
See Barre Toelken, The Demands of Harmony, in I BECOME A PART OF IT: SACRED
DIMENSIONS IN NATIVE AMERICAN LIFE 68–69 (D.M. Dooling & Paul Jordan-Smith eds., 1989)
(asserting that different parts of nature according to the Navajo “naturally . . . go in the same category
because they are ritually connected”).
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are harmony within and connection to the physical/spiritual world.’”
Reflecting similar sentiments, one commentator writes, “Because of
the unified nature of Native American traditional culture, it can be difficult
to assign cultural dynamics to fragmented Western categories.”82 Yet, the
oft-repeated mantra that Indians “have no word for religion”83 is surely an
over-generalization. The Cherokee Nation, for example, gives the word
dinelvdodi as a direct translation of the English word religion.84 Cherokee
linguist Dr. Durbin Feeling writes, “The word ‘dinelvlodi’ (dinelvdodi) is
the object of one’s belief. For religion, it could be anyone or anything.
For the Christian, Christ Jesus is the basis for his belief or faith.”85 Among
Cherokee individuals and communities, people follow a variety of religions
from traditional tribal practices, like the Stomp Dance, to Christianity and
other faiths.86
As these examples begin to suggest, American Indian religious
experiences are quite diverse and they are evolving. These religions have
also been poorly understood by outsiders.87 Former Cherokee Principal
Chief Wilma Mankiller once said that “stereotypes . . . particularly with
regard to spirituality” persist “because of the dearth of accurate
information about Native people.”88 The hundreds of tribal religions and
cultures are often lumped into generalities about Indian relationships with
the natural world, including the common impression that for Indians,

81
James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 18 TOURO L. REV. 563, 603 (2002)
(quoting Elizabeth L. Lewton & Victoria Bydone, Identity and Healing in Three Navajo Religious
Traditions: Sa’ah Naaghai Bik’eh Hozho, 14 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 476, 478 (2000)).
82
JOSEPH EPES BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS: UNDERSTANDING NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
TRADITIONS xxi (2001).
83
See, e.g., THE PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., RESEARCH REPORT: NATIVE
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (2005), available at
http://pluralism.org/reports/view/176 (noting that “people from different Native nations hasten to point
out that their respective languages include no word for religion” and instead maintain that the many
aspects of life and culture “are ideally integrated into a spiritually-informed whole,” making analogy to
Western principles of religious freedom difficult).
84
English-Cherokee Word List Lookup, CHEROKEE NATION,
http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/Wordlist.aspx (search “English” for “religion”; then follow
“Search” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
85
Email from Dr. Durbin Feeling to Author (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:20 AM) (on file with author).
86
See, e.g., Cherokee Stomp Dance, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNati
on/Culture/General/24400/Information.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (“There are nearly 300,000
Cherokee tribal citizens today. Although many choose to worship through other religious methods and
denominations, including Indian Baptist and Methodist among others, many traditional Cherokee
continue to worship at stomp dances and are members of one of the several stomp dance grounds
located within the Cherokee Nation.”).
87
See Charles E. Little, A Policy Agenda for Sacred Lands, in SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN
AMERICA 133, 133–35 (Jake Page ed., 2001) (explaining the difficulties presented to public land
policymakers in determining the location and importance of tribal religious sites as a result of the strict
confidential treatment afforded to traditional spiritual information and practices).
88
MANKILLER, supra note 78, at 13.
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“everything is sacred.” On the other hand, when scholars examine the
specifics of any traditional tribal religion, they must take care to develop
adequate cultural familiarity90 and respect particular privacy norms.91
“Traditional tribal religions”92 are those associated with the
indigenous spiritual experience of each tribe, whether Navajo, Yurok, or
Cherokee.93 These religions often begin with a creation story that traces
the group’s origin as a distinct people to a place of emergence or
migration.94 The creation story often situates the tribe in a particular place
in the natural landscape and sets forth a way of life—including values and
practices—that allows the people to thrive there.95 In many such stories,
89

89
See Frank Pommersheim, Representing Native People and Indian Tribes: A Response to
Professor Allegretti, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1998) (stating that “the concept of the secular
is largely unknown” in all Native American religions with which the author is familiar and asserting
that such religions hold that “[a]ll of life and all action in life—indeed every breath—is sacred”).
90
See Mary C. Churchill, Purity and Pollution: Unearthing an Oppositional Paradigm in the
Study of Cherokee Religious Traditions, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER
205, 212–13 (Lee Irwin ed., 2000) (noting that early non-Indian observers commonly misinterpreted
tribal rituals of the Cherokees and Chickasaws).
91
See Christopher Ronwaniènte Jocks, Spirituality for Sale: Sacred Knowledge in the Consumer
Age, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 61, 61–65 (Lee Irwin ed., 2000)
(reflecting on “the bases upon which an American Indian community might decide what is or is not to
be shared with outsiders” in the context of Iroquois Longhouse ceremonies and stories and pointing out
that such revelations “can violate Native rules of privilege, designed to protect aspects of specialized
knowledge and practice from dangerous exposure or misuse”); see also Debora L. Threedy, Claiming
the Shields: Law, Anthropology, and the Role of Storytelling in a NAGPRA Repatriation Case Study, 29
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 91, 118 (2009) (discussing that Navajo norms allowing disclosure
about religious significance of sacred shields, as contrasted with Paiute/Ute norms preventing such
disclosure, may have been determinative in repatriation matter). With these dynamics in mind, my own
practice is to avoid writing about religious topics that I know to be confidential in tribal communities,
to rely on interdisciplinary sources as a means of contextualizing and understanding specific tribal
practices, and to emphasize indigenous sources.
92
Compare VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 123 (1999)
(describing Indians who “maintain a traditional religious life”), with George E. Tinker, Around the
Sacred Fire: Native Religious Activism in the Red Power Era: A Narrative Map of the Indian
Ecumenical Conference, 20 WICAZO SA REV. 203, 205–06 (2005) (reviewing JAMES TREAT, AROUND
THE SACRED FIRE: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM IN THE RED POWER ERA (2003)) (discussing the “muchcontested” nature of the term “traditional” in Indian religious and other matters), and CLARA SUE
KIDWELL ET AL., A NATIVE AMERICAN THEOLOGY x (2001) (arguing for a Native American theology
that is “inclusive of all Natives (traditional, Christian neo-traditional, syncretic)”).
93
See BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS, supra note 82, at 107–08 (describing various Native American
tribal rituals as embodying “traditional values” and contrasting such practices against Western
“mainstream culture”).
94
Laura Adams Weaver, Native American Creation Stories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND
RELIGION IN NORTH AMERICAN 83, 83 (2006) (asserting that origin stories typically begin with an
“earthdiver” or “emergence” story); see also JACE WEAVER, NOTES FROM A MINER’S CANARY: ESSAYS
ON THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA 218 (2010) (“Every native people has some form of an origin
story.”).
95
See DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 208
(illustrating how specific sites are sacred in Native American religious traditions because they are
locations where “the sacred appeared in the lives of human beings,” thereby tying the sanctity of the
place to tribal experience).
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the people and natural world are mutually dependent, with humans having
obligations or covenants that they must perform in order to live in harmony
with the plants, animals, waters, mountains, and other features of the
natural world.96 The traditional religion often pervades identity, kinship,
governance, subsistence, and social order and often serves as a way to
define and maintain the tribal existence, even in contemporary times.97 As
Hopi clan leaders declared in 1951, “Our land, our religion, and our life are
one.”98
American Indians across a number of tribes participate in the peyote
religion which has roots in ancient traditions.99 Indigenous use of peyote
dates back to at least 1600 C.E., by the Huichol and Tarahumara Indians of
Northern Mexico, and possibly back to the Aztecs in 8000 B.C.E.100 In
North America, Kiowa-Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches used religious
peyote in the 1860s,101 and the NAC was officially chartered in 1918 in
Oklahoma to “foster and promote the religious beliefs of the several tribes
of Indians . . . with the practice of the Peyote Sacrament.”102 Practitioners
attest to the healing power of the plant, the fellowship among peyotists,
and the moral code of the NAC.103 Today, the peyote religion is practiced
in both urban and reservation settings, by inter-tribal and tribal groups.
Most legal disputes, of course, consider an individual practice or
religious practitioner out of the larger tribal religious context.104 Such
practices include ceremonies to keep the world in balance,105 heal those
inflicted with illness,106 and communicate with the creator.107 Depending
96
See id. at 211 (explaining that Native ceremonies “involve a process of continuous revelation
and provide the people with the necessary information to enable them to maintain a balance in their
relationships with the earth and other forms of life”).
97
See, e.g., Joel W. Martin, Rebalancing the World in the Contradictions of History: Creek/Musk
ogee, in NATIVE RELIGIONS AND CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA: ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SACRED 85,
86 (Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., 2000) (stating that the Creek religion “is dynamic, truly historical, and
continually innovative”).
98
JOHN D. LOFTIN, RELIGION AND HOPI LIFE 116 (2d ed. 2003).
99
See generally ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
(Huston Smith & Reuben Snake eds., 1996); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY
(1987).
100
YOUNG, supra note 79, at 309.
101
THOMAS CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, THE PEYOTE ROAD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 23–24 (2010).
102
YOUNG, supra note 79, at 309.
103
MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 59–60.
104
See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding charges
against an Arapaho man who shot an eagle, in violation of federal law, to provide it as an offering for
the Arapaho Sun Dance).
105
YOUNG, supra note 79, at 345–46.
106
Lee Irwin, Themes in Native American Spirituality, 20 AM. INDIAN Q. 309, 321 (1996)
(explaining how Odawa ceremonies “function to establish communal health that connects the Odawa to
a larger spiritual community”); Douglas L. Winiarksi, Native American Popular Religion in New
England’s Old Colony, 1670–1770, 15 RELIGION & AM. CULTURE: J. INTERPRETATION 147, 163–64
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on the tribe, there may be special rituals for major life events of individuals
and the community (birth, adoption, coming-of-age, marriage, hunting,
trading, diplomacy, going to war, and death); seasonal practices; daily
prayers; food preparation; modes of dress and appearance; and other
observations.108 In many religions, there are leaders, such as priests,
doctors, medicine women and men, chiefs, caciques and others, who have
responsibility for leading religious practices and training others.109 Today,
traditional tribal religions may be maintained informally or institutionally,
with varying degrees of participation by tribal citizens.
To a very significant extent, traditional religious practices are
undertaken for the collective benefit of the tribe, as much as for any
individual purposes. In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
v. Peterson,110 for example, the district court explained Yurok, Karuk, and
Tolowa traditions: “Medicine women in the tribes travel to the high
country to pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to gather medicines. They
then return to the tribe to administer to the sick the healing power gained in
the high country through ceremonies such as the Brush and Kick
Dances.”111 As the court observed: “The religious power these individuals
acquire in the high country lends meaning to these tribal ceremonies,
thereby enhancing the spiritual welfare of the entire tribal community.”112
Many traditional tribal religious practices work toward this sense of
collective renewal.113 Former Cherokee Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller
explained:
Each year one Cherokee ceremony in a series was conducted
in each settlement for the explicit purpose of rekindling
relationships, requesting forgiveness for inappropriate
conduct during the previous year, and cleansing the minds of
Cherokee people of any negative thoughts towards each other
(2005) (discussing how the Wampanoag communicated with the spirit world through religious
ceremonies in order to heal the sick).
107
Frell M. Owl, Who and What Is an American Indian?, 9 ETHNOHISTORY 265, 281 (1962).
108
See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 561, 577 (2005) (noting that the hunting ceremonies for
the Plains’ Indians were conducted to ensure food and to maintain relationships with the natural world);
Irwin supra, note 106, at 321 (explaining the role of “[g]iveaways, naming ceremonies, feasts, ghost
suppers for the dead, elder councils, [and] spiritual get-togethers,” in the Odawa community); Owl,
supra note 107, at 281 (noting that ceremonies vary from tribe to tribe, and the Sun Dance is a common
seasonal ceremony originated by the Plain Indians).
109
See Owl supra, note 107, at 273 (discussing role of priests, medicine men, singers of tribal
songs, drummers, and dancers in American Indian ceremonies); see also CONST. OF THE IROQUOIS
NATIONS §§ 100–01, 103, available at http://www.indigenouspeople.net/iroqcon.htm (assigning duties
related to the festivals of Thanksgiving to the Lords and appointed managers within the brotherhood).
110
565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
111
Id. at 592 (internal citations omitted).
112
Id. at 591–92.
113
Id. at 591 n.4.
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. . . . The primary goal of prayer is to promote a sense of
oneness and unity.114
These religious values are often inscribed in the tribe’s customs and
laws. The Iroquois Constitution, dating back to the fifteenth-century, for
example, provides an extensive description of the purposes of certain
ceremonies and ascribes to members of the community duties to support
those ceremonies.115 A contemporary Navajo Nation Resolution provides:
This religion, Beauty Way of Life, holds this land sacred and
that we, the Navajo People, must always care for it. Through
this sacred covenant, this sacred ancestral homeland is the
home and hogan of all Navajo people. Further, if the Navajo
left their homelands, all prayers and religion would be
ineffective and lost forever.116
At an even more particular level, the legislative code of the Navajo Nation
identifies, by name, the six sacred mountains of the Navajo Nation and sets
forth a standard of care owed to them by the Navajo people.117 The
significance of these mountains is traceable to the Navajo creation story
and values formative in Navajo culture.
Notwithstanding the ancient origins of many tribal religions, Indians
were often perceived as godless savages to the early Europeans who
encountered them. Indeed, religion was a flashpoint in the conquest and
colonization of North America. From the fourteenth century, monarchs
invoked Christian theology and papal law in justification of their New
World policies, using indigenous “heathenry” as a justification for military
incursions and land seizures, for example.118 At the same time, some
Catholic thinkers argued that Indians were human beings entitled to a
measure of natural law protection from the Spanish, if only the right to be
conquered and converted for their own benefit.119 In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, French and Spanish colonization efforts worked
114

MANKILLER, supra note 78, at 16–17.
CONST.
OF
THE
IROQUOIS
NATIONS
§§
64,
100–03,
available
at
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/iroqcon.htm. I discuss this Constitution extensively in Carpenter,
Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, supra note 30, at 169–
70.
116
Navajo Nation Council Res. CD-107-94 (Dec. 13, 1994).
117
General Provisions, Navajo Nation Code Tit. 1 (1995), § 205 (B)–(D) (identifying six sacred
mountains and Navajo obligations to them).
118
See id. at 59–71 (“Unfortunately for the American Indian, the West’s first steps toward this
noble vision of a Law of Nations contained a mandate for Christian Europe’s subjugation of all peoples
whose radical divergence from European-derived norms of right conduct signified their need for
conquest and remediation.”).
119
See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–19 (2d ed. 2004)
(noting that lead figures in this discussion included Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco Vitoria, who
confirmed the humanity of the Indians of the Western Hemisphere).
115
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closely with churches to establish missions across tribal communities,
while some of the English colonies and colonists isolated Indians in
“praying towns” so they could be instructed away from whites.120
Once the United States gained independence, federal lawmakers
quickly grasped that the eradication of Indian cultures was a key step in
“break[ing] up the tribal mass” and paving the way for political and
geographic domination by states and the federal government.121 At the
same time, policymakers believed that encouraging Indians to “put aside
all savage ways” would help them achieve “salvation” through
Christianity.122 These measures targeted individual Indians and whole
tribes alike. Beginning in 1869, President Grant’s “Peace Policy” provided
contracts to Christian missions, assigning them to reservations and granting
federal funding for the purpose of bringing civilization to the Indians.123
Federally funded boarding schools with a mission to “Kill the Indian in
him and Save the Man”124 targeted the children of traditional Indian
communities for removal from their families and educated them in English,
Christianity, and manual labor skills.125 In 1883, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs distributed a set of “Rules for Indian Courts” that defined as
“Indian [O]ffenses” religious activities, including participation in the Sun
Dance, scalp dance, war dance, and the practice of polygamy.126
Efforts to eradicate Indian religious practices became increasingly
coercive at the turn of the century. In 1890, the U.S. Army shot and killed
300 Lakota people engaged in a revivalist religion called the Ghost
120
See, e.g., COLIN CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE
MAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 75–77 (1997) (discussing fourteen praying towns established by John
Eliot in Massachusetts in the 1660s–1670s); DONALD A. GRINDE & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR
OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 73–91 (1991) (explaining Roger
Williams’s seventeenth century perceptions and activities regarding Narragansett and other Indian
tribal religions).
121
CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 19 (2005),
(quoting President Theodore Roosevelt as imposing assimilation and allotment policies “as a mighty
pulverizing machine to break up the tribal mass”); see Dussias, supra note 40, at 773–805 (describing
assimilation programs that worked directly on religion).
122
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones (Oct. 16, 1902), reprinted in 2
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 724, 727 (1973) [hereinafter Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones].
123
Dussias, supra note 40, at 776–87.
124
DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 52 (1995).
125
See id. at 21–24 (stating that the three aims of Indian education were to provide children with
the rudiments of an academic education, teach individualization over tribal community interests, and
promote Christianization); see generally TIM GIAGO, CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: THE DARK LEGACY OF
INDIAN MISSION BOARDING SCHOOLS (2006) (providing a first-hand account of a student’s experience
at an Indian boarding school); AWAY FROM HOME: AMERICAN INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOL
EXPERIENCES, 1879–2000 (Margaret L. Archuleta et al. eds., 2000) (providing an historical and
pictorial overview of Indian boarding schools in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
126
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 344, 348–49.
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127

Dance.
In 1902, the federal Indian Commissioner issued an order to
reservation-based Indian agents providing: “Indian dances and so-called
Indian feasts should be prohibited. In many cases, these dances and feasts
are simply subterfuges to cover degrading acts and to disguise immoral
purposes. You are directed to use your best efforts in the suppression of
these evils.”128 In 1904, the federal government criminalized Indian
religious dances, making, for example, the practice of the Sun Dance
punishable by ten days in prison or ten days denial of food rations.129
Around the same time, Indian Affairs declared peyote to be a narcotic and
waged an assault on the peyote religion; in 1908 and 1909, for example, an
Indian Affairs “investigator” reported that he had destroyed 176,400
peyote buttons, an act of incredible offense, sacrilege, and waste to the
practitioners for whom it was a holy sacrament.130 Into the 1920s, the
federal government was still issuing directives for agents to suppress
religious ceremonies in the Southwestern Pueblos.131
In response to the federal persecution of Indian religions, some
traditional American Indian religious practitioners went underground,
while some ceased practicing altogether, and still others resisted.132 While
the federal government expressly pursued the extermination of Indian
tribes, as such, officials reported that they had no intention of “interfering
with the Indian’s personal liberty”; instead, they saw their actions, as a
means of removing a “badge of servitude to savage ways and traditions
which are effectual barriers to the uplifting of the race.”133 To the extent
that the First Amendment applied at all to American Indian religions, it
was to uphold the use of treaty payments to fund Christian mission schools

127
See generally JAMES MOONEY, THE GHOST-DANCE RELIGION AND WOUNDED KNEE (1973).
Mooney visited Wounded Knee in December 1890. From interviews with survivors, Mooney
described that as a medicine man blew on his whistle and the Indians convened in their sacred Ghost
Shirts, the army opened fire: “The guns poured in 2-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per
minute, mowing down everything alive . . . . In a few minutes 200 Indian men, women, and children,
with 60 soldiers, were lying dead and wounded on the ground . . . . [T]he pursuit was simply a
massacre, where fleeing women, with infants in their arms, were shot down after resistance had ceased
and when almost every warrior was stretched dead or dying on the ground . . . . Authorities differ as to
the number of Indians present and killed at Wounded Knee [from 340-370 people].” Id. at 869–70.
128
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 725.
129
Dussias, supra note 40, at 800.
130
MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 40.
131
See Dussias, supra note 40, at 803–05 (describing directives requiring, among others,
“attendance at church and Sunday school by all Indian students,” and that “no dances be held in March,
April, June, July, or August”).
132
See, e.g., CHARLOTTE COTE, SPIRITS OF OUR WHALING ANCESTORS: REVITALIZING MAKAH
AND NUU-CHAH-NULTH TRADITIONS 56 (2010) (explaining that, from the 1880s to 1920s,
“[p]otlatching went underground and coastal peoples began holding their ceremonies in secret locations
or found innovative ways to conceal them”).
133
Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 727.
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on reservations against Establishment Clause challenges.
While some support for Indian cultural traditions surfaced in the
1930s, federal policy began to change in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s.135
Inspired both by tribal activism and federal policy changes, tribes
nationwide started to revitalize their political, economic, and cultural
institutions. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon announced a federal
policy in favor of tribal “self-determination,” inspiring dozens of new
statutes and programs to support tribal autonomy over education,
economics, government, and culture.136 The practice of tribal religions was
an important component, particularly in light of historic persecution of
Indian religions described above. In 1978, Congress passed the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), reversing federal policy.
Reflecting the broader aims of the self-determination era, AIRFA
provided:
[I]t shall be the federal policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials and traditional rites.137
Despite AIRFA and the religious revitalization of the selfdetermination era, certain legal and political obstacles still make it difficult
to practice American Indian religions. Through the dark years of Indian
removal, assimilation, and allotment, tribes lost ownership of many of their
sacred sites, which were now slated for development by private or
government owners.138 In 1962, Congress added the golden eagle to the
Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, which prohibits the killing of eagles
and the possession of eagle parts, and has been interpreted to trump even
Indian treaty rights to take eagles on their reservations.139 In 1965, the
134
See Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81–82 (1908) (explaining that a prohibition
against using federal monies for sectarian schools did not apply to use of treaty annuities to fund St.
Francis Mission School on the Rosebud Sioux reservation).
135
See WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS, supra note 121,
at 58–60, 177–89, 263 (detailing federal reports that shed light on the plight of Indians and
recommendations on how to improve their living conditions).
136
See id. at 189–98 (explaining President Nixon’s policies toward Indian affairs and the
programs started by the Office of Economic Opportunity).
137
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
138
See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1061
(“American Indians have been unsuccessful in challenging government actions that harm tribal sacred
sites located on federal public lands.”).
139
See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743–46 (1986) (describing ways in which Congress
tried to control Indian on-reservation hunting of eagles in the early 1960s).

2012]

LIMITING PRINCIPLES AND EMPOWERING PRACTICES

411

federal government, following a number of states, criminalized the
possession of peyote, the plant that serves as the main sacrament of the
NAC.140
Both the eagle and peyote legislation provided certain
exemptions for American Indian religious use.141 Nevertheless, these and
other developments produced a number of lawsuits in which the courts
tried to evaluate Indian religion claims against other competing interests.
III. LIMITING (JUDICIAL) PRINCIPLES
The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”142 In their application of this language, the federal courts have
long struggled to determine the scope of free exercise rights as against
other critical rights and interests. Cases that trigger such concerns include
those in which free exercise claims would infringe on other citizens’ rights
to equal protection, property, or privacy; pose a threat to public safety,
order, or peace; or impede the state’s ability to carry out the business of
government.143
In light of these competing concerns, it is clearly not the case that all
government activities infringing on religion violate the First Amendment.
As a means of sorting the wheat from the chaff, the Supreme Court has
long held that only those activities imposing a “substantial burden” on
religious activity trigger the protections of the Free Exercise Clause, and
even in those cases, the government may demonstrate a “compelling
interest” to sustain the activity.144 The cases giving rise to this test—
Sherbert v. Verner145 and Wisconsin v. Yoder146—also gave rise to various
attempts to discern limiting principles in the American Indian religion
context.147 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that South Carolina
140
In 1965, Congress listed peyote as a Schedule I hallucinogen on the list of controlled
substances under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006). State laws prohibiting
and regulating peyote possession date back to the 1920’s. THOMAS CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, PEYOTE
AND THE YANKTON SIOUX: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SAM NECKLACE 181 (2004).
141
Dion, 476 U.S. at 734; Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2011).
142
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
143
See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 15 (1946) (holding that Congress may
prohibit the transportation of a woman across state lines for the purpose of polygamy); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944) (“There is no denial of equal protection of the laws in
excluding children of a particular sect from [public proclaiming of religion in streets] as is barred also
to all other children.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute requiring adults be vaccinated against certain diseases);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 166 (1878) (holding that Congress has the constitutional power
to prohibit polygamy even if it is part of one’s religion).
144
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
145
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
146
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
147
Contra Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the
Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse supra note 7, at 1671–72 & n.2 (claiming that the argument of
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violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment benefits to
an individual who refused to accept Saturday work in violation of her
Seventh Day Adventist beliefs.148
The Court first assessed the
infringement on Sherbert’s religion:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.149
Such an infringement on religious exercise could only be sustained if
the government showed it had a “compelling state interest” in the
activity.150 The state’s concerns that fraudulent religious objections would
dilute the employment compensation fund or present scheduling problems
were, in the Court’s view, not compelling.151
In Yoder, Amish parents challenged Wisconsin’s compulsory
education rule as incompatible with their religious beliefs.152 To balance
the free exercise claims against the state’s interest, the Court first evaluated
the quality of the Amish claims that the complained of activity would
infringe on religious beliefs.153 While recognizing the “delicate” nature of
the inquiry, the Court looked closely at the sources and tenets of the Amish
religion, observing that “the traditional way of life of the Amish is not
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
living.”154 The “Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice” were
traceable to the community’s “literal interpretation of the Biblical
injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, be not conformed to this
world.”155 As the Court observed, “This command is fundamental to the
Amish faith” and created irreconcilable tensions with the obligation to send
young people to public high school.156 The state law violated the Free
Exercise Clause because it “affirmatively compel[led the Amish], under
leading academics that Yoder and Sherbert controlled Smith ignores a number of other important
precedents).
148
Verner, 374 U.S. at 403–04 (holding that the disqualification for benefits imposes burdens on
the free exercise of religion).
149
Id. at 404.
150
Id. at 406.
151
Id. at 407.
152
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972)
153
Id. at 215.
154
Id. at 215–16.
155
Id. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
Id. at 216–17.
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threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with the
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”157
Following Sherbert and Yoder, federal appellate courts subsequently
cited these passages for the proposition that judges should evaluate the
“quality” of religious claims as a component of the substantial burden
analysis.158 In the American Indian context, the courts interpreted Yoder to
mean the plaintiffs must show the government had infringed upon beliefs
or practices that were central or indispensable to the religion.159 These
were the first limiting principles to apply in Indian religion cases.
A. ”Centrality” as Limiting Principle in Indian Religion Cases:
1964–1986
Two state cases, People v. Woody160 and Frank v. Alaska,161 initially
introduced the concept of centrality into American Indian religious
freedoms analysis.162 The Indians prevailed in both cases, with the courts
showing little of the reluctance to analyze Indian religious practices that
would stymie future claims.163
In Woody, California Supreme Court Justice Tobriner explained: “On
April 28, 1962, a group of Navajos met in an Indian hogan in the desert
near Needles, California, to perform a religious ceremony which included
the use of peyote.”164 Police officers witnessed part of the ceremony and
arrested Jack Woody and other participants who were later convicted of
violating the state’s prohibition on peyote possession.165 Citing Sherbert,
the court first examined whether the state law imposed a burden on
Woody’s exercise of religion.166
The Woody court observed that for members of the NAC, peyote was
believed to embody the Holy Spirit and provide direct contact with God

157

Id. at 218.
See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining
that the test for Free Exercise Clause claims requires the evaluation of the “quality of the claims alleged
to be religious” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159
See id. at 1164 (stating that the plaintiff’s Cherokee religious claims “have fallen short of
demonstrating that worship at the particular geographic location in question is inseparable from the
way of life . . . , the cornerstone of their religious observance . . . , or plays the central role in their
religious ceremonies and practices”).
160
394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
161
604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
162
See Woody, 394 P.2d at 818 (holding a religious group’s use of peyote was protected by the
Constitution because the act was central to their religion); Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072–73 (finding a
religion’s use of moose meat was constitutionally protected because it was central to the faith).
163
Woody, 394 P.2d at 817; Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071–73.
164
Woody, 394 P.2d at 814.
165
Id. at 814–15.
166
Id. at 816.
158
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through its ingestion in sacraments of the religion of the NAC.
Relying
on the parties’ testimony, expert anthropologists and NAC documents, the
court described peyote practices in great detail. From sundown on
Saturday to sunrise on Sunday, NAC members gathered to pray, sing, and
drum, leading eventually to the “central event . . . consist[ing] of the use of
peyote in quantities sufficient to produce a hallucinatory state.”168 At this
point in the ritual, the sponsor passes a ceremonial bag from which most
adults are permitted to take four buttons. Peyote produces feelings of
brotherhood and love among members who revere it as a protector,
teacher, and grandfather.169 The ritual ends with a sunrise prayer and
breakfast and the members depart, suffering “no aftereffects.”170 Even
without written texts, the Court observed, Indians across the United States
and Canada “follow surprisingly similar ritual and theology.”171
Given the evidence, the Woody court concluded that peyote was “more
than a sacrament.”172 NAC members devoted prayers to peyote itself,
much like others did to the Holy Ghost.173 Articles of incorporation for the
NAC of California provided: “[W]e as a people place explicit faith and
hope and belief in the Almighty God . . . . [W]e further pledge ourselves to
work for unity with the sacramental use of peyote and its religious use.”174
In the court’s view, forbidding the use of peyote would “remove the
theological heart of Peyotism.”175 The state law prohibiting possession
amounted to a substantial burden, indeed a “virtual inhibition,” of the
practice of Woody’s religion.176
California, in turn, had failed to establish a compelling interest. The
Attorney General argued the prohibition was necessary to protect Indians
from the physical effects of peyote, the gateway effect to other drugs, and
the “indoctrination of small children,” but failed to substantiate any of
these claims.177 Harkening back to arguments of a previous generation, the
state also claimed peyote would “obstruct[] enlightenment and shackle[]
the Indian to primitive conditions,”178 an argument that the court
167

Id. at 817.
Id. Contemporary accounts by practitioners and scholars alike contest the notion that religious
use of peyote causes hallucinations or visions. See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 83 (discussing how
it is not common for Peyote to cause visions and delusions today, and asserting that the “vision thesis
of earlier scholars has been overstated”).
169
Woody, 394 P.2d at 817–18.
170
Id. at 817.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 815.
175
Id. at 818.
176
Id.
177
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
178
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
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rejected.
In an argument that foreshadowed the institutional concerns raised in
Smith, California complained that the court’s analysis inquired too far “into
the bona fides” of religious belief, an inquiry that the Attorney General
described as “difficult” and “repugnant to the spirit of our law.”180 The
court clarified that it was not intruding into the “truth or validity of
religious beliefs,” which would be disallowed by the First Amendment.181
Rather, it was the job of the court—using the evidence at hand—to
“distinguish between those who would feign faith in an esoteric religion
and those who would honestly follow it.”182 Courts had long made such
judgments in conscientious objector cases, decisions that posed “no undue
burden upon the trier of fact.”183
The Woody court’s description of peyote as “central” and “essential”
arose in its distinction of the case from others where courts had upheld
burdens on religion.184 In Reynolds v. United States,185 for example, the
Court sustained a federal law banning polygamy against challenges by
Mormons who argued their religion required plural marriage.186 The
Woody court wrote that while polygamy was a “basic tenet in the theology
of Mormonism,” it was “not essential to the practice of the religion.”187
Peyote, by contrast, was “the sole means by which [NAC members] are
able to experience their religion.”188
Other centrality cases followed. In Frank, the Alaska Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of an Athabascan Indian who had been found
guilty of violating game laws when he transported a moose, taken out of
state season, for a funeral feast.189 After the death of a young man in the
Athabascan village of Minto, Carlos Frank gathered with twenty-five-tothirty other men from the village, forming a hunting party to take a moose
for the funeral feast or “potlatch.”190 Frank assisted in transporting the
moose to Minto and was arrested for “unlawful transportation of game
illegally taken.”191 Over 200 people attended the potlatch, which was
believed to serve as the last meal shared by the living and the dead, helping
to nourish the spirit of the dead for his journey and to ease the grief of his
179

Id.
Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181
Id. at 821.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 817, 820.
185
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
186
Id. at 166.
187
Woody, 304 P.2d at 820.
188
Id.
189
Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Alaska 1979).
190
Id. at 1069.
191
Id.
180
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family.
The court reviewed testimony by elders and an anthropologist, several
of whom analogized the serving of wild meat at a potlatch to communion
in Catholic mass.193 The court observed: “Native foods comprise almost
all of the foods served at the funeral potlatch. In a culture without many
formal rules this is an absolute requirement.”194 The Frank court found the
“funeral potlatch is the most important institution in Athabascan life” and
that food “is the cornerstone of the ritual.”195 Moreover, “[m]oose is the
centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the
equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions.”196 The evidence made
clear that the serving of moose meat was “deeply rooted” in the
Athabascan religious tradition and that the state law infringed upon that
practice by making it illegal.197
The burden then turned to the State to show a compelling interest in
the hunting laws at issue in Frank. The State immediately turned down a
slippery slope, claiming that if an exemption were allowed in this case,
widespread disobedience would follow in the form of “poaching and creek
robbing, . . . tragic confrontations between recreational hunters and
Athabascans,” and a “downward spiral into anarchy.”198 But the court
wrote that “[j]ustifications founded only on fear and apprehension” could
not overcome First Amendment rights.199 Similarly, the fact “that there
was but one funeral potlatch in Minto in 1975, and that one moose was
needed for it,” undermined the state’s conservation argument.200 There
was no compelling interest in burdening the religious practice.201
Examining Woody and Frank in hindsight, several points are notable.
The two state courts did not shy away from evaluating the nature of the
religious claims based on the evidence provided, even when the
government claimed that such analysis exceeded the judicial role. Further,
the courts were willing to look at the specific parties in their larger
religious and cultural context, assessing what the criminalization of peyote
would mean for the NAC and how the prohibition of moose hunting would
affect Athabascan villagers. With tens of thousands of peyote practitioners
across the country, the peyote case was not just—or even primarily—about
192
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Jack Woody. In this regard, Woody may have been analogous to Yoder in
which the Court protected the “Amish way of life” as a collective, or at
least aggregated the interest against state interference.202 In Frank, the
court situated Carlos Frank’s actions in the Athabascan religion and
experiences of the village of Minto following a young person’s death.203
Frank’s religious obligations to help provide a moose for the funeral arose
from his membership in the native village of Minto and participation in the
Athabascan culture.204 Viewed through the prism of collective interests,
the centrality standard worked relatively well to preserve Indian religious
freedoms in these cases. The federal courts would have a more difficult
time with this standard.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,205 the centrality standard
worked to the tribal religious practitioners’ detriment.206 The Sixth Circuit
reviewed Cherokee Indian claims that a federally funded dam project
would violate the Free Exercise Clause by flooding ancient holy towns,
burial grounds, and medicine gathering sites in the Little Tennessee River
Valley.207 Cherokee medicine men and elders testified that the area was
“the birthplace of the Cherokee” people and the Cherokees’ “connection
with the Great Spirit.”208 Medicine men testified that they went to the
valley several times a year to gather medicine and that flooding the lands
would “destroy the spiritual strength of the Cherokee people.”209 For all of
these reasons, the plaintiffs alleged that the action would result in
“infringement on their right to worship . . . by the destruction of sites
which they hold in reverence and in denial of access to such sites.”210
The task for the court was how to decide whether and to what extent
these claims were actionable under the Free Exercise Clause. Observing
that “[o]rthodoxy is not at issue,” the Sixth Circuit explained that the
Cherokees would not be penalized for their lack of “written creeds” and

202
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 506 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). But see Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987)
(arguing that “individuals, not institutions, are always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and
cases such as Yoder recognize the “aggregated rights” of individuals and not the interests of “the
Amish”).
203
Frank, 604 P.2d at 1074.
204
Id. at 1073; see also id. at 1071–73 (describing and explaining Frank’s role in the Athabascan
funeral customs).
205
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
206
Id. at 1164 (“The claim of centrality of the Valley to the practice of the traditional Cherokee
religion, as required by Yoder, Woody and Frank, is missing from this case.”); see also BRIAN EDWARD
BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
SACRED LAND 9–38 (1999) (discussing the Sequoyah case).
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Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
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Id. at 1162.
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Id.
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Id. at 1160.
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“man-made houses of worship.”
Yet, even accepting the Cherokees’
“sincerity,” the court wrote that it still had to determine whether the
Cherokees had stated a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment
objection to the otherwise legal conduct of the government.212 Citing
Yoder, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the “centrality or indispensabilty” of
each religious practice to the religion.213 Here, the court noted that some of
the religiously significant plants were available elsewhere and some
Cherokees did not know the location of the sacred sites. In a passage that
would presage concerns about geographic limits in future sacred sites
cases, the court said that the plaintiffs “are now claiming that the entire
Valley is sacred” even though “none of the affidavits state[] this
explicitly.”214 Moreover, there was conflicting testimony even among
Cherokees about the area’s significance.215 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the religious claims reflected “‘personal preference’ rather than
convictions ‘shared by an organized group.’”216 This was because under
Yoder, Woody, and Frank, the Cherokees had not shown the threatened
practices and places to be “indispensab[le]” to their way of life, the
“cornerstone” of their religious observance, or “central” to religious
ceremonies.217
Today, of course, the fact pattern in Sequoyah would likely trigger the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, which
provides to tribal governments a right of consultation with respect to the
intentional excavation of American Indian graves on federal lands.218 But
in 1980, the Sixth Circuit struggled to appreciate the tribal nature of the
claims in Sequoyah. The Eastern Band of Cherokees and United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians were named plaintiffs and had tried
to emphasize their collective interests, framing the claim in terms of “all
those present or future Cherokee Indians who practice the traditional
Cherokee religion.”219 The affidavit of religious practitioners Lloyd
Sequoyah, Emmaline Driver, Willie Walkingstick, and Lloyd C. Owle also
made clear that they were not litigating for themselves alone, arguing:
211
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exist as a people. . . . The white man has taken nearly
everything away from us, our heritage, culture, traditions,
and our way of life that is our religion. . . . [A]s the water
backs over the once Cherokee land, our people will feel a
great pain. The earth will cry . . . as water covers this
beautiful, fruitful valley, members of our tribe will be in
silence.220
But the court said “[s]imilar feelings” about places where their
ancestors lived “are shared by most people to a greater or lesser extent.”221
In response to the Cherokee claims that they lost access to their sacred sites
through the treaty and removal process, the court was sympathetic but
ultimately deferred to the United States’s current ownership.222 The
dissenting judge would have remanded to give the Cherokees the
opportunity to brief the centrality standard and, in particular, to develop the
record on “the role that this particular location plays in the Cherokee
religion.”223
In Badoni v. Higginson,224 Navajo medicine men and leaders filed a
claim to prevent further desecration of Navajo gods and sacred areas
caused by recreation at Rainbow Bridge National Monument.225 The
federal district court held the plaintiffs had no cognizable Free Exercise
Clause claim in part because the government’s authority as an owner
outweighed any claims by the Navajo medicine men.226 Without the bright
line of ownership, the Navajos could not differentiate their claims in a way
that the government could be expected to manage. This might “lead to
unauthorized and very troublesome results”:
A person might sincerely believe that he or a predecessor
encountered a profound religious experience in the environs of
what is now the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D. C., and
that experience might cause him to believe that the Lincoln
Memorial is therefore a sacred religious shrine to him. That
person, however, could hardly expect to call upon the courts to
enjoin all other visitors from entering the Lincoln Memorial in
order to protect his constitutional right to religious freedom. 227
In the district court’s view, the plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate
220
BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS, supra note 82, at 15 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
221
Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162–63.
222
Id. at 1162–64.
223
Id. at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
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Id. at 642–43.
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Id. at 647.
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“deep religious conviction[s], shared by an organized group and intimately
related to daily living,” as required by Yoder.228 This was because, in the
court’s view, the few medicine men conducting the religious rites at
Rainbow Bridge were “not recognized by the Navajo Nation as such”; their
training had taken place years ago and was not “tribally organized or
carried out.”229 Additionally, the plaintiffs had only “attended a combined
total of nine religious ceremonies” at the Monument and had done so “only
infrequently prior to 1965.”230 For all of these reasons, the court
concluded:
[T]here is nothing to indicate that at the present time the
Rainbow Bridge National Monument and its environs has
anything approaching deep, religious significance to any
organized group, or has in recent decades been intimately
related to the daily living of any group or individual. Rather,
the record supplied by the plaintiffs is to the contrary.231
The district court decision in Badoni reveals one of the problems with
pitting individual religious practitioners against the federal government in
Indian religion cases: the court may lack sufficient context to assess the
religious practices in the record. Without an appreciation of the ways in
which medicine men served and were recognized by the larger community,
for example, the Badoni court was left to count up Navajo medicine men
who had visited Rainbow Bridge as a measure of the depth and
significance of the religious practice.232 Similarly, by counting visits to
Rainbow Bridge, the court could not seem to understand that the
ceremonies in question were never held periodically (such as once a month
or year), but rather as the needs of an individual or family arose.233
Missing was an assessment of how these practices and beliefs stemmed
from the Navajo creation story, perpetuated Navajo culture and lifeways,
and were critical to helping individuals and the community maintain the
state of hozho that defined the right way of living for Navajos.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajos had presented
religious claims of sufficient quality vis-à-vis Yoder:
228
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Rainbow Bridge and a nearby spring, prayer spot and cave
have held positions of central importance in the religion of
some Navajo people living in that area for at least 100 years.
These shrines are regarded as the incarnate forms of Navajo
gods, which provide protection and rain-giving functions.
For generations Navajo singers have performed ceremonies
near the Bridge and water from the spring has been used for
other ceremonies. Plaintiffs believe that if humans alter the
earth in the area of the Bridge, plaintiffs’ prayers will not be
heard by the gods and their ceremonies will be ineffective to
prevent evil and disease.234
Accepting the Navajo practices at Rainbow Bridge as “central,” the Tenth
Circuit nonetheless agreed that the government’s interests in water levels at
Lake Powell outweighed the religious claims.235 Here the problem was in
the court’s lack of institutional capacity to negotiate the contours of a
negotiation between the Navajo Nation and United States. And the
Navajos lost the case.
B. The Bright Lines of “Objective Coercion” and “Ownership” in Free
Exercise Cases 1986–1993
Not long after Sequoyah and Badoni, the Supreme Court took up two
cases, Bowen and Lyng, which changed the direction of Indian religion
cases dramatically. The lower appellate courts had understood Yoder and
Sherbert to require a “quality” test and applied it by looking for a claim
that was “central” to a religion and then balancing such claim against the
government interests. In Bowen and Lyng, however, the Court made clear
that the judicial role was not to probe the quality of the religious claims at
all—courts were institutionally ill-suited to intrude into the sphere of
religion in this way. As I will argue here, in Bowen and Lyng, the Court
replaced the nuanced “centrality” inquiry with bright lines that made it
even more difficult, if not impossible, for Indian religious plaintiffs to
obtain relief.
In Bowen, Stephen Roy challenged the federal requirement that his
daughter obtain a Social Security number in order to receive welfare
benefits, contending that the assigned number would rob their daughter of
her spirit, in violation of their “Native American religious beliefs.”236
According to Roy, the daughter had been given her name “Little Bird of
the Snow” in a ceremony in which her father and sister buried her placenta
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and a small white bird appeared to them.
Her name became a sacred
aspect of her identity, derived through a spiritual event. In addition, Roy
had related religious concerns, which he attributed to Abenaki Indian
beliefs, about the pervasiveness of technology in identifying human beings.
“[T]he legend of Katahdin” described “great evil” that results from three
related practices: “the widespread use of computers”; the “people’s casual
acceptance” of such use; and the “proliferation of weaponry” relying on
computer technology, which made killing into a “sterile act.”238
Because of these concerns, Roy refused to provide his daughter’s
Social Security number in the application process for benefits through the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. He believed that it
would harm her spirit and the purity necessary for her to become a “holy
person.”239 As a result, the family had been denied benefits of between
thirty-three and sixty-six dollars per month for several years by the time of
the trial.240 Roy argued that this government action violated the Free
Exercise Clause by forcing them to choose between observing a
requirement of their faith and receiving a government benefit (not unlike,
of course, the claims in Sherbert).241
At trial, the government argued that Roy’s beliefs were not “religious”
in nature on grounds that these beliefs were generically Native American
(versus Abenaki), philosophical, and irrational.242 Yet, the court saw no
reason why a belief had to be traceable to one tribe and cited to the
testimony on the religious aspect of the Katahdin tradition.243 The court
also noted that religious beliefs did not have to be rational to be actionable
under the First Amendment. Thus, the district court enjoined the
government both from denying benefits to the Roys and from using their
daughter’s Social Security number until she turned sixteen, at which time
the government indicated that it would have even greater concern about
identifying her.244
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Free Exercise Clause did
not compel the government to conform its conduct to the religious
preferences of citizens.245 While the Supreme Court formally accepted the
sincerity of Roy’s claims, everything about the opinion projected
skepticism. Whereas the district court had noted Roy’s Abenaki family
lineage and described the religious beliefs in that context, the Supreme
237
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Court emphasized that Roy had only “recently” developed his religious
objection to Social Security numbers through “recent” conversations with
an Abenaki chief.246 Similarly, when it came time to “determin[e] the
breadth of Roy’s religious concerns,”247 the Court was skeptical about his
reliability. Roy had originally testified that his daughter’s spirit would be
robbed if she were issued a Social Security number. But when new
evidence at trial revealed that the government had already issued her a
number, Roy seemed to change his tune. He testified that Little Bird’s
spirit was not actually robbed yet, but would be robbed by “widespread
use” of the number.248
Roy’s changing position heightened the Court’s usual concerns about
the slippery slope. As the majority wrote: “It is readily apparent that
virtually every action that the Government takes, no matter how innocuous
it might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection.”249
For example, “someone might raise a religious objection, based on Norse
mythology, to filing a tax return on a Wednesday (Woden’s day).”250 The
Court was unconvinced that the government would have to accommodate
beliefs of this nature, writing: “Roy may no more prevail on his religious
objection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number for his
daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color
of the Government’s filing cabinets.”251
Bowen stands for a clear bright line position: religious believers cannot
compel the government to do anything under the First Amendment. To
this end, the Court wrote that Yoder was not a suitable test to apply to “the
enforcement of facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for
the administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of
people.”252 In hindsight, the Court was on a path toward articulating what
it would say even more emphatically in Smith—that the substantial
burden–compelling interest test does not apply to neutral statutes of
general applicability. Thus, the Court’s skepticism about Roy’s claims,
which it repeatedly described as “recent” and “unique,” may have been
246
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only window dressing. The case may have come out the same way even if
the Roys had more effectively articulated limits on the claims and remedies
they sought.
That said, it is also true that the Roys’ religious beliefs were not deeply
articulated in terms of a tribal religion. The Abenakis are an ancient tribe
with aboriginal lands in Vermont and New Hampshire, and treaties dating
back to the 1700s.253 Nevertheless, the Abenakis are not federally
recognized and were not a party or amicus in the Bowen case. And there is
little to suggest that Abenakis generally oppose Social Security numbers on
religious grounds. While one Abenaki elder testified in the case, the brief
of the National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) pointed out that
the Social Security Administration had failed to consult with tribal
leaders.254 As Walter Echo-Hawk has argued, “Bowen does not involve
recognizable tribal religious beliefs. It involved an offbeat idiosyncratic
religious belief . . . that was only incidentally described as Native
American.”255 Despite the lack of agency consultation or a tribal presence
in the litigation, Bowen has come to stand for the proposition that
American Indian religious claims may generally be too broad or
idiosyncratic for the government to accommodate as a matter of right
under the First Amendment.256 This reasoning would prevail in Lyng.
In Lyng, American Indian religious practitioners sued the United States
Forest Service alleging that its plans to build a logging road through sacred
sites would violate the Free Exercise Clause.257 The Yurok, Karuk, and
Tolowa tribes knew the mountainous area as the “High Country,” a sacred
space inhabited by spiritual ancestors where religious leaders went to
gather medicine, engage in prayer, and otherwise prepare for tribal
ceremonies.258 These activities, conducted by a small number of religious
leaders or “doctors,” were necessary precursors to various religious dances
undertaken by the tribal people in their villages.259 These dances along
with other religious duties comprised some of the tribal “cultural
covenants”—set forth in the creation stories—designating the various
responsibilities of human beings and the natural world to each other that
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would keep the world in balance.
While the High Country was located in the tribes’ aboriginal territory,
it was not included in their reservations and, by the time of the case, was
owned by the United States and managed by the Forest Service.261 A Draft
Environmental Statement was released by the Forest Service in 1974 which
outlined possible land use plans for the “Blue Creek Unit” of the Six
Rivers National Forest in Northern California.262 The proposal ultimately
called for “harvesting 733 million board feet of timber over the course of
80 years and required construction of 200 miles of logging roads in the
areas adjacent to Chimney Rock.”263 Each day, an estimated seventy-six
logging vehicles, as well as ninety-two other vehicles, would travel
through the Chimney Rock area. In support of this activity, the
government proposed constructing a new road to connect the towns of
Gasquet and Orleans (“G-O road”).” This road would cut through the
High Country. 264
When Indians raised concerns about possible damage to sacred sites,
the Forest Service commissioned an expert study, which found the entire
area to be “significant as an integral and indispensable part of Indian
religious conceptualization and practice.”265 The Theodoratus Report went
on to explain that specific sites are used for certain rituals, and “successful
use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of
the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence,
and an undisturbed natural setting.”266 Because constructing a road along
any of the available routes “would cause serious and irreparable damage to
the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief
systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples,” the
Theodoratus Report recommended that the G-O road not be completed.267
Despite the findings and recommendations of its own experts, the
Forest Service selected the logging and road plan described above. It did
try to avoid certain sacred sites in selecting the route for the road and
called for a half-mile buffer around sites identified in the Theodoratus
Report.268 Yet, the Forest Service rejected alternatives that would have
260
See id. at 494–95 (discussing the “cultural covenants,” and how “[e]ach had a purpose in the
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avoided certain sacred sites, such as Chimney Rock, altogether because
they required the purchase of private land, had soil stability problems, and
would still have disturbed other Indian cultural sites.269
The Indian plaintiffs sued, alleging that the completion of the road
would violate the Free Exercise Clause by degrading the sacred qualities of
the high country and impeding its use for religious purposes.270 More
specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the visibility of the road, the noise
associated with it, and the resulting environmental damage would all
“erode the religious significance of the area” and “impair the success of
religious and medicinal” activities.271 The Indians were represented by six
named religious practitioners and the Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, a non-profit corporation created to represent the
tribal interests in grave protection and other religious matters. The Yurok,
Karuk, and Tolowa tribes did not appear as parties, possibly because they
were not federally recognized and did not have well-developed
governmental infrastructures at the time.272 While the Indian communities
coordinated their efforts and worked closely with their attorneys at
California Indian Legal Services, they did not have the resources or
organization that they have today. For example, in 1993, the Yurok Tribe
adopted a constitution that sets forth its religious laws and cultural
covenants, a legal instrument that was unavailable to lawyers at the time of
the Lyng case.273 Moreover, the Yurok Tribe has since developed
considerable expertise in negotiating with federal agencies regarding land
use disputes.
Despite the lack of formal tribal resources, the Yurok, Tolowa, and
Karuk religious practitioners participated actively in the trial. Their
testimony relied on oral tradition and it was very persuasive.274 The
district court looked to Sherbert, Yoder, Sequoyah, and Badoni to evaluate
whether the Indians had shown a substantial burden on their religion.
Distinguishing Sequoyah, the district court observed that here, the Indians
had demonstrated that the area was indispensable and central to the
practice of religion, and that the government use would seriously interfere
269
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 443 (1988) (stating that the
Forest Service decided not to adopt the recommendations).
270
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See Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592–95 (finding that Sherbert and Yoder “support the conclusion
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therewith.
The court stated, “The Forest Service’s own study concluded
that intrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high country are . . .
potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest Indian religious
beliefs and practices.”276
These included preparation for “‘World
Renewal’ ceremonies, such as the White Deerskin and Jump Dances,
which constitute the heart of the Northwest Indian religious belief
system.”277 Citing Yoder and Sherbert, the Court concluded that the Forest
Service’s actions in the High Country would “impose an unlawful burden”
on the Indians’ religion.278 Moreover, the government interests in the sixmile road project were not demonstrably “compelling.”279 Having failed
the Free Exercise Clause test, the government’s plan to build a road
through the sacred high country was struck down.280
The Ninth Circuit heard the Lyng case twice, initially on direct appeal
in 1985,281 and again on rehearing in 1986.282 Both times, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the road construction and
timber harvesting would impermissibly burden the Tolowa, Yurok, and
Karuk peoples’ religious freedoms.283 Judge Canby reviewed and upheld
the district court’s findings that the G-O road would substantially infringe
the Indians’ religion.284 On the compelling governmental interest prong, he
went somewhat further than the district court, observing that the
government “makes little attempt to demonstrate that compelling
275

275
See id. at 595 (“Unlike the present case, plaintiffs in Sequoyah did not claim that the area
threatened with flooding played a central role in the practice of their religion, and in fact failed to
demonstrate that there had been significant past use of the area for religious purposes.” (internal
citation omitted)).
276
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
277
Id. at 594.
278
See id. at 595 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to the court’s
finding in Sherbert that there was an unlawful burden on the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion even
though it constituted the denial of a benefit or privilege and was only an indirect result of welfare
legislation within the State’s general competence to exist).
279
According to the court, the available timber in the Blue Creek Unit was too small to affect
timber supplies and the timber industry would not suffer significantly without the project. Even if the
government could demonstrate a compelling public interest, the court held that there were “means less
restrictive of [the Indians’] First Amendment rights” than the government’s proposed management plan
for Blue Creek Unit. Id. at 596.
280
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595–96. The district court also decided claims under the
Establishment Clause and numerous federal statutes. Id. at 597–98.
281
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d
sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
282
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
283
See Peterson, 764 F.2d at 585–86 (“[The Ninth Circuit’s] finding is sufficient to support the
district court’s conclusion that the proposed operations would interfere with the Indian plaintiffs’ free
exercise rights. . . . We also reject the government’s argument that the free exercise clause cannot be
violated unless the governmental activity in question penalizes religious beliefs or practices.”);
Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692–94 (explaining that the court agrees with the district court’s conclusion that
“the proposed operations would interfere with the Indian plaintiffs’ free exercise rights”).
284
Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693.
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governmental interests . . . require the completion of the paved G-O road or
the logging of the high country.”285 The evidence did not justify the
infringement of Indian religious freedoms.286
By the time Lyng reached the Supreme Court, however, the newly
issued Bowen opinion had changed the analysis altogether. At oral
argument, the government urged that “[a] believer’s conclusion that
government action impacts adversely [on] his belief system is not by itself
sufficient to trigger constitutional protection, and that was really the
holding of this Court joined by eight members in Bowen v. Roy.”287 And
further, “the Government need not make any concessions whatever to the
interests of the Indians in this case.”288 Here, the government took Bowen
one step further, arguing in this case that it was not merely the
government’s management of internal affairs, but rights over its own
property at stake. In this regard, a new limiting principle was emerging:
the principle of ownership. As the Court put it: “Whatever rights the
Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest
the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”289
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, it was thus in Lyng that
ownership became an effective ban on Indian free exercise claims
involving the public lands.290 In my view, the Court announced this near
absolute rule in response to fears about the scope of the Indians claims on
federal property. The line of question occupied much of the discussion at
oral argument, where the Justices questioned the size of the contested area
and the extent to which the Indians were trying to exclude others from it.291
The opening question to the Indians’ attorney was “how many square miles
or square feet there are involved?”292 She answered, “admittedly it’s a
large area,” and then tried to direct the Justices’ attention to the location
“where the conduct is occurring”—namely the six-mile road segment. 293
In response to questioning, Miles explained that the Indians were not trying
to exclude Forest Service rangers, campers, hunters, motorcycles, jeeps,
285

Id. at 695.
Id.
287
Oral Argument, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (No. 86-1013)
(1988), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1013#argument [hereinafter
Oral Argument, Lyng].
288
Id.
289
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
290
See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1084–85
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng, and how the decision “cleared up the role of
ownership”).
291
See Oral Argument, Lyng, supra note 287 (“Not all religious practices have to be conducted at
the particular site, and, so, it would not interfere with the Government’s proposal at all unless you
could show that, and not all land projects are going to seriously interfere with it.”).
292
Id.
293
Id.
286
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backpackers, Mormons, or the Boy scouts from the contested area.
One
Justice asked whether “the claim could be made in the future, that any use,
including that [use] by other non-Indians, of the Forest Service land would
constitute a sufficient burden that it must be prohibited.”295 Miles
responded that no applicable precedent would support such a claim, but the
Justice’s question signaled where the Court was going: it could not discern
any workable limits on the Indians’ claims.
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, holding that the Indians had no Free Exercise Clause claim. 296
The majority reasoned that Lyng was indistinguishable from Bowen,
writing, “In both cases, the challenged Government action would interfere
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment
according to their own religious beliefs.”297
The majority was unwilling to use the “centrality” test to distinguish
Lyng from Bowen.298 The dissent had advocated such an approach as a
means of “balancing” the interests at stake and thereby addressing a “stress
point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures.”299 But
the majority disagreed that the Court should act as the “arbiter” in
determining which public lands are central to which religions and which
government programs were sufficiently compelling to justify burdening
those practices.300 This would require the Court to “weigh the value of
every religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any
government program” and, in some cases, hold that “some sincerely held
religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite
protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the
lawsuit.”301 Such an approach would, in the majority’s view, “cast the
Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.”302
To Justice O’Connor, the facts of Lyng illustrated exactly why, beyond
the institutional issues, a nuanced approach would be difficult. As she
wrote: “government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy
every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”303 Stating that “[o]ne need not
look far beyond the present case”304 to see why this was true, the Court
then proceeded with a set of speculations going far beyond the actual Lyng
294

Id.
Id.
296
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 440–41 (1988).
297
Id. at 449.
298
Id. at 457–58.
299
Id. at 473–74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
300
Id. at 457.
301
Id.
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Id. at 458.
303
Id. at 452.
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Id.
295

430

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:387

case:
Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious
servitude that they are now seeking to impose on the
Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. While
defending an injunction against logging operations and the
construction of a road, they apparently do not at present
object to the area’s being used by recreational visitors, other
Indians, or forest rangers. Nothing in the principle for which
they contend, however, would distinguish this case from
another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious
objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their
own from sacred areas of the public lands. The Indian
respondents insist that “[p]rivacy during the power quests is
required for the practitioners to maintain the purity needed
for a successful journey.”
Similarly: “The practices
conducted in the high country entail intense meditation and
require the practitioner to achieve a profound awareness of
the natural environment. Prayer seats are oriented so there is
an unobstructed view, and the practitioner must be
surrounded by undisturbed naturalness.” No disrespect for
these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some
rather spacious tracts of public property. Even without
anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government’s
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian
religion, would in this case be far from trivial: the District
Court’s order permanently forbade commercial timber
harvesting, or the construction of a two-lane road, anywhere
within an area covering a full 27 sections (i.e. more than
17,000 acres) of public land.305
The upshot was that the government could not function if it might be
forced to accommodate uses of this inscrutably broad nature. A bright line
approach was preferable. Lyng was like Bowen in that in neither case had
the government “coerce[d] individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs” by imposing a penalty or denying a benefit, as in Yoder
and Sherbert.306 Coercion became the new bright line. The Court held
“incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more
difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [cannot] require

305
306

Id. at 452–53 (citations omitted).
Id. at 450–51.
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government to bring forward a compelling justification.”
The Indian
plaintiffs’ claim was not actionable under the Free Exercise Clause.308
The plaintiffs in Lyng were devastated, fearing that their spiritual
center of the Yurok universe would be destroyed, and not understanding
why the First Amendment did not protect their religious freedom. 309 Two
years later, Congress passed legislation effectively designating the High
Country as a wilderness area where no further road construction could
occur.310 The six-mile segment was never built (suggesting that the result
sought by the Indians did not actually cause government to grind to a
halt).311 Some commentators argue that this was the correct result, leaving
it up to Congress and the Executive Branch to protect religions on a caseby-case basis.312 Others criticize Lyng for narrowing free exercise rights
and broadening the government’s powers as an owner to the extent of
immunizing the destruction of Indian religious practices on the federal
lands.313 In any event, it is clear that Lyng advanced some limiting
principles on religious liberty: in order to show a “substantial burden,” free
exercise claimants must demonstrate that the government has “coerced
religious belief” or “denied a benefit” and that the government’s
management of its land will not typically violate the Free Exercise Clause.
C. The Ultimate Limit: Neutral Statutes of General Applicability
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,314
307

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 231.
309
See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 526 (“When the Lyng opinion hit the banks of the
Klamath River, the tribal communities were shocked, devastated, and despondent.”).
310
Smith River National Recreation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 101-612, 104 Stat. 3209 (1990)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460bbb (2006)).
311
See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 527.
312
See Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1629 (2004) (“In foreclosing
judicial protection, the Lyng Court shut off one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested
another, more feasible method in its place—agency accommodation.”). Cf. Zoë Robinson,
Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for
Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 133, 162–64 (2011) (hypothesizing “that a person’s
religious freedom is dependent on their political power” or their ability to secure legislative
accommodation for religious practices).
313
See, e.g., Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at
1062–67 (outlining the Lyng decision and critiquing its implication that the government is a property
owner with an almost absolute right to exploit federal lands, even where detrimental to Indians’ sacred
sites); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association:
Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 504–06,
510–11 (1989) (criticizing Lyng’s analysis and narrowing of free exercise rights); see also Peggy
Healy, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: A Form-Over-Effect
Standard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 171, 171 (1988) (“The [Lyng] decision, if
adhered to in future cases, portends a more restrictive interpretation of the free exercise clause, with
profound implications for all religious groups.”).
314
494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
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the case that would ultimately inspire the enactment of RFRA. In Smith,
the Supreme Court rejected the Free Exercise Clause claims of two
individuals who were deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits after
being fired from their jobs for having ingested peyote in ceremonies of the
NAC.315 The significance of peyote as a religious sacrament has been
described above in Woody.
Some states had been regulating peyote since the 1920s, and the
federal government put peyote on its list of controlled substances in 1967,
which made it illegal to possess the plant, with regulatory exceptions for
“nondrug use of peyote in bona fide ceremonies of the Native American
Church.”316 States remained free to legislate without religious exemptions
for Native Americans. Oregon prohibited the knowing or intentional
possession of any controlled substance including peyote, and persons who
violated the prohibition were guilty of a Class B felony. 317
In 1983, Al Smith, a Klamath Indian, and Galen Black, a non-Indian,
were fired from their jobs for religious use of peyote in ceremonies of the
NAC. The state employment division determined that they had been fired
for “misconduct” and were thus ineligible for benefits.318 Finding that the
state law made no exception for religious use of peyote, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause
and that the State of Oregon could not deny Smith and Black benefits for
this reason.319
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Free Exercise
Clause neither prohibited Oregon from applying its drug laws to
ceremonial ingestion of peyote nor stopped the state from denying
claimants unemployment compensation for work-related “misconduct”
based on use of peyote.320 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that
states need not grant religious exemptions to neutral statutes of general
applicability such as this one.321 As in recent cases rejecting religious
claims for tax exemptions, the Court held there was no religious
entitlement to an exemption from government programs.322
The Court found the Smith facts akin to Lyng and Bowen, in which a
religious claimant could not interfere with the government’s management
of its own affairs.
By contrast, Sherbert and Yoder were unhelpful
315

Id. at 872.
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2007).
317
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
318
Id. at 874.
319
For an engaging treatment of the case, including coverage of the judicial decisions, contextual
information on the parties and lawyers, and insight into the political dealings behind the litigation, see
generally GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001).
320
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
321
Id. at 883–84.
322
Id. at 880 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982)).
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according to the majority because Sherbert was confined to the
unemployment benefit context323 and Yoder was a “hybrid” case based as
much on the parents’ fundamental interests in raising their children as in
their free exercise rights.324 Additionally, the religious plaintiffs’ conduct
was not criminally prohibited in either Sherbert or Yoder.
Concurring, Justice O’Connor would have found a substantial burden
here on grounds that the state’s interest in enforcing the peyote prohibition
in Smith was unlike the government’s management of its own affairs in
Bowen or Lyng.325 Justice Scalia disagreed that drug regulation was
meaningfully different from Social Security Administration or public lands
management, writing that the government interest was paramount in
each.326 While Justice O’Connor tried unsuccessfully to distinguish these,
she concurred in the judgment upholding the Oregon laws on grounds that
the state had a compelling interest in regulating drug possession.327
Justices Scalia and O’Connor agreed that the Court should not protect
peyote possession because of its “centrality” to the NAC religion.328 State
courts had recognized peyote as the main sacrament in the NAC and thus
recognized it as central and indispensable to the religion. But the Supreme
Court had already rejected the centrality analysis as institutionally
inappropriate for the judiciary in Lyng, a point that Justice Scalia reiterated
in the majority opinion.329 With centrality off the table, however, the Smith
Court had no way to distinguish claims to peyote from any other
religiously motivated claim to drugs. With the compelling interest test also
off the table, the majority also could not distinguish the government’s
interest in regulating religious use of peyote from any other drug use.
Citing Lyng, Justice Scalia conceded negative impacts on the Indian
religion. In his view, the disfavoring of minority religions was an
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government,” which could only
be remedied by the political process.330
323

Id. at 882–84.
Id. at 881–82.
325
Id. at 885 n.2.
326
See id. (“[I]t is hard to see any reason . . . why the government should have to tailor its health
and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not have to tailor its
management of public lands, or its administration of welfare programs.” (citations omitted)).
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Id. at 907 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
328
See id. at 885 (“The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct . . . ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector’s spiritual development.’” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988))).
329
See id. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court today gives no convincing reason to
depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of
general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a
person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws
aimed at religion.”).
330
Id. at 890 (majority opinion).
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Justice Blackmun’s dissent took the majority to task on precisely these
grounds, writing that the case could not be about the state’s general interest
in fighting the war on drugs or even its general interests in protecting
citizens from the health and safety harms of illegal drugs. To meet the
compelling interest test, a state’s interest in burdening religious activity
had to be more than merely abstract or speculative and, indeed, must be
supported by evidence.331 Here, the state had only once in its history
prosecuted an individual for peyote possession and had presented no
evidence that the religious use of peyote harmed anyone. In most of the
preceding peyote cases from other jurisdictions, the courts had rejected (or
the prosecutors had conceded) that religious use of peyote was not
harmful.332
The dissent cited many factors tending to show how the NAC itself
regulated and limited the religious practice. First, “[t]he carefully
circumscribed ritual context” in which Smith and Black used peyote was
“far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of
unlawful drugs.”333 The NAC itself places “internal restrictions” on and
engages in “supervision of, its members’ use of [religious] peyote,” which
in the dissent’s view, “obviate[d] the State’s health and safety concerns”
and distinguished the NAC from groups that claimed a religious exemption
to smoke marijuana all day.334 The federal Drug Enforcement Agency
(“DEA”) itself had recognized that the NAC strictly limited peyote use to
ceremonies under the direction of a church leader, and maintained an
absolute prohibition on use, sale, or possession for any non-sacramental
purpose.335 The Church’s own doctrine forbids non-religious use of
peyote.336 Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs,
331

Id. at 911–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 912 (“[T]he State failed to prove that the quantities of peyote used in the sacraments of
the Native American Church are sufficiently harmful to the health and welfare of the participants so as
to permit a legitimate intrusion under the State’s police power.” (quoting State v. Whittingham, 504
P.2d 950, 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973))); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1964) (“[A]s the
Attorney General . . . admits, . . . the opinion of scientists and other experts is that peyote . . . works no
permanent deleterious injury to the Indian.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
334
Id.
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Id. at 913–15 (citing Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1467 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“[The DEA] finds that . . . the Native American Church’s use of peyote is isolated to specific
ceremonial occasions, [and so] an accommodation can be made for a religious organization which uses
peyote in circumscribed ceremonies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1464 (holding that
“for members of the Native American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious”);
ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION 148 (3d ed. 1981) (“[P]eyote is seldom abused by
members of the Native American Church.”); J.S. Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE
AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 96, 104 (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock
eds., 1975) (“[T]he Native American Church . . . refuses to permit the presence of curiosity seekers at
its rites, and vigorously opposes the sale or use of Peyote for non-sacramental purposes.”).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the NAC’s spiritual code—with its emphasis on brotherly love, selfreliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol—
”exemplifies values that Oregon’s drug laws are presumably intended to
foster.”337 Justice Blackmun pointed out that “[t]he use of peyote is, to
some degree, self-limiting”338 because it may cause vomiting and “other
unpleasant physical manifestations” discouraging casual use.339 For all of
these reasons, peyote was unlikely to become anyone’s recreational drug of
choice.340 Numerous sources attested to the lack of peyote abuse or
trafficking either by NAC members or the general population.341
Finally, the dissent responded to the state’s fears that “if it grants an
exemption for religious peyote use, a flood of other claims to religious
exemptions will follow.”342 This was, of course, a classic appeal to the
slippery slope. As the dissent pointed out, this argument was not
persuasive here. 343 The federal government and almost half of the states
had a peyote exception and had not been deluged by other claims to
religious exemptions.344 Moreover, granting a religious exemption to
religious users of peyote would not, as the majority suggested, obligate the
state to allow religious claims to smoke marijuana “all day” or to use
heroin.345 The drugs had been proven harmful and trafficked illegally, and
as Justice Blackmun said, there was no religious institution or tenet
limiting the drug use in those cases.346
Allowing Oregon to “constitutionally prosecute . . . this act of
worship” was particularly unfortunate, according to Justice Blackmun, in
light of the government’s recent reversal of its centuries’ old policies and
practices of persecuting Indian religions.347 While Justice Blackmun was a
dissenting view on the Court, developments following the decision would
suggest that his views in favor of recognizing American Indian religious
freedoms would prevail in the political process.
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IV. EMPOWERING (ADMINISTRATIVE) PRACTICES
The Smith and Lyng opinions struck many American Indians as
heartless and unjust.348 They could not understand why their religious
practices should be exempt from the protections of the First Amendment.
As the dissenting opinion in Smith indicated, these decisions also seemed
like a throwback to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when federal
and state lawmakers were actively persecuting American Indian religions
as part of a policy in favor of American Indian cultural assimilation.349 Yet
dicta in both Lyng and Smith offered the suggestion of a new way forward:
legislative and administrative accommodation of Indian religions. As
Justice O’Connor wrote in Lyng:
Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage
governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any
citizen. The Government’s rights to the use of its own land
. . . need not and should not discourage it from
accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by
the Indian respondents.350
In Smith, Justice Scalia admitted that the legislative process might leave
minority religious practitioners at “a relative disadvantage,” but that was
an unavoidable consequence of democratic government that must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself and in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all beliefs. Still he suggested: “[A] society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of
that value in its legislation as well.”351
Few American Indians would have predicted governmental sensitivity
or solicitude following these decisions. And yet, in the post-Bowen-LyngSmith era, Congress passed a number of statutes calling for the
accommodation of American Indian religious freedoms. Enactments and
amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, National
Historic Preservation Act, Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle Protection Act,
and Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act now make it
federal policy to preserve and accommodate the traditional religions of

348
See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 525 (noting American Indians’ reaction to and
criticism of Lyng decision).
349
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 920 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Oregon’s attitude toward
respondents’ religious peyote use harkens back to the repressive federal policies pursued a century ago:
In the government’s view, traditional practices were not only morally degrading, but unhealthy. Indians
are fond of gatherings of every description, a 1913 public health study complained, advocating the
restriction of dances and ‘sings’ to stem contagious diseases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
350
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 453–54 (1988).
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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American Indians.
These statutes delegate to agencies, including the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Forest Service, Park Service, Army Corps of
Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife Service, the obligation to manage
resources—such as sacred sites, eagle feathers, burial grounds, and peyote
plants—which are vital to American Indian religion.353
Two things are critical about the post-Lyng and post-Smith laws. First,
Congress explicitly created an institutionally appropriate framework for the
accommodation of Indian religious claims, giving federal agencies
delegated authority to become experts in the religious questions that so
stymied the courts in earlier cases. This first point is elaborated in detailed
discussion below about the agency process in sacred sites, eagle feathers,
burial grounds and human remains, and peyote matters.
Second, Congress explicitly referenced the rights of tribes as an aspect
of its interest in accommodating Indian religious freedoms and placed in
tribal governments the opportunity and responsibility to engage with the
United States in religious accommodations. As I have suggested above, a
revealing and understudied aspect of Bowen, Lyng, and Smith is that none
of these cases involved tribes as parties. Also described above, few of the
tribes potentially implicated in Bowen or Lyng were federally recognized at
the time of the cases. In Smith, neither the NAC nor the Klamath Tribes
were parties. In fact, the history of the Smith case suggests that the NAC,
as an organization, was actually leery of the case.354 The Klamath Tribe,
which had signed treaties with the United States in the 1850s, had been
“terminated” by the government in 1954, only to be restored in 1986, a few
years before Smith. It is probably not coincidental that all three of these
cases started in the 1980s—just when the federal government was
beginning to recognize tribal self-determination, but before the tribes had
gathered significant political, financial, and organizational strength as
governments.355
Additionally, of course, First Amendment litigation has classically
been framed in terms of individual rights, making it unclear what role
tribes have to play in religious freedoms jurisprudence. Religious legal
theory work in the post-Smith era has evaluated collective rights and
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See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668b (2006) (stating that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
enter into cooperative agreements with State fish and wildlife agencies or other appropriate State
authorities to facilitate enforcement of [The Bald and Gold Eagles Protection Act]”).
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never heard of Al Smith . . . .” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
355
See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 502–33 (linking Yurok participation in Lyng to the
emergence of tribal self-determination).
353
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interests by conceptualizing individual practitioners in the aggregate,356 as
minority faiths,357 associational groups,358 enclave communities,359 and
cultural interests.360 Some scholars suggest that the modern realities of
multiculturalism and pluralistic interests in religion and culture are
chipping away at the classic foundation of individual rights.361 From this
literature, there are many useful themes for comparison with the American
Indian situation, such as the social exclusion of minority groups,362 counter

356
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1397, 1411 (2003) (“However discrete or insular minority sects might be one by one, crossreligious alliances are possible, and the political lobbying power of religious interests in the aggregate
makes up for any sect’s weakness operating alone.”); see also Ira Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and
Religious Institutions, supra note 199, at 422 & n.119 (1987) (arguing that “individuals, not
institutions, are always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and cases such as Yoder recognize
the “aggregated interests” of individuals and not the interests of “the Amish”).
357
See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919, 923 (2004) (“[T]he protection and equal status of minority faiths and adherents is a significant
purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole or conclusive one.”); see also Stephen M. Feldman,
Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 222, 224 (2003) (“[H]istory reveals that . . . the First Amendment often has failed to provide
equal liberty to religious minorities.”); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look
at Free Exercise Laws Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153,
160 (1996) (“The continuing increase in religious minorities suggests that more than ever courts must
appreciate religious minority perspectives to ensure that the law evolves concurrently with our
country’s changing religious landscape.”); Rosalie B. Levinson, The Dark Side of Federalism in the
Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 55 (1998) (“[T]he whole
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects, such as religious liberty, from the will of
the majority.”); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for
Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 501 (1998) (stating that minority religious group
interests are not always represented in public policy decisions); David E. Steinberg, Religious
Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 78 (1991) (“[J]ust as the Court has allowed the
use of racial classifications to benefit racial minorities, the Court should also authorize the use of
religious exemptions to accommodate members of minority religious groups.”).
358
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 522 (2007) (asserting that religious institutions are
more than voluntary associations).
359
See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet: A Religious Group’s Quest for Its Own Public School, in LAW AND RELIGION: CASES IN
CONTEXT 203, 207 (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010) (discussing formation of Satmar Jewish enclave in
Monroe Township).
360
See, e.g., András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2401, 2417 (2009) (describing scholars who discuss “the role of religions in the
national culture, and propose a rethinking of the constitutional role of religions in constitutional law by
granting recognition to religion as culture”).
361
There is a very rich literature on this topic, which I can only begin to hint at here. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).
362
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 282–86 (1997) (providing examples of the social
exclusion of minority religious groups).
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363

majoritarian challenges of the political process, and the enduring power,
not always benign, of religious institutions.364 Cases considering the
illiberal beliefs of certain religious groups,365 jurisdictional claims of
religious enclave communities,366 and desire of religious bodies to enjoy a
protected sphere of authority367 are all highly resonant with the Indian
cases and may suggest new directions for advocacy.
One line of analysis suggests some intersection between the uncertain
role of tribes in religious freedoms jurisprudence and the courts’ reluctance
to probe the limits of Indian religious claims. In several cases, courts have
begun to conceptualize the rights of religious institutions through a theory
of “church autonomy”368 in which judges defer, to some extent, to religious
decisions about clergy hiring, theological disputes, and distribution of
property.369 Professor Richard Garnett has suggested a conception of
institutional religious rights as a matter of constitutional interpretation, in
which:
“[S]eparation of church and state” would seem to denote a
structural arrangement involving institutions, a constitutional
order in which the institutions of religion . . . are distinct
from, other than, and meaningfully independent of, the
institutions of government. What is “at stake,” then, with
separation is not so much—or, not only—the perceptions,
363
See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE
END OF SECULAR POLITICS 157 (2007) (“Secularists tend to overlook the importance of religion and its
historical role in American public life.”).
364
See Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory:
Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 227–30 (2007)
(asserting that child sex abuse is often covered up by the church, and clergymen are shielded by the
“ministerial exception”).
365
See, e.g., Ofrit Liviatan, Faith in the Law—The Role of Legal Arrangements in Religion-Based
Conflicts Involving Minorities, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (2011) (stating that religious
minorities’ liberty is infringed by illiberal sentiments).
366
See Stolzenberg, supra note 356, at 207 (discussing formation of Satmar Jewish enclave in
Monroe Township).
367
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct 694, 712 (2012)
(Alito, J., concurring) (stating that religious groups must be free to govern themselves and determine
who is qualified to serve in positions of religious importance); see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[R]eligious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal affairs,
so that they may be free to: ‘select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own
disputes, and run their own institutions.’” (quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981))).
368
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch,.132 S. Ct. at 705–06
(recognizing “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws for a religious institution and
its ministers); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1,
10–12 (2011) (situating the “ministerial exception” in “church autonomy” scholarship).
369
See generally Lund, supra note 365 (surveying church autonomy cases).
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feelings, immunities, and even the consciences of
individuals, but a distinctions [sic] between spheres, the
independence of institutions, and the “freedom of the
church.”370
In this regard, judges’ reluctance to probe the substance of religious claims
may be linked to institutional church autonomy and church-state separation
arguments.371 Perhaps, then, the courts are treating Indian religious groups
like other religious groups, from which the courts also try to maintain a
respectful distance in recognition of the structural relationship between
church and state.372 Tribal courts have, to some extent, taken this
approach: when asked to decide competing claims to religious resources
and ceremonies among tribal members, some tribal courts have deferred to
traditional spiritual authorities in the tribal community.373
Yet, there are pragmatic, conceptual, and doctrinal differences that
distinguish American Indians from other theories of groups or institutional
rights, and other instances of deference to church autonomy. 374 As
370
Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, supra note
355, at 523; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) (arguing that “the independence and autonomy of
churches, and of religious institutions and associations generally are seen as deriving from the freeexercise or conscience rights of individual persons” (emphasis added)).
371
See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1185–89 (1988) (describing three
different views, evangelical, secular, and separate spheres, that may explain judicial reluctance to
entertain religious questions). For a sampling of the “hands-off” literature and its various theoretical
underpinnings, see generally Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What
Are We Talking About?, supra note 38 (describing symposium and scholarship devoted to the “handsoff approach to religious doctrine”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts
over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme
Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85
(1997).
372
Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a ‘Religious Question’ Doctrine: Judicial Authority to Examine
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 499—501 (2005).
373
Two disputes about religious freedoms in the court of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes illustrate
deference to traditional spiritual authorities. See, e.g., In re Sacred Arrows, 3 Okla. Trib. 332 (1990)
(observing that the Tribal Court cannot decide who the Arrow Keeper is, a question better left “to the
Headsmen, Chiefs, and the Cheyenne tribal members themselves . . . in accordance with traditional
practice and procedure”); see also Redman v. Birdshead, 9 Okla. Trib. 495 (2006) (noting a conflict in
tribal constitution simultaneously providing for free exercise rights and prohibiting tribal court
jurisdiction “over traditional matters such as the conduct of ceremonies,” usually decided by spiritual
leaders in the tribal community). For a deeper discussion of the challenges, both substantive and
procedural, of assessing tribal customary law beyond the religion context, see MATTHEW L.M.
FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 87–88 (2011) (describing the role of customary and
codified law in tribal justice systems); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and
Intratribal Common Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 701 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East:
The Stories of Modern Indian People and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1
(2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 57 (2007); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2007).
374
This, too, is a literature that I can only reference briefly here. In previous works, I have
examined in more detail American Indian group rights vis-à-vis political theory, surveying leading
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described above, American Indians have experienced a particular and
pronounced history of federal intervention into tribal religious matters.
While attempts to disentangle the government from such involvement are
ongoing, they are also incomplete. Federal courts can and should defer to
tribal courts regarding religious matters arising on reservations, and tribal
courts may, in some cases, be able to defer to religious institutions that will
be best able to decide internal theological questions.375 But when it comes,
for example, to sacred sites located on federal public lands, the United
States is not yet in a position to disclaim a role in regulating or reviewing
religious access, whether through a theory of church or tribal autonomy.
Until the federal government comprehensively restores ownership of
sacred sites and burial grounds to tribes, fully repatriates all of the human
remains and religious artifacts in federal possession, and decriminalizes
peyote and eagle feather use, it will probably play a role in accommodating
American Indian religious practices.376
The second distinction is conceptual. Most of the institutional or
group rights arguments referenced above still stay relatively close to the
liberal democratic conception that rights are held by individuals, whether
as associated individuals or incorporated entities.377 By contrast, from an
indigenous perspective, tribal members relate to one another through a
fabric of kinship and cultural relations that link them to a particular place
on the natural landscape. The fundamentally collective nature of tribal
interests is especially pronounced in matters of religion wherein, as
previously described, the primary purpose of tribal religion is for the
works of western liberalism, nationhood, peoplehood, human rights, multiculturalism, minority, and
indigenous rights. See, e.g., Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal
Constitutional Law, supra note 30, at 159–61, 173; Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE
L.J. 1022, 1050–61 (2009); Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 348–55; see
generally Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, supra note 44 (discussing American Indian
rights and liberalism). The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has numerous
articles recognizing the collective rights of indigenous peoples, including religious liberty and practice.
See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept.
13,
2007),
available
at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement.
375
Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959)
(holding that there is no federal cause of action for a First Amendment case arising on a reservation);
Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (same).
376
On occasion, the United States has returned sacred sites to tribes. For example, federal
legislation restored Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo. Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437, 1438 (1970); see
generally R.C. GORDON-MCCUTCHAN, THE TAOS INDIANS AND THE BATTLE FOR BLUE LAKE (1991)
(providing a detailed historical account of the return of Blue Lake to the Taos people). Today, Lakota
people are trying to raise enough money to purchase a portion of their sacred Black Hills. See ICTMN
Staff, Tribes Reach Deal to Purchase Black Hills Sacred Site, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, (Sept. 4,
2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/09/04/tribes-reach-deal-to-purchase-blackhills-sacred-site-132613.
377
See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 1–6 (1995) (surveying existing bases
for group rights in U.S. law and calling for additional legal protection of such groups).
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survival of the tribe itself and not for individual salvation. Again and
again, tribal leaders articulate a relationship between tribal religious
traditions and contemporary tribal self-determination.378 To survive as
Indian people, they must survive collectively.
Finally, from a doctrinal perspective perspective, tribes are sovereign
entities whose existence pre-dates the Constitution. They are not bound by
the Bill of Rights379 and may even maintain theocratic forms of
government.380 Tribes interact with the United States through a
“government to government” relationship. Originating in the treaties
between American Indian and European governments (later the United
States), this relationship is effectuated today through the federal Indian
trust responsibility.381 The trust responsibility has been interpreted as a
fiduciary obligation to manage Indian resources with the highest degree of
care, through legislative and executive actions.382 Today, federal and tribal
governments alike are committed to a policy of tribal “self-determination”

378
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
the relationship between ceremonies at Bear Lodge and Lakota as self-determination); see also GELYA
FRANKS & CAROLE GOLDBERG, DEFYING THE ODDS: THE TULE RIVER TRIBE’S STRUGGLE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY IN THREE CENTURIES 26–27 (2010) (describing Yokuts tribal creation story as a
“[s]ource of [n]ative [s]overeignty”); Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City
Council, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Jan. 12, 2006), http://azdailysun.com/snowmaking-opponents-nowtargeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f9-8461-63548e54cfb5.html (“It is another sad day . . .
[when] in the 21st Century, genocide and religious persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo
people [and] other Native Americans . . . who regard the Peaks as sacred.” (quoting Navajo Nation
President Joe Shirley Jr.)).
379
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–82 (1895) (holding the right to grand jury under the First
Amendment inapplicable in capital case before Cherokee Nation court); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez,
119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (holding the First Amendment inapplicable to actions of tribal council
against Protestant members of Pueblo); see generally Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of
American Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1596 (2004) (noting the U.S. Constitution does
not regulate the conduct of Indian tribal governments).
380
See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 463 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey,
eds., Thomson Reuters 2011) (citing work by Rina Swentzell, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo and
noting Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not interfere with tribal rights to organize as theocracies).
By virtue of their own norms or adoption of the Indian Civil Rights Act, many tribes do have a Free
Exercise Clause and maintain a pluralistic religious society. I have examined this point in scholarship
explaining dozens of tribal constitutions. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious
Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, supra note 30.
381
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831).
382
Compare Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942) (maintaining that in
establishing a treaty with the Indians, the U.S. government has charged itself with the “moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” and that its conduct should therefore be judged by
“the most exacting fiduciary standards”), with United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 504–14
(2003) (rejecting Navajo Nation’s claim that the Secretary of the Interior breached trust duties when he
approved tribal coal leases containing below market royalty rates in a set of transactions including
private communications with coal company).
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in which tribes exercise autonomy over internal affairs.
The trust
responsibility is interpreted as a partnership between the federal and tribal
governments where these political partners join forces to protect the
separate existence of Indian tribes.384 Congress legislates in Indian Affairs
pursuant to its “plenary authority”385 and increasingly uses this power to
foster the political, economic, and cultural aspects of tribal selfdetermination.386
What is so transformative about the contemporary statutes recognizing
American Indian religious freedoms is that they begin to address the
pragmatic, conceptual, and doctrinal situation of American Indians.
Congress realizes that, after hundreds of years of religious suppression, it
now has a duty to foster tribal self-determination. To do so, it must
accommodate Indian religion on a collective basis to reflect tribal cultural
practices. Moreover, Congress has the doctrinal power to legislate in the
area of tribal religions—whether sacred sites, eagle feathers, burial
grounds and human remains, or peyote—pursuant to its plenary power and
trust responsibility.387 The upshot is that, in addition to protections
available under the First Amendment and RFRA, tribal governments, as
383
See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006)
(stating Congressional findings on the federal government’s historical and special obligation to
American Indians, including their right to self-government); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 62–68 (1978) (discussing cases and statutes furthering tribal self-determination).
384
See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 14 (1987) (describing
the reservation system as reserving “islands of tribalism largely free from interference by non-Indians
or future state governments”).
385
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (identifying the federal legislative “power”
over Indian affairs as a basis for upholding criminal statute).
386
NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02 (2005)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW] (discussing the enactment of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act to continue Congress’s legal and moral obligation in
assisting Indian people as well as allow tribal self-determination).
387
The purpose of my Article, which is largely conceptual and descriptive, is not to provide a
normative justification for American Indian legislative exemptions. Yet, as I acknowledge in the
discussion below, such challenges do come up, particularly in Equal Protection grounds. Professor
Kevin J. Worthen has argued that the preferential treatment of American Indian religious practitioners
vis-à-vis other religious practitioners is justifiable, in terms of equality and liberty, on the following
grounds: “(1) [American Indian religions] were created here and exist only here; (2) their beliefs are
often unique and culture-encompassing; and (3) those beliefs often revolve around sacred sites which
are located only here . . . [and (4) n]o group in the United States has been dispossessed of as much land,
or in such a systematic manner as have Native Americans . . . [and the] massive land deprivation has
been particularly devastating to Native American religion because of the intimate connection Native
Americans have between land and religion.” Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons
on Religious Exceptions from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1007. For a
discussion of equality and liberty interests in Free Exercise Clause cases, see CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
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such, are now empowered to work with the agencies to develop
accommodations that are carefully crafted to reflect the real religious needs
of their citizens. American Indian individuals are, in many (though not all)
cases, no longer out on their own in trying to assert religious freedoms.
Of course there are downsides to legislating at the tribal level. Some
tribes are, in fact, theocracies and establish a certain tribal religion.388 But
in others, the tribal government is not synonymous with a tribal religion or
religious institution.389 In many tribal communities, there are several
religions practiced and perhaps even competition among religions.390
Political leaders may not have access to confidential religious information
and there may even be tension between religious practitioners and elected
tribal leadership, as in any community.391 Tribes without federal
recognition are typically not even covered by federal Indian statutes,
including the religion statutes.392 For these reasons, advocates often insist
that traditional tribal religious leaders be invited to consultations with
federal agencies, in addition to governmental representatives. Despite
these and other challenges, however, the presence of tribal governments
has often improved and enhanced the ability of American Indian religious
practitioners to articulate the scope and norms of tribal religions, as I
describe in several examples below.
In this Part, I describe the evolution and enactment of these statutes,
along with their administration in regulatory contexts. I argue that tribal
governments now have the opportunity to work with the agencies on
religious freedoms matters and that they are using these opportunities to
bring tribal religious law and custom to bear on religious accommodations.
These developments reflect what I call an “empowering practices”
388
Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, supra note 44, at 845; see also Gloria ValenciaWeber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-five Years of Disparate Cultural Visions, 14 KAN J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 49, 52 (2004) (describing the relationship between religion and government at Santa
Clara Pueblo).
389
See Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law,
supra note 30, at 159–93 (surveying tribal constitutions, including some that establish religion and
others that prohibit religious establishment); see also VINE DELORIA, JR., SINGING FOR A SPIRIT: A
PORTRAIT OF THE DAKOTA SIOUX (1999) (describing traditional Dakota religious leaders and
Episcopalians in Deloria family).
390
See, e.g., Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.N.M. 1954) (claims by
Protestant Pueblo members that they were denied certain rights unless they adopted Catholicism).
391
Historically, for example, the Navajo Nation outlawed peyote practice, a position which has
recently changed, as described below.
392
See, e.g., Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that consultation requirements of National Historic Preservation Act did not apply in sacred site case
where tribe lacked federal recognition); Marc Dadigan, Fish and Wildlife Service Denies an Indian her
Feathers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.hcn.org/greenjustice/blog/fishand-wildlife-service-denies-an-indian-her-feathers (recounting the story of a traditional Wintu religious
practitioner who is not entitled to participate in the eagle permitting program, and thus denied religious
access to eagle feathers required for her religion because her tribe is not federally recognized).
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approach to American Indian religious freedoms occurring at the
intersection of administrative practice, federal Indian law, and tribal
religious practice.393 At its best, the empowering practices approach has
the potential to develop accommodations that are meaningful to tribes and
address the problems of content and scope that presented such problems in
the cases described above. In this Part, I highlight both the statutory
provisions, administrative mechanisms (rulemaking, hearing, land
management plan, advisory committee, etc.), and particular religious
practices at issue to suggest both successful models of “limiting practices”
and opportunities for improvement. In several examples, I discuss briefly
the ways in which these statutes and regulatory models comply with the
Establishment Clause, often furthering a secular purpose of public lands
management, endangered species conservation, or the preservation of tribal
culture. For the most part, however, I leave detailed discussion of these
and other questions about judicial review for a follow-up article.
A. AIRFA and RFRA
As a backdrop to the wave of 1990s statutes, recall that Congress
passed the AIRFA to set forth a nationwide policy on American Indian
religious freedoms. Therefore, acknowledging the need for a national
policy in favor of Indian religious freedom, Congress stated its respect for
the “inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including, but not limited to, access to sites, use and possession
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites.”394
Consistent with the spirit of the First Amendment, AIRFA focused
primarily on American Indian religion in terms of individual liberties. 395
But it also expressly acknowledged the link between Indian religious belief
and Indian “cultures” and the Indian “way of life.”396 Subsequent legal
instruments would go even further in connecting Indian religious liberty
with tribal rights, and indeed, self-determination and self-government. In
1994, President Clinton issued an Executive Order calling for all
departments and agencies of the United States to consult with tribal
governments on federal lawmaking matters that affect the tribes, in
393
While this Article does not deeply look at administrative law, this Section draws on my
previous works addressing the administrative law aspects of the agency process in Indian law. See
Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country¸ supra note 65, at 83–153 (analyzing judicial review of agency
interpretation in Indian law cases); Carpenter, Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 329–35,
364–38 (considering agency expertise in sacred sites matters).
394
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
395
Id. (stating that the policy of the United States will be to protect and preserve individual
liberties such as “freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradition religions”).
396
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(1) (2006).
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397

fulfillment of the trust responsibility.
President Clinton’s 1994
Executive Order has since been replaced by Executive Order 13,175 on
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments of 2001,
which emphasizes the obligation of consultation with tribal
governments.398 The order, confirmed by both Presidents Bush and
Obama,399 highlights the federal government’s commitment to tribal
sovereignty, self-government and self-determination and to the
“government-to-government” relationship between the United States and
Indian nations.400
In 1993, Congress passed RFRA based on findings that the Court’s
decision in Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion.”401 RFRA’s intent is “to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government”
and “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”402 RFRA provides that “governments
should not substantially burden religious exercise” even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless it can show the burden
on religion furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means.403 RFRA does not define the term “substantial burden,”
but defines the “exercise of religion” as “any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”404 RFRA
has been ruled unconstitutional as applied to state governments405 but still
applies to the federal government.406
In this regard, RFRA has potential in American Indian religion cases,
which often occur in federal contexts, such as in the management of the
public lands, the regulation of controlled substances, the regulation of
endangered species, and otherwise. On the other hand, while RFRA’s
plain language contemplates “religious exercise” without reference to any
397

Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2000).
Id.
399
President Bush’s 2004 Memorandum and President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum are available
at http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/Consultation/Templates/index.htm.
400
Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the “Public Trust” and “Indian Trust” Doctrines:
Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 288 (2003).
401
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)).
402
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (citations omitted).
403
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(1)–(3), (5).
404
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4). This definition was provided in the RLUIPA, which amended
RFRA in 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc).
405
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the RFRA violated
the separation of powers doctrine).
406
See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficenta Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006)
(noting that the RFRA restricts the federal government from substantially burdening the practice of
religion, despite its inapplicability to the states).
398
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specific practice, the legislative history is somewhat ambiguous with
respect to American Indian religions.407 As a result, perhaps, the federal
courts seem unsure about RFRA’s application to these religious claims.
B. Sacred Sites
Sacred sites cases demonstrate some of the most palpable changes to
federal law and policy in religious freedoms in the post-Smith era. The
term “sacred sites” encompasses a variety of places and features on the
natural landscape with religious significance for certain tribes.408 Sacred
sites often mark the place of creation or emergence for a tribe; they may be
locations where deities are believed to reside or where contemporary
prayers and ceremonies take place.409 Most sacred sites are unique places
and the religious activities that occur there cannot be replicated
elsewhere.410 Some places, such as rock formations or mountains, may be
perceived as living beings.411 Tribal religions often instill in the people the
obligation to care for certain sacred sites, both through specific ceremonies
and respectful conduct.412 Having lost title to their sacred sites through
generations of conquest and colonization, tribes now find themselves in the
challenging position of having to contest the current owners—whether
public or private—to gain access for religious purposes and to protect their
sacred sites from desecration. As Lyng demonstrates, it is difficult for
Indian religious practitioners to prevail in these cases, which arise
407
See Epps, supra note 61, at 1016 (discussing how the interfaith coalition advocating for RFRA
declined to push the peyote access issue); see also Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring
the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1315 &
nn.198–99 (1996) (“Congress was assured that RFRA would not create a cause of action on behalf of
Native Americans seeking to protect sacred sites. The Senate report stated that RFRA would not
overrule Lyng and that, under Lyng, strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only
management of internal government affairs or the use of the government’s own property or
resources.”); see also Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying RFRA relief to a Native
American couple challenging road construction through the gravesite of their infant).
408
See ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL
TRADITIONS 67–69 (2000) (discussing a variety of sacred sites found in the natural environment of the
United States); CHARLES E. LITTLE ET AL., SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA 8 (Jack Page ed.,
2001) (noting that natural cultural landmarks are considered “holy” sites by a variety of tribes).
409
See, e.g., Steve Young, Sioux Tribes Seek to Buy Sacred Land in S.D., USATODAY.COM (Aug.
18, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-18/black-hills-salesioux-tribes/57130396/1?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=206567 (describing a
sacred site to the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakato tribes as being “home to their creation story and essential
to their culture and beliefs”); Tribe: S Calif Quarry Plan Imperils Sacred Site, NATIVE AM. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nativetimes.com/life/culture/5867-tribe-s-calif-quarry-plan-imperilssacred-site (describing a tribe’s objection to building along the Luiseno reservation because it “would
be built at the spot that they consider the site of the world’s creation”).
410
See Young, supra note 409 (noting that there are religious and cultural ceremonies tied to the
disputed sacred site).
411
See GULLIFORD, supra note 408, at 70 (linking rock formations with ancestral connotations
and transubstantiation).
412
See id. at 68 (explaining that for most native people the word sacred connotes respect).
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frequently in the federal courts.
In 1992, Congress extended the protections of the National Historic
Preservation Act (“NHPA”) to certain American Indian sacred sites.414 As
amended, the NHPA provides, “Properties of traditional religious and
cultural importance to an Indian tribe [(“TCP”)] . . . may be determined to
be eligible for inclusion on the National Register” of Historic Places.415
Like other federal historic sites, a TCP does not enjoy any automatic
protection from development or otherwise. Rather, the protections of the
NHPA are generally procedural.416 Similarly, in the American Indian
context, the 1992 amendments provide that federal agencies are directed to
consult “with any Indian tribe . . . that attaches religious and cultural
significance” to a TCP regarding federal “undertakings” that may affect
it.417
The NHPA’s TCP provisions are enhanced by several instruments,
including President Clinton’s 1996 Executive Order 13,007 on Indian
sacred sites.418 Substantively, the Executive Order urges federal agencies
to “accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by
Indian religious practitioners and . . . [to] avoid adversely affecting the
physical integrity of such sacred sites.”419 Procedurally, the agencies must
give notice to tribal governments when federal management may affect
sacred sites and consult with tribal leaders regarding such plans.420
Significantly, the Executive Order notes that the responsibility to identify
sacred sites to the agencies belongs to “an Indian tribe or individual
determined to be an appropriately authoritative representative of an Indian
religion.”421
Federal land management agencies, including the National Park
Service and U.S. Forest Service, have developed internal guidelines in
413
Many of the well-known sacred sites cases are cited throughout this paper. For some recent
and ongoing cases, see Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1,
Karuk v. Kelley, No. CV-10-2039 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 2444668 (discussing
tribal challenge to Forest Service management of sacred lands in the Orleans district of Six Rivers
National Forest that was also the subject of Lyng). See also Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin.,
682 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1201–02 (D. Or. 2010) (dismissing a portion of claim by hereditary Chief of the
Klickitat Tribe regarding damage to sacred lands caused by highway on Mt. Hood, Oregon for lack of
standing).
414
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006); see also Dean B. Suagee,
Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic Preservation Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 86, 86–87 (2002) (describing 1992 amendments to the NHPA and implementing regulations).
415
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A) (2006).
416
See Morris Cnty. Trust for Historic Pres. v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 278–79 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“NHPA, like NEPA, is primarily a procedural statute . . . .”).
417
16 U.SC. § 470a(d)(6)(B).
418
Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
419
Id.
420
Id.
421
Id. § 1(b).
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422

favor of sacred site protections.
The National Park Service’s
Management Policies manual provides that the Park Service “will develop
and implement its programs in a manner that reflects knowledge of and
respect for the cultures of Native American tribes or groups with
demonstrated ancestral ties to particular resources in parks.” Procedurally,
the policy provides that, through its Superintendents, the Park Service will
consult with tribes regarding administration of parks including sacred
sites.423 Substantively, the Park Service is to undertake “decisions [that]
reflect knowledge about and understanding of potentially affected Native
American cultures and people, gained through research and consultations
with the potentially affected groups.”424
The United States Forest Service’s National Resource Guide to
American Indian and Alaska Native Relations, which was issued in 1997,
acknowledges federal obligations at sacred sites arising from the
government-to-government relationship, tribal sovereignty, and the fact
that the Forest Service lands are often adjacent to tribal lands.425 While
Forest Service lands “are public” and “most Indian title to these lands has
been extinguished,” the Forest Service nevertheless must “be concerned
where there are [t]ribal rights reserved by treaty, [s]piritual and cultural
values and practices.”426 The Forest Service Guide instructs its employees
to “[w]alk the land with American Indians . . . to gain an understanding
and appreciation of their culture, religion, beliefs, and practices.”427 The
substantive goal is to “[i]dentify and acknowledge [Indian] cultural needs
. . . [and c]onsider these values an important part of management of the
national forests.”428 As described below, a number of recent controversies
compelled Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack to request that the
Forest Service issue a new study and report in 2010.
These post-Lyng evolutions in administrative law have been tested in a
number of cases. For present purposes, it is perhaps most helpful to
juxtapose the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Association v. Babbitt429 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Navajo Nation
422
For BLM Policies, see Bureau of Land Management, “8120–Tribal Consultation Under
Cultural Resource Authorities” (Dec. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Bureau of Land Management Manual],
available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/pol
icy/blm_manual.Par.80216.File.dat/8120.pdf; Bureau of Land Management, “H-8120-1–General
Procedural Guidance for Native American Consultation” (Dec. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/blm_han
dbook.Par.38741.File.dat/H-8120-1.pdf.
423
Bureau of Land Management Manual.
424
Id.
425
FOREST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND
ALASKA NATIVE RELATIONS xi (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/.
426
Id. at 36.
427
Id. at 59.
428
Id.
429
175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
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430

v. Forest Service.
Bear Lodge involved the National Park Service’s
management of Devils Tower National Monument.431 Devils Tower has
long been a sacred site to a number of Plains tribes and is named
accordingly in each tribal story (e.g., Mato Tipila or the “Lodge of the
Bear” in Lakota). As one Lakota story tells:
To honor the Great Spirit, the Lakota gathered at Mato Tipila
for a sun dance. A mysterious woman appeared and gave the
Lakota a pipe and taught them how to use it in prayer. As
she headed back to the horizon, the woman turned into a
buffalo calf. Since then she’s been known as White Buffalo
Calf Woman. Mato Tipila is remembered as the place where
the Lakota received the pipe from the spirit world.432
Consequently, for the Lakota and other tribes, Devils Tower is
important as a place where human beings interacted with the sacred,
learned religious traditions, and acquired values important to their identity.
Lakota people go to Devils Tower for individual prayers and visions, to
leave offerings, and to conduct the Sun Dance, a collective, multi-day
ceremony of sacrifice conducted every summer. They continue to keep the
pipe as one of their most sacred religious traditions.433
The tribal presence at Devils Tower is evident not only in these
religious traditions, but also in the political history of the place. Devils
Tower was originally reserved to the Great Sioux Nation with the Black
Hills in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868,434 which was soon thereafter
violated by the United States.435 Devils Tower became a National
Monument in 1906, and is now managed by the Park Service.436 By the
1990s, Devils Tower became an exceedingly popular destination for rock
climbers, hikers, tourists, and motorcycle enthusiasts—whose various uses
of the tower made it difficult for Indian religious practitioners to keep
Mato Tipila, as they put it, “in the light of reverence.”437 The noise, litter,
presence, and curiosity of these other users all made it difficult to conduct
religious ceremonies requiring quiet, solicitude, and care for the tower.438
430

535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 815.
432
IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE (Sacred Land Film Project of Earth Island Institute, 2001)
(recounting this story).
433
See CHIEF ARVOL LOOKING HORSE, WHITE BUFFALO TEACHINGS (2001).
434
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 635 (1868).
435
Ray H. Mattison, Devil’s Tower History & Culture: The First 50 Years, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/upload.First_50_Years.pdf (last updated July 23, 2012) (“The
Treaty of 1868 guaranteed this region to the Indians. In 1874, in violation of this treaty, General
George A. Custer led a reconnaissance expedition into the Black Hills.”).
436
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
437
IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE, supra note 432 (statement of Lakota Elder Johnson Holy Rock).
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Id.
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In addition, the climbers were threatening nesting raptors and the
environmental quality of the Tower itself.439
The Park Service was obligated to manage these conflicting uses at
Devils Tower by the NHPA, the National Park Service Organic Act and
the Presidential Proclamation, which established Devils Tower as a
National Monument.440 The Park Superintendent initiated a planning
process in which nineteen federally recognized tribes were invited to
consult on a government-to-government basis. Other invited participants
included local governments in Wyoming, organizations representing rock
climbers, local and national environmental organizations, and American
Indian interests, and a number of locally involved individuals.441 The Park
Service held hearings at numerous venues, including Indian reservations,
and also convened a “Work Group” of leaders representing the various
interests.
Through this process, the Park Service produced a “Draft Climbing
Management Plan” that listed four objectives: (1) preserving the
monument’s natural and cultural resources; (2) managing recreational
climbing; (3) increasing visitor awareness of American Indian beliefs and
traditional cultural practices at Devils Tower; and (4) providing the
monument with a guide for managing climbing consistent with other Park
Service and Devils Tower management policies.442
After considering six alternatives for achieving those
objectives—representing a spectrum of approaches from allowing more
rock climbing to banning it altogether—the Park Service settled on a
middle ground: the prohibition of commercial rock climbing during the
month of June when the most American Indian religious ceremonies were
conducted.443 The Climbing Management Plan also called for educational
programs on Indian religious and cultural uses and for mitigation of
climbing’s effects on the environment through reduced use of pitons and
closure of routes near raptor nests.444 The plan was published in the

439
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, DEVILS TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT, WYOMING (1994)
[hereinafter DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN], available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/vi
ewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=govdocs.
440
See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817 n.7, 819 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1; Proclamation No. 458, 34
Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906)).
441
See DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 439 (listing the organizations,
businesses, and individuals who were contacted in the development of the Climbing Management Plan
and Environmental Assessment).
442
Id.
443
See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging the FMCP’s efforts to ask climbers to
voluntarily refrain from climbing during the month of June).
444
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998) (“To
protect against any new physical impacts to the tower, the FCMP provides that no new bolts or fixed
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Federal Register for public notice and comment, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, yielding hundreds of comments both in support and
opposition to the plan.445 After a lawsuit was filed by a group of rock
climbers who challenged the plan on Establishment Clause grounds, the
NPS changed the climbing ban to a voluntary closure, which was
ultimately upheld in the Tenth Circuit on grounds that the climbers
suffered no injury and lacked standing to sue.446
In this process, the Park Service specifically recognized tribal interests,
in addition to those of individual Indian religious practitioners. As one
Lakota leader explained, religious use of Bear Lodge is “vital to the health
of our nation and to our self-determination as a Tribe.”447 Accordingly, the
National Park Service website lists the federally recognized Indian tribes
with historic relations to Devils Tower and provides education on the
cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions of each.448 This is indicative of
the respect that the Park Service has tried to show for the tribal religions
associated with Devils Tower. Second, when it was time to engage in
consultation on the Climbing Management Plan, the Park Service granted
formal and informal measures of respect to the relevant tribes. It provided
notice of consultation meetings to nineteen federally recognized tribes, 449
and also invited participation by representatives of the Medicine Wheel
Coalition who were authorized by their own tribal governments.450 As
Lloyd Burton notes, the Park Service Superintendent held five meetings
over the year, personally travelled to tribal communities, allowed tribal
representatives to take time to debrief with their constituents, and
undertook other measures to “preserve a government-to-government
relationship with the larger group of tribes” interested in Devils Tower.451
The Climbing Management Plan was also revealing because the basis
for the compromise between American Indian and other uses of Devils
Tower was found in the tribal religions themselves.452 While some
pitons will be permitted on the tower . . . . [However, NPS] will not enforce the voluntary closure, but
will instead rely on climbers’ self-regulation and a new ‘cross-cultural educational program . . . .’”).
445
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
446
Id. at 822; see also Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1043–44 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding Forest Service ban on rock climbing at Washoe sacred site did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it had “a secular purpose—preservation of a historic cultural area”).
447
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817.
448
George L. San Miguel, How Is Devils Tower a Sacred Site to American Indians, NAT’L PARK
SERV. (Aug. 1994), http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/sacredsite.htm.
449
See DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 439, at 53 (listing nineteen federally
recognized tribes).
450
LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS, CULTURE, RELIGION AND LAW IN PUBLIC
LANDS MANAGEMENT 131 (2001).
451
Id. at 131 & nn. 18, 20.
452
See Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y v. Alston, 98 F. App’x. 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding
National Park Service’s plan asking tourists to refrain from walking under a sandstone bridge out of
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American Indians may have preferred complete closure of Devils Tower
on grounds that any climbing was sacrilegious, some rock climbers
advocated for no restrictions whatsoever.453 But the members of the Work
Group were ultimately willing to compromise on closure during June, the
month of the summer solstice, a time of the year that Lakota leaders
describe as sacred and when most of the ceremonies take place.454
The incorporation of tribal religious values into determinations about
the content and scope of the accommodation may have helped the Devils
Tower Climbing Management Plan succeed where other attempts have
failed. Following adoption of the plan, no tribe or individual American
Indian challenged the Devils Tower Climbing Management Plan in court.
A group of rock climbers did, however, sue under the Establishment
Clause, but the federal district court upheld the plan, ruling it did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it advanced secular purposes, did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and did not entangle the
government with religion.455 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but
not on the merits. It held that because the plan made the climbing
restrictions “voluntary” and the plaintiff climbers had continued climbing,
they suffered no injury and therefore lacked standing to sue.456
Attempts to invoke the slippery slope against this religious
accommodation also failed. Lakota people generally describe the Black
Hills as “sacred.”457 Yet this particular accommodation only involved one
butte located within the Black Hills. Undaunted by this fact, the Mountain
States Legal Foundation (“Mountain States”) argued for a writ of certiorari
on grounds that such accommodations would end development across the
western United States. This was because the government owned upwards
of ninety-percent of the property in some counties and American Indians
could claim anything to be “sacred.”458 Mountain States argued that if the
Bear Lodge accommodation served as precedent, it could end “tourism,
forestry, ranching, mining, and oil and gas exploration and development”
throughout the public lands, and “many rural western counties would be
respect for Native American religious beliefs on grounds that plaintiffs had not suffered an actual injury
and thus lacked standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge).
453
BURTON, supra note 450, at 129–35 (describing the consultation and negotiation process
leading to the final climbing management plan).
454
See CHIEF ARVOL LOOKING HORSE, supra note 433.
455
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbit, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454−57 (D. Wyo. 1998)
(applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and its articulation of the Establishment Clause
test).
456
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821–22 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and its articulation of the standing test).
457
See Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything that Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota
Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 317, 317 (1998).
458
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814
(10th Cir. 1999) (No. 99−1045), 1999 WL 33640033 at *27.
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devastated” by the loss of revenue streams associated with such
activities.459 But both the district court and Tenth Circuit had confined
their analysis to the terms of the plan as actually drafted to pertain only to
Devils Tower itself and rejected the climbers’ lawsuits,460 and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.461
While early studies showed substantial compliance with the plan, rock
climbers can, of course, still climb on Devils Tower even during the Sun
Dance.462 The accommodation at Devils Tower is modest, though still
remarkable in light of the current state of American Indian religious
freedoms.
Individual religious practitioners, along with tribal
governments, negotiated an accommodation that reflected in significant
respects their own religious traditions, developed a very solid record on
their religious views and practices, and defeated attempts to challenge the
religious claims through slippery slope arguments. The Park Service was
able to incorporate tribal customs and values into an accommodation plan
that would afford religious freedom while also meeting statutory
obligations to conserve and protect the Tower’s physical features. In these
respects, Bear Lodge represents major progress over a case like Lyng.
Navajo Nation by contrast, reads almost like a replay of Lyng and
raises some questions about the effectiveness of the new sacred sites laws.
This case arose when the Forest Service decided to permit the use of
sewage effluent in ski area snowmaking on the San Francisco Peaks, which
are sacred not only to the Navajo, but also the Hopi, Havasupai, Hualapai,
and a number of other tribes.463 The tribes had claimed that spraying one
of their most holy mountains with the sewage effluent would interfere with
specific religious practices, such as Navajo healing ceremonies relying on
plants and medicines collected from the mountain,464 and entire religious
belief systems, including the Hopi ceremonial cycle based on the kachinas’
seasonal migrations from the Peaks to the Hopi villages.465 The Forest
Service had gleaned extensive knowledge of these religious interests—and
those of other tribes—through the NHPA and National Environmental
459

Id.
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821 (“Even if other Bear Lodge members have elected not to climb in
June, that decision is one of several choices available under the plan and is not an injury conferring
standing.”); Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456−57 (“[T]he voluntary climbing ban[] is a policy that has
been carefully crafted to balance the competing needs of individuals using Devil’s Tower National
Monument while, at the same time, obeying the edicts of the Constitution.”).
461
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
462
See BURTON, supra note 450, at 143 (describing that since 1995 “80 percent of the recreational
climbers who would have otherwise climbed the tower agree[d] not to” do so).
463
See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Forest
Service has acknowledged that the Peaks are sacred to at least thirteen formally recognized Indian
tribes, and that this religious significance is of centuries’ duration.”).
464
Id. at 1063.
465
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007).
460
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Policy Act (“NEPA”) consultation process. In fact, the Forest Service
made “more than 500 contacts” and held over forty meetings to determine
the impact on the tribes.466
While there were a number of religious and cultural concerns, the
tribes objected most vociferously to the use of “reclaimed water” for the
ski area snowmaking.467 Reclaimed water is sewage from homes,
hospitals, and elsewhere, that has been treated to a point where it is
classified “A+” by the state department of environmental quality.468 As a
practical matter, reclaimed water can be used for landscape irrigation, but
is non-potable. The tribes complained that this water would pollute the
mountain, plants, and springs thereon, thereby violating religious
requirements of purity for religious resources gathered there.469
To the Hopis, for example, polluting the water was extremely grave
because the San Francisco Peaks are the mountain home of the kachinas
who bring water to the corn that is the lifeblood of Hopi sustenance, and
are involved in specific ceremonies and an entire religious way of life. In
addition, the Hopis had “shrines” on the mountains that would be
desecrated.470 For the Navajos, the plants that they gathered from the
Peaks, which are kept in medicine bundles and used in healing ceremonies,
would be contaminated. Their concerns were further exacerbated by
religious taboos against handling materials that have come in contact with
the dead, as would the sewage from hospitals and other sources.471
Thus the consultation process revealed the impact on the tribes. But
despite finding that several of the proposals would have an “[a]dverse
effect” on the tribes’ religious practices, the Forest Service decided to
select an alternative for development that included snowmaking using
reclaimed water over 205 acres of the mountain, as well as construction of
a pipeline, water reservoir, ski lodge, and new trails.472 In short, the Forest
Service and tribes had not arrived at a compromise. The mitigating
activities announced by the Forest Service, including attempts to protect
religious shrines and the use of the chairlift during the summer, were
wholly inadequate to address the concerns about the reclaimed water.473
As justification for this decision to harm the Indian religions, the Forest
Service cited its statutory mandate to promote “multiple uses” of the public
lands and its limited responsibilities to Indian tribes under Lyng.474 The
Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1065−66.
Id. at 1082.
468
Id. at 1065.
469
Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1039.
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Id. at 1035.
471
Id. at 1040.
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Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871, 879 (D. Ariz. 2006).
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Id. at 880.
474
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tribes sued, arguing that the Forest Service’s plan imposed a substantial
burden on religion and was not justified by a compelling governmental
interest under RFRA.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Forest Service, holding that the
“sole effect of the artificial snow is on the [American Indians’] subjective
spiritual experience,” which did not constitute a “substantial burden” under
RFRA.475 Under Lyng, which the court held to govern the case, the court
determined that there was no governmental coercion of Indian belief.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit said that it could not distinguish this
mountain from dozens of other mountains, entire rivers and canyons, and
upwards of 40,000 prehistoric sites throughout the southwest.476 The
dissent pointed out that the Navajo religion has a very small number of
sacred sites, exactly one of which was at issue in the case.477 But the
majority, interpreting RFRA through the lens of Lyng, held that the Forest
Service was free to desecrate, contaminate, and even destroy the Navajo
sacred site, in part because there was no other workable approach to the
government’s management of its own land.478 The bright line of Lyng
would prevail.
There are at least four lessons to draw by contrasting Bear Lodge and
Navajo Nation. First, for all of its relative advantages over the courts,
using the federal agency process to secure religious practices is still
difficult—and still, in the final analysis rests on agency discretion. As
numerous commentators have observed, the agency process demands that
traditional American Indians try to translate their religious practices in a
foreign setting, participating in bureaucratic hearings and disclosing to
government officials information that would otherwise only be discussed
in tribal religious contexts—or not at all.479 This process is particularly
475

Id. at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1066 n.7.
477
Id. at 1098 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
478
See id. at 1071 n.13 (noting that although Lyng was a Free Exercise Clause case and not an
RFRA case, this difference is of no material consequence in deciding the case at hand, as the test used
in Lyng was indicated by Congress to be a workable test that struck a balance between religious liberty
and government interests).
479
See generally Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 25 (1999)
(discussing the tension between traditional Native American views of productive consultations, such as
where success is measured by the adoption of the advocated outcome or a discussion leading to an
unforeseen outcome that is still satisfactory to the majority, and federal agencies’ tendency to measure
success only in procedural terms). See, e.g., Christy McCann, Dammed if You Do, Damned if You
Don’t: FERC’s Tribal Consultation Requirement and the Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls Dam,
41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 434 (2006) (addressing the two competing views of federal-tribal consultation
requirements: skeptical, where consultation is regarded as perpetuating the betrayal of Native
Americans by white men; and optimistic, which views the government as recognizing the importance
of and making every effort to incorporate Native Americans’ views and interests in federal planning).
For a survey of best practices, see SHERRI HUTT & JAIME LAVALLEE, NAT’L ASS’N OF TRIBAL
476
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fraught in light of this same federal government’s history of persecuting
these very same tribal religions.480
Agency officials, like Park
Superintendent Deb Liggett in Bear Lodge, can try to mitigate these effects
through personal efforts to put religious practitioners at ease and meet in
reservation communities, but even the most heroic efforts will not make
the consultation process a comfortable, pleasant, or risk-free experience for
tribal participants. It also imposes dignitary harms of a kind rarely
experienced by religious practitioners in the United States—in which
individuals must undergo an inquisition of sorts to be free to conduct their
religions. As American Indian advocate Suzan Harjo recently argued, the
consultations over the San Francisco Peaks revealed many stress points
where, for example, the Hopi participants did not feel as if they were
speaking the same language as the Forest Service—particularly when they
were repeatedly asked to quantify or measure their religious claims in
metrics not meaningful to them.481 The challenges of the consultation
process can make it difficult to arrive at a meaningful accommodation, as
the Navajo Nation case might suggest.
Second, the Forest Service’s “multiple use” mandate creates special
challenges in the accommodation of Indian sacred site practices. The Park
Service, for example, operates under a statutory mission to “conserve” the
national parks and monuments for future generations.482 The Forest
Service’s “multiple-use” mandate, by contrast, provides that the forests are
to be managed “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
wildlife and fish purposes.”483 Needless to say, perhaps, the Park Service’s
conservation mandate is closer to the spirit of many Indian religious
practices than is the Forest Service’s multiple-use mandate. Congress has
HISTORIC PRES. OFFS., TRIBAL CONSULTATION: BEST PRACTICES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS (2005), available at
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tribal/download/Tribal_Consultation.pdf.
480
See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817 (“In 1890 for example, the United States Calvary shot and
killed 300 unarmed Sioux men, women and children en route to an Indian religious ceremony called the
Ghost Dance; these included individuals from the Intervenors’ tribe.”).
481
See Suzan Shown Harjo, The USDA’s Culture War Against Sacred Places, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Feb. 15, 2012, available at http://www.indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict_sbc/usdasculture-war-against-sacred-places (addressing communication issues encountered by Forest Service
officials and Hopi Elders); see also Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98
YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1989) (explaining that different legal ideas will be encountered as different
factors are considered—in this context, particularly religion and the amount of experience that
individuals have in interacting with police, administrative agencies, or courts).
482
National Park Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
483
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2006); see also Federico Cheever,
The United States Forest Service and National Park Service: Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful
Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625, 628 (1997) (“The
Park Service and the Forest Service are different. The Forest Service authorizes logging, oil and gas
development, mining and hunting in the national forests. The Park Service (with a few exceptions)
permits none of these uses in National Parks.” (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
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not provided guidance to help the Forest Service prioritize among the
multiple uses either as a general matter or in specific contexts, nor has
Congress explicitly suggested how to reconcile Indian religions with
incompatible uses like snowmaking on the San Francisco Peaks.
The Forest Service is not unaware of these problems. Following
Navajo Nation, U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Secretary
Thomas J. Vilsack requested that the Forest Service produce a report to
evaluate compliance with Executive Order 13,007 and to study
“unintended consequences of land management decisions” affecting sacred
sites.484 The USDA’s Office of Tribal Relations and the Forest Service
formed a team to conduct over fifty “listening sessions” with tribal leaders
and traditional practitioners throughout the country.485 The USDA also
conducted an employee survey and surveyed relevant law and policy. The
responses suggested that “Forest Service managers would benefit from
more explicit policy language to protect Sacred Sites” and that the Agency
has sufficient “discretion” under existing law to provide greater protection
of sacred sites.486 The Draft Report recommended several measures to
address these issues, including: “improv[ing] relationships through
communication, training, staffing, and accountability”; reviewing and
revising directives such as Executive Order 13,007; and “improv[ing] onthe-ground Sacred Site protection through partnerships, access, and
protections.”487 The Report was clearly a step in the right direction, and
may lead to real changes in policy and attitude.
Third, the contrast between Bear Lodge and Navajo Nation suggests
the need for more “teeth” in the agency accommodation process. Here too
reform may be necessary. One possibility is to require agencies and
participants in the consultation process to enter into a memorandum of
agreement outlining the terms of an agreed-upon accommodation. Some
tribal agency accommodations have voluntarily used this model, including
the U.S. Forest Service’s successful agreement at Medicine Wheel
National Forest.488 But in other instances, including the Forest Service in
the San Francisco Peaks Consultation, the agencies seem to perceive and
treat information gleaned from the consultation process as merely advisory.
This approach conflicts with a growing sentiment, perhaps best reflected in
484
U.S. DEP’T of AGRIC., DRAFT REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, USDA’S OFFICE OF TRIBAL
RELATIONS AND FOREST SERVICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES REVIEW: INDIAN SACRED SITES i (July
2011), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/tribalrelations/documents/sacredsites/20110712_SACRED
_SITES_DRAFT_REPORT_ TO_SECRETARY.pdf.
485
Id.
486
Id. at ii.
487
Id.
488
See Wyo. Sawmills Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (describing
the Memorandum of Agreement between Forest Service and American Indian religious practitioners
providing for closure of road to Medicine Wheel except for traditional religious practitioners’ access).
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recommendations of the National Congress of American Indians, that the
Forest Service go beyond mere “communication” and incorporate a
concept of “seeking agreement” in the consultation process.489 Moreover,
fostering tribal-agency agreements with respect to religious
accommodations would advance compliance with the UNDRIP’s mandate
that “states shall consult and cooperate in good faith” with indigenous
peoples” and “obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting
and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect
them.”490
And finally, it is unclear what effect RFRA has on Lyng or in other
Indian religion cases. Given the agencies’ discretion over substantive
accommodations and the procedural nature of NHPA and NEPA
requirements, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit’s approach will not actually
require any protection of Indian religious freedom at sacred sites. In fact,
Navajo Nation merely reifies Lyng by limiting RFRA claims on public
lands to facts where the government “coerces” religious belief.491 More
promisingly, in Comanche Nation v. United States,492 a federal district
court in Oklahoma recently applied RFRA to protect an Indian sacred site,
noting that the Tenth Circuit has declined to take the narrow view of
“substantial burden” adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Navajo Nation.493
The district court followed Thiry v. Carlson,494 in which the Tenth Circuit
articulated the test for a substantial burden under RFRA as requiring a
showing that the government regulation:
[M]ust significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or
expression that manifests some central tenet of . . . [an
individual’s] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail [an
individual’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith;
489
Letter from NCAI to Sec’y Tom Vilsack, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Chief Thomas Tidwell,
U.S. Forest Serv. & Dir. Fred Clark, U.S. Forest Serv. 9 (Oct. 17, 2011) (on file with author).
490
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sep. 13, 2007); see also Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government,
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 371 (1989) (querying whether Indian tribes ever consented to American
government); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 45, 47
(2012) (arguing that “the fundamental question of tribal consent continues to haunt Indian affairs, and
will continue to do so unless it is rectified”).
491
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
although Lyng was a free exercise case and not an RFRA case, this difference is of no material
consequence in deciding the case at hand, as the test used in Lyng was indicated by Congress to be a
workable test that struck a balance between religious liberty and government interests).
492
No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008).
493
See id. at *20 (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the federal government from
constructing a “training support center” on lands sacred to the Comanche people, on the strength of the
tribe’s RFRA and NHPA claims, and noting that the Tenth Circuit has declined to adopt the narrow test
for substantial burden advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Navajo).
494
78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d. 1476, 1480 (1995)).
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or must deny [an individual] reasonable opportunities to
engage in those activities that are fundamental to [an
individual’s] religion.495
This standard would suggest broader judicial review than Lyng’s coercion
test.496
C. Eagle Feathers
In many American Indian religions, eagles are thought to link humans
with the spirit world. A member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Oyate,
Angelique EagleWoman, explains, “the eagle takes our prayers to the
Great Spirit, Wakan Tanka, for us.”497 In Hopi religion, “[t]he eagle serves
as the link between the spiritual world and the physical world of the Hopi,
a connection that embodies the very essence of Hopi spirituality and
belief.”498 In the Arapaho tradition, an individual who pledges to sponsor
the Sun Dance may be required to provide an eagle for the ceremony, and
this offering of “[t]he eagle is seen as a gift of the Creator.”499 Depending
on the tribe and religious ceremony, an individual may need to take a live
eaglet or adult eagle, or possess a single feather, wing, or other eagle part
to fulfill his or her religious obligations or beliefs.
Unfortunately for the many Lakota, Hopi, Arapaho, and other Indian
people whose religion requires use of eagles and eagle parts, it is now a
federal crime to “take[], possess[], s[ell], purchase[], barter[], offer[] for
sale, purchase, or barter, transport[], export[], or import” bald and golden
eagles.500 Originally enacted in 1940, the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (“Eagle Act”) imposes a sweeping prohibition on such
activities, and punishes the “taking” of an eagle by a fine of up to $5,000
and one year in prison.501 The Eagle Act has been held to nullify even
treaty rights to hunt eagles on the reservation in part because of the fear
that American Indians will hunt eagles “to extinction.”502 Numerous
American Indians have been prosecuted for violating the Eagle Act and
related federal statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and Migratory

495

Id. at 1495 (quoting Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d. 1476, 1480 (1995)).
Id. In Thiry, the court noted some potential tension with Lyng, but still articulated the broader
RFRA test under which the Thirys’ challenge to government relocation of their child’s gravesite failed.
Id. at 1496.
497
Featherproject, Angelique EagleWoman: The Importance of Eagle Feathers, YOUTUBE (July
19, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNwP66amEmM&feature=related.
498
Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets from Wupatki National Monument, 66
Fed. Reg. 6,516, 6,517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7).
499
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2008).
500
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668b(b) (2006).
501
Id.
502
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 & n.5 (1986).
496
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Bird Treaty Act. While the bald eagle has recently been “delisted” as an
endangered species, the federal government maintains interests in
protecting both bald and golden eagles, which are each symbols of national
identity and are essential for American Indian religions.504
Since 1962, the Eagle Act has authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to administer a permitting process that allows Indians limited opportunities
to take and possess eagles and eagle parts for religious purposes.505 To
obtain a permit, an individual must apply to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“USFWS”), which is, in turn, required to evaluate certain
threshold questions of Indian status and religious practice.506 The
regulations provide that USFWS will “investigat[e]” applications to
determine whether “the applicant is an Indian who is authorized to
participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies.”507 An “Indian” is
defined as a citizen of a federally recognized tribe, while the term “bona
fide tribal religious ceremonies” is not defined.508 To substantiate their
claims, applicants must provide a “certificate of enrollment in an Indian
tribe” that “must be signed by an tribal official who is authorized to certify
that an individual is a duly enrolled member of that tribe” and must specify
the “name of [the] tribal religious ceremony” for which the eagle is
required.509 If the agency determines that the applicant has proven his
Indian status and bona fide religious purpose, then the permit may be
granted. In most cases, it will be a permit to receive and possess an eagle
feather, wing, or complete carcass sources from the USFWS’s National
503

503
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Native American Talks About the Importance of Eagle
Feathers, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9SFuM1FpOo (“Reginald
Dale Akeen pleaded guilty in December 2009 to a felony violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act. . . . [A]s part of his plea agreement, Akeen agreed to speak on video about the significance of the
feathers of eagles and other birds to Native Americans and about the fact that he broke the law.”).
504
See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Bald Eagle Recovered!, FWS.GOV,
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/eagle/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (discussing that although the bald
eagle was removed from the federal list of threatened and endangered species, there are current legal
protections that still remain for bald and golden eagles).
505
See Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006) (“Whenever . . . the
Secretary of the Interior shall determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or
the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession, and transportation of specimens thereof for . . . the
religious purposes of Indian tribes . . . he may authorize the taking of such eagles . . . .”).
506
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, THE NATIVE AMERICAN POLICY OF THE U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE 5 (1994), http://www.fws.gov/nativeamerican/graphics/Native_Amer_Policy.pdf.
507
50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2011); see also Protection of Bald Eagles and Golden Eagles, 28 Fed. Reg.
975, 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (“Whenever the Secretary determines that the taking and possession of bald or
golden eagles for the religious purposes of Indian tribes is compatible with the preservation of such
birds, he may issue permits . . . to those individual Indians who are authentic, bona fide practitioners of
such religion.”).
508
50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
509
Id.
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510

Eagle Repository in Colorado.
These are parts of eagles that have been
accidentally killed and donated to meet American Indian religious needs.
Occasionally, an individual will receive a permit to take a live eagle if
required for a ceremony.
The eagle permit process has been successful, to some extent. As of
2008, the Eagle Repository reported that it made approximately 1,700 to
1,800 annual shipments of eagles or eagle parts to applicants.511 It has
granted two tribal permits to the Navajo tribe and one annually recurring
permit to the Hopi tribe to take live golden eagles.512 Challenges to the
eagle permitting process, including those by non-Indians, have failed, with
the courts recognizing a compelling governmental interest in both eagle
conservation and the religious practices of federally-recognized tribes. 513
On the other hand, Indian religious practitioners have lodged a number
of complaints regarding the eagle permit process, including that: it is not
well-noticed; it is fraught with delay and supply problems making it
impossible to receive eagles in time for religious ceremonies (the USFWS
itself estimates a five-year wait for an immature golden eagle);514 it often
provides eagle carcasses and parts that are dirty, diseased, or insectinfested such that religious purity is missing; and it invades privacy by
requiring disclosure of religious and personal identity information to
federal officials.515
For some of the reasons described above, some American Indians
continue to take eagles without a permit or purchase them illegally, leading
to criminal prosecutions for what they perceive to be activities compelled
by their religion.516 In various cases, the federal appellate courts have
510
See Jay Wexler, Eagle Party, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 181, 182 (2011), available at
http://www.greenbag.org/archive/green_bag_tables_of_contents.html (“Applying to the [National
Eagle] Repository is the only way to legally get hold of any part of either [bald or golden] eagle[s] in
the United States.”).
511
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008).
512
Id. at 945.
513
See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing national interest in
eagles and religious interests of federally recognized tribes as a compelling interest to sustain eagle
permit program against RFRA challenge by non-Indian); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,
1127–29 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[T]he government’s general interests in preserving Native
American culture and religion in-and-of-themselves and in fulfilling trust obligations to Native
Americans [are] compelling interests.”).
514
Id. at 953; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ORDERING EAGLE PARTS AND FEATHERS FROM THE
NATIONAL EAGLE REPOSITORY 3 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-15b.pdf.
515
See, e.g., United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 n.7 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(noting that “traditional” Hopi “believe it an affront” to have the government exercise authority over
them); Friday, 525 F.3d at 944–45 (summarizing problems with federal interference, supply, delay, and
quality).
516
See, e.g., Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (“Defendant testified he believes his
permission to take eagles is conferred by his acting in accordance with the tenets of his religious faith,
i.e., that properly preparing feathers and prayer objects prior to taking the eagles, as he was taught by
his uncles, should be the only ‘permit’ required to take the eagles.”).
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upheld the eagle permitting process against First Amendment and RFRA
challenges. And yet, a number of these opinions have voiced concern.
In United States v. Friday,517 for example, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a Northern Arapaho man who took an eagle on the
reservation for an upcoming Sun Dance.518 His relative had pledged to
sponsor the Sun Dance and thus acquired an obligation for the family to
provide an eagle, an obligation that Winslow Friday believed he was
fulfilling.519 Friday did not know of the eagle permitting process or of the
repository program in Denver.520 From the USFWS’s own testimony, it
was unclear (or perhaps unlikely) that even if Friday had applied, he would
have received a pure eagle, as religiously required, or received any eagle in
time for the Sun Dance.521 The USFWS had issued very few permits to
take live eagles, and even in these cases, only permitted the taking of
golden eagles.522
While the district court agreed that the government could regulate the
taking of eagles for religious purposes, it was extremely concerned about
the way in which the permit process was managed, stating: “It is clear to
this Court that the Government has no intention of accommodating the
religious beliefs of Native Americans except on its own terms and in its
own good time.”523 Yet, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction on the
grounds that Friday could not challenge the “futility” of a permitting
program that he had not even tried to use.524 The Tenth Circuit allowed
that if Friday, or some similarly situated practitioner, applied and was
unable to obtain a “pure” eagle—if religiously required, or unable to obtain
an eagle in time for a ceremonial use—he or she might have a RFRA claim
in the future.525
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has begun to address these issues.
In 2011, it issued a memorandum formally asking for tribal input on two
questions: (1) whether the DOJ should formalize its internal policy in favor
of accommodating American Indian religious use of eagle feathers; and (2)
517

525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 945.
519
Id.
520
Id. at 953
521
Id. at 953–54 (“Native Americans charged with violating the Eagle Act could make an asapplied challenge to the Act’s permitting system without applying for permits if they demonstrated that
‘it would have been futile . . . to apply for permits.’” (quoting United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d
1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). The court then noted that if Mr. Friday was unable to obtain a
“pure eagle,” he, like the defendants in Hardman, may have had an RFRA claim. Id.
522
Id. at 945 (“While it was [the relative]’s responsibility to ensure that the tribe had the eagle it
needed for the dance, the Fridays believe obligation to be familial, so Winslow was responsible for
helping however he could.”).
523
United States v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 WL 3592952, at *5 (D. Wyo. Oct. 13, 2006).
524
Friday, 525 F.3d at 951.
525
Id. at 953–54.
518
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whether the DOJ should support tribal governments that seek to become
more active in wildlife enforcement.526 After consultation with tribes
around the country, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a new
Memorandum indicating that the DOJ would no longer prosecute enrolled
members of federally recognized tribes when they possess eagle feathers,
find molten feathers in the wild, gift eagle feathers, provide them to crafts
people, or travel with them.527 The DOJ will continue to prosecute for
killing eagles or possessing eagle carcasses without a permit, even by
enrolled tribal members on the reservation for religious purposes. Yet,
prosecutors are encouraged to use discretion and “consider whether
prosecution of particular cases would be more appropriated be handled by
tribal prosecutorial authorities in lieu of federal prosecution.”528
These and other initiatives have shown a willingness to consult both
with individual religious practitioners and tribes, on a government-togovernment basis, about eagle regulation.529 Through the Office of Tribal
Justice, the DOJ has signaled its willingness to help tribes implement or
develop legislative codes on eagle regulation.530
Given that many, though certainly not all, religious uses of eagles
occur in reservation communities, it seems particularly appropriate to defer
to tribal government jurisdiction. Winslow Friday, for example, took his
eagle from a tree on the reservation and used it for a Sun Dance occurring
on the reservation.531 Historically, the Northern Arapaho tribe would have
had exclusive jurisdiction over his hunting and the Sun Dance itself. The
tribal code had potentially relevant provisions governing hunting on the
reservation.532 The case was federal only because of the reach of the Eagle
526
U.S. DOJ, REQUEST FOR TRIBAL INPUT ON: (1) DOJ CONSIDERATION OF POLICY REGARDING
EAGLE FEATHERS; AND (2) FEDERAL/TRIBAL TRAINING PROGRAM ON ENFORCEMENT OF WILDLIFE
AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 2, 5 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/Eagle%2
0Feathers%20-%20DOJ%20Request%20for%20Tribal%20Input.pdf.
527
See Off. of the Att’y Gen., Memorandum on Possession or Use of the Feathers or Other Parts
of Federally Protected Birds for Tribal Cultural or Religious Purposes, Oct. 12, 2012, at 1–3, available
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ef-policy.pdf.
528
Id. at 4.
529
See, e.g., Eagle Summit on March 18, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/tribal/tracks/022010.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) (detailing
the Colorado Commission of Indian Affairs invitation to the Tribal Council and other tribal members to
participate in an Eagle Summit to discuss eagle permits, eagle population management, and the
possession of eagle feathers).
530
See E-mail from Montana Wyoming Tribal Leaders Council to Tribal Eagle Feathers
Workgroup, FW: Eagle Feathers Update and Conference Call—May 20th, 1–3p.m. EDT, MONTANA
WYOMING TRIBAL LEADERS COUNCIL, http://www.mtwytlc.org/component/content/article/114announcements/1683-fw-eagle-feathers-update-and-conference-call-may-20th-1-3pm-edt.html
(last
visited Sept. 11, 2012) (reporting on an annual meeting of tribal leaders during which the Office of
Tribal Justice Director Tracy Toulou spoke regarding “eagle feathers related issues”).
531
Friday, 525 F.3d at 945.
532
See Friday, 525 F.3d at 943 (discussing tribal hunting regulations that forbid the taking of
eagles).
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Act to federal and tribal lands. Notwithstanding the federal law, however,
there was clearly a tribal law element of the case. Testimony in the Tenth
Circuit involved extensive (and potentially conflicting) evidence on tribal
law and custom regarding the taking of a bald eagle for the Sun Dance,
evidence that the Tenth Circuit declined to rule on.533 Following the Tenth
Circuit’s decision, the U.S. Attorney’s office—perhaps appreciating this
history and the tribal nature of the incident—decided to transfer Winslow
Friday’s case to the Northern Arapaho Tribal Court.534 Friday entered a
guilty plea, paid a $2,500 fine, and had his hunting privileges on the
reservation revoked for a year.535
Friday and the current state of eagle feather regulation reveal a strong
current of tribal interests in a set of cases that had historically been
adjudicated as individual rights, either under the First Amendment or
criminal law. While many problems remain in the permitting process, the
agencies’ willingness to recognize tribal law regulations and jurisdiction is
promising. As Steven Moore, a prominent American Indian law attorney,
remarked after the Friday case, “In this modern era of tribal sovereignty,
more and more authority for regulating these kinds of activities needs to be
turned away from the United States and to tribes.”536
Finally, in an interesting turn of events, the USFWS recently issued a
permit to the Northern Arapaho tribe, allowing it to take two bald eagles
per year for religious purposes.537 This is the first permit to kill a bald
eagle ever issued in the United States and it has been granted to effectuate
American Indian religious freedoms in fulfillment of RFRA and the federal
trust responsibility to Indian tribes.538 As USFWS recognized, this is a
“controversial” decision in light of the eagle’s “iconic” status as the

533
See id. at 942–43. Though the court acknowledged the extensive evidence on tribal law and
custom that was presented, it held no weight in the court’s analysis other than being used as
background information. Id.
534
See Northern Arapaho Man Who Shot Eagle for Sun Dance Pleads Guilty, BUFF. POST (Dec.
23, 2009, 9:41 AM), www.buffalopost.net/?p=5233.
535
Id.
536
Id.
537
David Yeargin, Bald Eagle Take Permit Issued for Religious Purposes, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. (Mar. 15, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.fws.gov/news/blog/index.cfm/2012/3/15/Bald-EagleTake-Permit-Issued-for-Religious-Purposes. While the permit would seem to have great promise, one
potential limitation is that it does not allow the Northern Arapaho to take eagles on the reservation—
raising the question of where, if anywhere, Northern Arapaho people will be allowed to exercise this
religious accommodation. See Michael Winter, Wyoming Tribe Gets OK to Kill 2 Bald Eagles for
Ceremonies, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2
012/03/wyo-indian-tribe-gets-ok-to-kill-bald-eagles-for-ceremonies/1#.UGIYdlFTCYQ (stating that
“the [USFWS] issued the permit Friday, allowing the tribe to kill two bald eagles off the Wind River
Indian Reservation”).
538
Id.
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539

symbol of American identity. Yet, it is difficult to know how this permit
might be implemented given that it forbids the killing of eagles on the
reservation and Wyoming law forbids taking them off of the reservation.
Despite their limitations, the Northern Arapaho permit and the DOJ
Memorandum on Eagle Feathers both reveal a willingness to negotiate
with tribes over the limits of eagle conservation and religious use.540 The
new permit suggests that USFWS now recognizes that the limited taking of
eagles by tribal members, at least in the Northern Arapaho context, is
religiously necessary and will not threaten the entire species.541 The
agency’s statements also suggest that USFWS has come to appreciate the
relevance of tribal custom as a meaningful factor in guiding regulatory
decisions. For instance, USFWS Regional Supervisor Matt Hogan said
upon issuance of the permit: “We’re really talking about Native Americans
who have had a longtime, customary traditional relationship with eagles—
in some cases thousands of years. . . . We’re constantly trying to balance
the conservation of the species with the religious needs of Native
Americans.”542 To that end, the Northern Arapaho tribe has recently
amended its tribal code setting forth the tribe’s role in allocating eagle take
rights for traditional ceremonial purposes.543

539
Id. The decision was quickly covered in major media outlets, including CNN, MSNBC, The
Washington Post, and The Huffington Post. E.g., Steve Hendrix & Dana Hedgpeth, For Va. Eagle,
Death Is Beginning of Journey, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2012, at A01; Eric Fiegel, Feds Grant Native
American Tribe Permit to Kill Bald Eagles for Religious Purposes, CNN BELIEF BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012,
10:33 PM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/15/feds-grant-permit-to-kill-bald-eagles/; Ben Neary,
Northern
Arapaho
Given
Permit
to
Kill
Bald
Eagles,
NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46729054/ns/us_news-environment/t/northernarapaho-given-permit-kill-bald-eagles/ (last updated Mar. 14, 2012); Northern Arapaho Tribe Receives
Permit to Kill 2 Bald Eagles for Religious Purposes, HUFFINGTON POST GREEN (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:57
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/northern-arapaho-tribe-permit_n_1342933.html.
540
See Neary, supra note 539 (“Congress recognized [the culturally unique way Native American
tribes value bald eagles and other wildlife] when they passed the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
and required the Service to consider religious uses by tribes a priority for issuing take permits under the
law.”).
541
See Ben Neary, Wyoming Tribe Says First Bald Eagle Kill Permit Is a Victory for American
Indian Sovereignty; Tribe: Bald Eagle Permit a Victory for Tradition, CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 17, 2012
(“[O]nly a few tribes have intact ceremonies involving eagles and . . . only a few individuals within
those tribes have a religious need to kill wild birds.”).
542
Tristan Ahtone, Wyoming Tribe Wins Right to Hunt Two Bald Eagles, NPR (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/19/148919990/wyoming-tribe-wins-right-to-hunt-two-bald-eagles.
543
Title 13 of the Northern Arapaho Code is notable for its extensive discussion of the
relationship between eagles and religious freedoms (including as a matter of federal law), the role of
the tribe vis-à-vis individual tribal members in eagle take permits, the protection of tribal ceremonies,
confidentiality of religious matters, ramifications for religious freedoms of tribal property, and treaty
rights between Arapaho and Shoshones on the reservation. See NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE, Tit. 13,
Religious Freedom (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.northernarapaho.com/sites/northernarapaho
.com/files/NA%20Code%20Title%2013%20Freedom%20of%20Religion%2011-2-10.pdf.
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D. Burial Sites, Funerary Objects, and Human Remains
Like people around the world, American Indians conduct funeral rites
and care for the gravesites of deceased relatives. Religious norms may
prescribe specific values and traditions associated with treatment of the
dead. For example, some Native Hawaiians express an intergenerational
relationship between the ancestors and living human beings. Ancestors
nourish the earth through the mana or power contained in their bones,
while the living have obligations to care for gravesites, bring offerings to
the ancestors, and recite personal lineages going back for generations. 544
Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, Native peoples have struggled
to protect gravesites against encroaching settlers—who acquired their lands
including cemeteries—and gravediggers—who excavated Native graves
for their scientific or curiosity value.
As Sequoyah reveals, American Indian tribes first struggled to protect
their cemeteries because they lost title to their lands during European and
American conquest and colonization.545 The Cherokee Nation lost almost
all of its aboriginal territory in the East through dozens of treaties with
England, France, and later, the United States, culminating in the 1838
“Trail of Tears,” in which Cherokees were forcibly removed from their
remaining treaty-guaranteed lands in Georgia.546 The Cherokees explicitly
referenced their ancestors’ graves among the reasons why they did not
want to leave their homeland.547 When the United States nonetheless
acquired Cherokee lands, it distributed them either to state governments or
individual citizens.548 By 1980, when Sequoyah was decided, the
Cherokee burial grounds in the Tennessee River Valley had been owned by
non-Cherokees for over one hundred years, and its new owners had the
legal authority to destroy the graces if they wished.549
American Indian graves have also been looted by government and
544
See Edward Halealoha Ayau, Rooted in Native Soil, 7 FED. ARCHAEOLOGY, Fall-Winter 1995,
available at http://www.nps.gov/archeology/cg/fd_fa_win_1995/soil.htm (remarking that the living
“are guided in part by a belief that the ancestors may exact retribution for failure to protect them from
those who would steal their mana”).
545
See DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE
BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY 21 (2000) (noting that as a result of the Indian Removal Act
of 1830, many Indians “lost their land, their homes, and their livestock”).
546
Id.
547
See, e.g., Resolutions from Aquohee District, 3 CHEROKEE PHX. & INDIANS’ ADVOC., Sept. 11,
1830, at 2, available at http://www.wcu.edu/library/DigitalCollections/CherokeePhoenix/Vol3/no18/3n
o18_p2-c5A.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“It has been frequently asserted that we are willing and
even desirous to go to the west. We assure our friends it is not so. We have our homes, we have our
families, we love to dwell by our father’s graves.”).
548
See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that the few
Cherokee expeditions back to former lands were merely educational experiences pertaining to their
cultural heritage).
549
Id.

468

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:387

individual parties. During the 1800s, federal agencies were directed to
collect Indian human remains as scientific specimen.550 In 1868, for
example, the U.S. Surgeon General ordered army personnel to collect
Indian skulls for craniology studies taking place at the Army Medical
Museum.551 One army surgeon shared that he acquired the head of a
recently deceased Sioux man by severing it from the body before the man
could be buried by his family.552 This story was replayed many times over.
For example, in 1900, “Arles Hrdlicka led an expedition to Larson Bay,
Alaska, and in front of the anguished villagers, dug up and departed with
the remains of 800 Koniag people.”553 In another instance, the Nebraska
State Historical Society came to possess the remains of over 400 dead
Pawnee Indians.554
Well into the twentieth century, government-sponsored and private
parties looted Indian graves in the name of art, science, and education.555
By the late 1980s, thousands of human skeletons and many more funerary
artifacts were housed in federally funded museums and other locations.
The National Museum of Natural History had in its collection 19,250
human skeletal remains of Native Americans.556
For American Indians, the disinterment of ancestral remains causes
personal and collective grief, disrupting the cycle of life, obligations to
ancestors, and religious beliefs.557 Moreover, the loss of religious and
cultural items, such as ceremonial rattles, regalia, and figurines, has made
it difficult to conduct contemporary religious ceremonies requiring those
550

This history was studied and documented in detail when Congress considered the legislation
that would become the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. See, e.g., ROBERT E.
BIEDER, A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS
(1990), reprinted in S. 1021 & S. 1980: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs of the S.,
101st Cong. 278–363.
551
Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992) (noting that as a
result of the directive, “[i]n ensuing decades, over 4000 heads were taken from battlefields, burial
grounds, POW camps, hospitals, fresh graves, and burial scaffolds across the country”).
552
THOMAS, supra note 545, at 57.
553
WINONA LADUKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF NAMING AND CLAIMING 77
(2005).
554
See id. at 79.
555
See THOMAS, supra note 545, at 140–42 (detailing the proliferation and efforts of looters and
public and private museums in seizing and/or documenting Indian culture); Pot Hunters Head to
Hoosegow, ART MARKET MONITOR (June 12, 2009), http://artmarketmonitor.com/2009/06/12/pothunters-head-to-hoosegow/ (noting that “pot hunting” for Native American treasures is a pastime in
many rural communities in the history-rich region).
556
SMITHSONIAN INST., NAT’L MUSEUM OF NATURAL HIST., REPATRIATION OFF.,
ANTHROPOLOGY DEP’T, http://anthropology.si.edu/repatriation/faq/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2012).
557
See KENN HARPER, GIVE ME MY FATHER’S BODY: THE LIFE OF MINIK, THE NEW YORK
ESKIMO 27 (2000) (giving an Eskimo’s description of his feelings upon seeing the remains of his
people in five barrels upon arrival to New York City).
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558

items.
After 300 Lakota people participating in the religious Ghost
Dance were killed by the U.S. Army at Wounded Knee in 1890, for
example, army and private individuals took personal effects both from
bodies still on the field and from the mass grave.559 When the items were
publicly exhibited one hundred years later, it caused “great anguish and
suffering to the victims’ descendants and the entire Sioux nations.”560
Early legal advocacy to protect gravesites and recover cultural
patrimony met many hurdles.561 State cemetery protection laws rarely
extended to Indian burial sites562 and federal law, such as the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, treated Indian artifacts on public
lands as nationally owned property.563 In the 1980s, American Indian
advocates, led by Walter Echo-Hawk, Suzan Harjo, and others, initiated a
campaign to address these religious, cultural, and dignitary harms through
federal legislation.564 In 1990, Congress passed the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).565 Like other postSmith religious freedoms statutes, NAGPRA addresses individual and
tribal claims,566 which seems appropriate given the nature of the harms and
issues described above. By its very terms, it also requires agencies to work
with tribes to effectuate tribal religious norms, for example, repatriating
“sacred objects . . . which are needed by traditional Native American
religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions

558
Notice of Intent to Repatriate Cultural Items in the Possession of the Denver Art Museum,
Denver, CO, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,373, 32,374 (June 14, 2001), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-06-14/pdf/01-14992.pdf (“These three cultural items also are
needed by the Zuni Bow Priest, a traditional religious leader, for ceremonial installation at the
appropriate Ahayu:da shrine in accordance with the practice of Zuni traditional religion.”).
559
LADUKE, supra note 553, at 101.
560
Id. at 105.
561
E.g., Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 189 U.S. 306, 306–08 (1903) (recounting the Onondaga
Nation’s attempt to recover wampum belts from state custody and the court’s denials thereof); Kim
Dayton, “Trespassers, Beware!”: Lyda Burton Conley and the Battle for Huron Place Cemetery, 8
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1–2 (1996) (recounting the story of Lyda Burton Conley who used both the law
and her shotgun to protect her mother’s grave from development).
562
See, e.g., Wana Bear v. Cmty. Constr., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that California cemetery protection law doesn’t apply to protect Miwok Indian burial ground
from excavation for development); Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d 479, 480, 483–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (quashing conviction for removing a Seminole Indian skull because the action was not proven to
have been done “wantonly and maliciously” as required by a Florida law).
563
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470cc–ee (2006).
564
James Riding In et al., Protecting Native American Human Remains, Burial Grounds, and
Sacred Places: Panel Discussion, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 169, 173 (2004).
565
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048
(1990).
566
E.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2006).
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567

by their present day adherents.”
NAGPRA has three major features. First, in the case of discoveries of
human remains and cultural items made on federal lands after 1990,
NAGPRA gives ownership to lineal descendants, to the tribe, or to Native
Hawaiian organization; it also provides a right of tribal consultation for
any intentional excavations of such items.568 Second, NAGPRA prohibits
trafficking in American Indian human remains and cultural items, which is
punishable by fines and imprisonment.569 Third, NAGPRA requires
federal agencies and federally funded museums to inventory and repatriate
certain items to tribes after consultation.570
Many museums, art dealers, archaeologists, and others initially
opposed NAGRPA. They feared, among other things, that human
skeletons and other objects with scientific, educational, and aesthetic value
to the public would be returned wholesale to tribes, leaving museums, labs,
and other institutions empty of their most precious resources.571 While
thousands of repatriations have taken place, these fears have gone
unrealized.572
First, NAGPRA places significant procedural and
substantive hurdles in front of successful repatriations. It takes museums
and tribes time, money, and expertise to complete the inventory, notice,
consultation, and claims processes. 573 Second, NAGPRA has, in some
instances, facilitated cooperation among museums and tribes, or among
scientists and tribes.574 Such interactions are typically characterized by a
substantial investment in time and the development of mutual respect
among the parties. As one curator put it, working with tribes works best
567
Id. § 3001(3)(C); see also GREG JOHNSON, SACRED CLAIMS: REPATRIATION AND LIVING
TRADITION 90–92, 97–99, 102 (2007) (reflecting on Native Hawaiian advocacy before NAGPRA
review committee on issue of “sacred objects”).
568
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2006).
569
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006).
570
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003–05 (2006).
571
E.g., ELIZABETH WEISS, REBURYING THE PAST; THE EFFECTS OF REPATRIATION AND
REBURIAL ON SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, 67–81 (2008) (arguing that NAGPRA has diminished the number
of skeletal remains available for study, reduced funds for scientific research, and infringed on scientific
freedom).
572
MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 16–18 (2003).
573
E.g., T.J. Ferguson et al., Repatriation at the Pueblo of Zuni, Diverse Solutions to Complex
Problems, in REPATRIATION READER: WHO OWNS AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS? 239, 262–63 (Devon
A. Mihesuah ed., 2000).
574
See, e.g., Miranda J. Brady, A Dialogic Response to the Problematized Past, in CONTESTING
KNOWLEDGE: MUSEUMS AND INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES 133, 133–37 (Susan Sleeper-Smith ed.,
2009) (reflecting on the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of the American Indian adopting a
more collaborative model); Brian D. Jones & Kevin A. McBride, Indigenous Archaeology in Southern
New England: Case Studies from the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation, in CROSS-CULTURAL
COLLABORATION: NATIVE PEOPLES AND ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 265,
265–66, 278–80 (Jordan E. Kerber ed., 2006) (providing an example of a tribe funding to hire
archaeologists and historians to conduct scientific and academic research, as well as assisting in the
repatriation process).
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when museums treat “consultation as a process not a destination.”
Some museums have, for example, adopted “special handling”
procedures to respect tribal norms on the appropriate treatment of human
remains or sacred objects in their collections (for example, covering them
with a blanket, allowing tribal members to bless them with sage, or
avoiding handling by a member of one gender or the other).576 Museum
officials have gained from tribal leaders valuable information about the
objects in their possession.577 Museums can try to “give back” to the
Indian communities that are willing to share valuable knowledge with
them, by loaning sacred objects for religious use or study. 578 After years of
consultation leading to a successful repatriation, museum officials have
even been invited to reburial ceremonies occurring in tribal
communities.579
Assessing and implementing Native religious norms into
administrative accommodations is a challenging process, contested among
tribes and among religious practitioners or groups in the Native
community.580 Two mechanisms have been particularly useful: the
NAGPRA Review Committee and the agency rulemaking process. The
Review Committee is established under NAGPRA “to monitor and review
the implementation of the inventory and identification process and
repatriation activities.”581 The Review Committee makes annual reports to
Congress on compliance and also hears disputes on factual matters to
resolve repatriation issues between Indian tribes, Alaska Native villages
and corporations, and Native Hawaiian organizations with museums and
Federal agencies.582 Constituted as an “advisory committee” under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, the NAGPRA Review Committee is
governed by administrative law, as well as religious freedoms and federal
Indian law. Review Committee members are appointed by the Secretary of
the Interior from nominations by Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian
organizations, traditional Native American religious leaders, national
museum organizations, and scientific organizations.583 The NAGPRA
575

575
Bridget M. Ambler, Curator of Material Culture, Remarks at the Univ. of Colo. Law Sch.,
(Oct. 11, 2011).
576
Id.
577
Id.
578
Id.
579
Ken Gewertz, The Long Voyage Home: Peabody Returns Native American Remains to Pecos
Pueblo,
HARV.
U.
GAZETTE
(May
20,
1999),
available
at
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/05.20/indian.remains.html.
580
See, e.g., Na Lei Alii Kawananakoa v. Hui Malama I Na Kupuna O Hawai’I Nei, 158 F. App’x
53 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (involving a suit between Native Hawaiian organizations regarding
disposition of cultural items).
581
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (2006).
582
Id. § 3006(c).
583
Id. § 3006(b)(1).
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Review Committee’s composition is meant to lend both substantive
expertise and political balance in policy determinations, such as the
eternally complicated question of determining when it is appropriate to
allow scientific study on items covered by NAGPRA.584
Following one recent and now infamous case, a rule by the Department
of the Interior resolved a major issue of broad contention. In Bonnichsen
v. United States,585 anthropologists and archaeologists challenged the
applicability of NAGPRA to an 8,000 year-old skeleton found in the
aboriginal territory of several tribes in the Columbia River Plateau near
Kennewick, Washington.586 When the skeleton was initially discovered by
two teenagers, it was turned over to the Army Corps of Engineers. The
court stated: “The experts compared the physical characteristics of the
remains—e.g., measurements of the skull, teeth, and bones—with
corresponding measurements from other skeletons. They concluded that
Kennewick Man’s remains were unlike those of any known present-day
population, American Indian or otherwise.”587 This examination evoked
earlier “science” that had classified Indians’ according to craniometry and
other disciplines that required used the study and measurement of dead
Indian bodies to substantiate claims about Indian racial inferiority.588 It
also contradicted their religious obligations to rebury the individual they
called the “Ancient One.”589 The tribes argued that according to their
religious beliefs:
When a body goes into the ground, it is meant to stay there
until the end of time. When remains are disturbed and
remain above the ground, their spirits are at unrest. . . . To
put these spirits at ease, the remains must be returned to the
ground as soon as possible.590
The Department of Interior had decided that the tribes had a right to
rebury the Ancient One’s remains, a ruling that the scientists challenged.591
The Ninth Circuit vacated the Interior’s decision, holding that the scientists
had a right to study the skeleton under an Archaeological Resources
Protection Act because the remains did not fall under NAGPRA’s
584
See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1224
(D. Nev. 2006) (holding that BLM’s decision not to repatriate remains to tribe, and instead to allow
scientific study on grounds that the remains were culturally unidentifiable, was arbitrary and
capricious).
585
367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
586
Id. at 870.
587
Id. at 871.
588
ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 249.
589
Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 870 n.8 (quoting Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1121 (D. Or. 2002)).
590
Id. (quoting Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1121).
591
Id. at 868.
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purview.
This was because NAGPRA defined “Native American” as
“of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the
United States.”593 Given the evidence about the skull and other
measurements, the court was unconvinced that the skeleton was
indigenous.594 Moreover, the court noted with some incredulity the
government’s argument that even “remains as old as 100,000 or 150,000
years, close to the dawn of homo sapiens . . . would be ‘Native American’
under the government’s interpretation of NAGPRA.”595
The
archaeological evidence showed no human settlements in the relevant
region dating back 9,000 years, and the court was not compelled by the
tribes’ oral traditions that showed a connection to “the Ancient One.”596
Stating that “the government’s . . . interpretation . . . has no principle of
limitation beyond geography” and that Congress did not intend NAGPRA
to apply to remains of “such great antiquity,”597 the Ninth Circuit held that
the government’s determination that the remains were Native American
and covered by NAGPRA must fail.598 The court ordered that the skeleton
(which had already been reburied) be made available to the scientists.599
In the aftermath of Bonnichsen, the Department of the Interior issued
regulations dealing with the disposition of “culturally unidentifiable human
remains,” an issue that had previously been left open under NAGPRA. 600
These regulations provide that if an agency or museum is unable to provide
a “right of possession,” culturally unidentifiable remains are to be
repatriated first to the tribe from which the remains were removed or to the
Indian tribe or tribes “that are recognized as aboriginal to the area from
which the remains were removed.”601 This was exactly the standard
proposed by the Columbia River Tribes in Bonnichsen.602 Its adoption by
the Department of the Interior suggests that what may look to the courts
like a limitless tribal religious norm—in this case, an obligation to take
care of ancestral remains within the aboriginal territory—can ultimately
serve to inform administrative policy after consultation with tribes.
592

592

Id. at 880.
Id. at 875 (citing Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 3001(9) (2006)).
594
Id. at 880.
595
Id. at 876 n.17.
596
Id. at 880–82.
597
Id. at 876 n.17.
598
Id. at 882.
599
Id.
600
43 C.F.R. § 10.11(c)(1) (2011).
601
Id. § 10.11(c)(1).
602
Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 870.
593

474

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:387

E. Peyote
This review of legislative and administrative accommodations of
Indian religion ends where it began: with religious use of peyote. As the
earlier discussions of Woody and Smith make clear, peyote is the sacrament
of the NAC, deeply revered for its spiritual and healing powers. Smith was
controversial because it provided that states could outlaw peyote
possession even for religious use.603 True, as Professor Marci Hamilton
often points out, many states legislated in favor of peyote exemptions
following Smith.604 But this hardly ensured widespread religious liberty
for NAC members. To the contrary, these laws created a “patchwork”
effect in which twenty-eight states had an exemption for religious use and
the rest made peyote possession a felony.605 As Walter Echo-Hawk
argued, “NAC members became subject in twenty-two states to arrest,
incarceration, and discrimination solely because of their form of
worship.”606 Not only were peyote practitioners forbidden from practicing
in those states, but they could not transport peyote across those states.607
Given that peyote grows only in Texas (and Mexico), it became very
difficult to obtain the sacrament. 608 Moreover, the state rules varied, with
some, like Texas, imposing a “25 percent Indian blood-quantumrequirement” and others using different measures of eligibility.609 As a
result of outright prohibitions, legal uncertainty, and continuing societal
ignorance about peyote, NAC members were left to “pray in fear” after
Smith.610
After the broad-based coalition of religious and secular organizations
declined to push for peyote-specific protections in RFRA, well-known
peyote leaders such as Reuben Snake partnered with legal services
organizations and the Native American Religious Freedom Project to push
603
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988) (finding that the First Amendment does not
extend protection to conduct, including the use of peyote, that the States have validly proscribed),
superseded by statute, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006)) (“[T]he use,
possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes . . . is
lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State.”).
604
Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants,
and the Doctrinal Discourse, supra note 7, at 1693; see also Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the
Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 820 n.73 (1999) (listing examples of
federal and state statutes that provide exemptions for peyote use in religious ceremonies).
605
See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 208 (discussing the AIRFA Amendments of 1994, which
eliminated disparities between states in the treatment of religious peyote use by Indians).
606
ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 317.
607
See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 205–06 (discussing how, after Smith, the states could
prosecute the possession of peyote, even if intended for religious use).
608
Id. at 5.
609
See id. at 200–01 (discussing lawsuits in Texas and in New York that challenged the Indianblood requirements for the use of peyote in religious ceremonies).
610
ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 317, 532 n.164 (quoting Robert Billie White Horse, President
of the Native American Church of Navajoland).
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611

for more responsive federal legislation.
This effort required a
nationwide grassroots effort, reaching peyote organizations and Indian
tribes across the United States. Elected leaders, even those from tribes that
had not always supported peyote, testified in support of the bill. In 1994,
Congress passed amendments to the AIRFA, providing “the use,
possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide . . .
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the
United States or any State.”612 Under the AIRFA amendments, “Indian” is
defined as a member of a federally recognized tribe.613 This statutory
approach had the welcome effect of overruling Smith and it was also
consistent with accommodating Indian religious in the context of tribal
self-determination.
Still, challenges remain. The AIRFA Amendments create potential
inconsistency with an earlier regulatory exception, stating that “[t]he listing
of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using
peyote are exempt from registration.”614 The regulations had sometimes
been interpreted to include and protect NAC members who were either
non-Indian or of Indian heritage but not eligible for citizenship in their
tribes.
Access to peyote by non-Indians raises a number of issues. NAC
members and leaders are, for example, deeply concerned about instances in
which non-Indians have claimed to create a new “Native American
Church” and sought exemptions for the “religious use” of peyote.615 The
“Oklevueha Native American Church”—an organization run by a nonIndian peyote activist named James Mooney who was arrested in 2006 for
possession of 12,000 peyote buttons—has been particularly aggressive.616
Mooney has argued that state and federal laws violate equal protection and
RFRA by limiting peyote exemptions to members of federally recognized
tribes, claims that have thus far been unsuccessful.617 In one case, the DOJ
611
HUSTON SMITH & REUBEN SNAKE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE
AMERICAN CHURCH 139–40 (1996); see also id. at 125–39 (describing the history of Indian religious
use of peyote and how it has been affected by European jurisprudence from the early European
colonization of America through the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith).
612
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006).
613
Id. §§ 1996a(c)(1)–(2).
614
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2012).
615
See State v. Mooney, 98 P.3d 420, 422 (Utah 2004) (overturning conviction of non-Indian who
possessed peyote and claimed membership in “Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church”).
616
MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 223.
617
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 8–11, Oklevueha
Native Am. Church v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-00892 (D. Utah Sept. 13, 2010) (alleging that the
government violated the RFRA and the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to allow members of the
NAC to use peyote in religious ceremonies).
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agreed to drop the charges if Mooney “agreed to never acquire, use, or
distribute Peyote.”618
Many American Indians find Mooney’s litigation strategy worrisome
and his conduct offensive. First, if successful, Mooney could eviscerate
the federal statutory protection for peyote use that American Indians fought
so hard to obtain after Smith. Second, Mooney’s use of peyote in his own
brand of ceremony violates their beliefs about the sanctity of the plant. For
NAC members, peyote is a deity that must be carefully harvested and
transported, never wasted, and only taken in a religious ceremony. 619
Because of the very small geographic area where peyote can grow, as well
as overharvesting problems, peyote supplies are already quite low. NonIndian use jeopardizes the plant, creates extra demand, and raises the
price.620 Additionally, when federal agents seize peyote from individuals
not protected by law, they destroy the plant—leading to the desecration
and loss of thousands of peyote buttons that would have otherwise been
used in a NAC meeting.621 Finally, Mooney and others similarly situated
threaten to raise the kind of concerns articulated in Smith, that certain
individuals are merely using religious arguments as a shield for illicit drug
use.
Mooney’s challenges reveal much about the current state of American
Indian religious freedoms.622 It would be very difficult for the NAC to
prevail, under the First Amendment or RFRA alone, on an argument that
American Indians should have an exclusive exemption for peyote use. A
“church autonomy” argument might protect the NAC in its internal
affairs—for example, in affirming the Church’s right to select certain
individuals as roadmen or divide property according to church rules. But
some NAC leaders and members desire to limit non-Indian access to
peyote as a general matter. On this point, the Utah court held that tribal
affiliation is immaterial to the legality of the ingestion of peyote by an

618

MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 224.
See, e.g., Non-Natives Using Peyote, NATIVE AM. CALLING (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.nativeamericacalling.com/nac_past2010.shtml (national radio call-in show featuring
differing perspectives on non-Indian peyote use, as in Oklevueha).
620
See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 225–28 (describing the ecological and economic factors
that have led to a decline in peyote harvest, and a concurrent increase in the price of peyote over the
past fifty years).
621
See Non-Natives Using Peyote, supra note 619.
622
While Mooney is generally perceived at one end of a continuum of legitimacy in religious use
of peyote, there are more nuanced and complicated questions raised, for example, by the religious use
of peyote by American Indians lacking enrollment status or by non-Indian relatives of tribal members.
For discussion of these issues in the eagle feather context, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Culture Talk or
Culture War, 45 TULSA L. REV. 89, 96–97 (2009).
619
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623

individual.
But other courts have held that that NAC membership is a
political classification that withstands free exercise and equal protection
challenges by non-Indians.624 Moreover, the DOJ and DEA have been
quite sympathetic to the NAC in its quest to preserve the statutory
exemption for members of federally recognized tribes. The DOJ has
worked to prosecute Mooney and others, and the DEA, after consultation
with tribal and NAC leaders, has proposed amending the regulations to
conform with AIRFA, such that the exemption for peyote possession will
be available only for members of federally recognized tribes.625 As scholar
Thomas Maroukis argues, “This represents a moving away from a First
Amendment defense of Peyote use to the argument that the exemption
comes from the unique trust relationship between American Indian nations
and the federal government.”626
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps in an ideal world, there would be no role for federal courts,
legislators, or agencies in American Indian religion.627 Tribal people
would be truly free to live out their own spiritual visions and dreams as
communities sharing the landscapes that give rise to a different and
beautiful way of life.628 But this is not the reality that we inhabit, at least
not today. Through generations of conquest and colonization, the federal
government has inserted itself into every aspect of American Indian tribal
life, and has only begun to disentangle itself from the previous suppression
of American Indian religion. Increasingly, the government has shown its
support for the American Indian perspective that religious freedom is tied
623
See Utah v. Mooney, 98 P.3d 420, 428 (Utah 2004) (holding that bona fide religious use of
peyote by members of the NAC cannot serve as a basis for the prosecution of members, irrespective of
tribal membership).
624
See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that NAC membership is a political classification).
625
MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 222–23.
626
Id. at 224. Cf. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
434 (2006) (“[I]f any schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter
how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote?
Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health
risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a schedule I substance.”).
627
Those who call for external oversight of religious institutions, see, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin,
The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. L. REV. 951,
969–70 (criticizing Supreme Court cases that fail to protect the civil rights of ministers against
discrimination by religious institutions) and of tribal governments, see, e.g., Robert Clinton, Federal
Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REV. 657, 657 (2002)
(considering whether additional federal judicial review would strengthen the case for indigenous selfgovernance), might start from a different premise.
628
See James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness, 1
INDIGENOUS L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that indigenous peoples must “dream and articulate impossible
visions” in furtherance of a post-colonial reality).
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to tribal self-determination, and that religious and cultural experiences give
tribal members the values that shape their collective and separate existence
as nations within the nation. Yet, so long as the United States continues to
own sacred sites and regulate religious rituals, there will still be a long way
to go in ensuring that American Indians enjoy religious liberties at the
individual and tribal level.
Given this reality, what are the lessons to draw about limiting
principles and empowering practices in American Indian religious
freedoms? First, I am not entirely persuaded that courts are institutionally
incapable of assessing the basic beliefs and practices of tribal religions in
free exercise cases. Like religious freedoms scholar Richard Garnett and
others, I see this inquiry as requiring the evaluation of testimony and
documents, no more or no less difficult than the analysis of other complex
or specialized matters like the science behind toxic torts or financial
transactions giving rise to mortgage-backed securities. Admittedly,
American Indian religions reflect a different world view than other world
religions. Yet, the state courts in Woody and Frank, and even the federal
appellate court in Lyng, showed sensitivity and sensibility as they analyzed
Indian practices without intruding into a forbidden religions sphere. The
rhetoric about limitless Indian religious claims in Bowen, Lyng, and Smith
may be more about acceding to the power of conquest than about true
institutional incompetence.629 In any event, the Supreme Court’s inability
or unwillingness to evaluate American Indian religious claims on their own
terms was a major factor explaining the Bowen-Lyng-Smith trilogy—a
factor that has been largely overlooked in previous scholarship examining
Smith generically as a religion case.
I am persuaded, however, that Congress and the Executive Branch,
when motivated to address Indian issues, are better situated than the courts
to negotiate with tribal governments over the contours of religious
accommodation. The legislative and administrative framework created in
the post-Smith era empowers tribes and agencies, taking religious norms as
a baseline, to work together and find solutions to seemingly intractable
problems. The Departments of Justice and the Interior, and agencies such
as the Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, have increasingly shown
their willingness to work closely on matters of eagle feathers, peyote,
sacred sites, and burial grounds to fashion accommodations that allow for
some restoration of religious freedoms to American Indians while
balancing the needs of competing stakeholders. I have suggested several
629
See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, 274–75 (arguing that the Indian cases are not only about “an
insensitive court system that experienced inordinate difficulty understanding and protecting a set of
religions vastly different from those more familiar to American judges” but also about the fact that “the
courts were captive to larger, more powerful forces that resulted in the near eradication of tribal
religion—that is, settler-state policies animated by religious discrimination against tribal religions”).
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reforms in this Article, including the requirement for agencies to enter into
consensual agreements with tribes; the expansion of tribal government
jurisdiction over eagle feather and peyote matters; and the formation of
expert, representative, interdisciplinary national advisory committees to
provide insight on complex religious matters. Together, these reforms
would improve the legal framework in the spirit of self-determination,
religious freedoms, and human rights.
Beyond the American Indian context, it seems that for many
individuals and groups, RFRA and RLUIPA are working relatively well to
effectuate religious freedoms. The statutory version of the substantial
burden/compelling interest test has successfully protected even minority
religions in recent RFRA cases.630 Of course, as religious rights scholar Ira
Lupu has argued, one problem with the legislative accommodation model
is that “[r]eligious liberty cannot be captured in a simple test or phrase or
statutory formula.”631 American Indian tribes have worked relatively well
with agencies to develop richly nuanced accommodations of tribal-specific
religions in ways that broad brush legislation might not. An interesting
follow-up project to this one would be to assess the extent to which other
religious groups have worked successfully with agencies to fashion
particularized accommodations of religion, and whether the American
Indian context is typical or exceptional in this regard. Relatedly, the
American Indian context also illustrates Alan Brownstein’s point about the
costs of the accommodation model on religious minorities.632 At best,
these groups must now expend significant political capital and resources
negotiating for the fundamental liberties that members of majority faiths
enjoy without conflict. The American public may want to evaluate
whether this is a justifiable cost to impose on minority religious
practitioners.
The costs are particularly high for American Indians. Tribal leaders
have spent significant time and resources lobbying Congress and the
agencies on sacred sites and eagle feathers at the same time that reservation
residents are facing crushing poverty, violent crime, jurisdictional battles,
land claims, and other matters requiring tribal leaders’ attention.
Moreover, in the administrative process, tribal interests often still lose out
to parties with more financial resources and political clout. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Navajo Nation casts serious doubt on the extent to
630
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005) (discussing Wicca, Asatru, and
Satanism); Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 418–19 (discussing the “UDV” religion).
631
Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 565, 577 (1999).
632
See Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger
When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1725 & n.74 (2011) (arguing that
religious minorities must expend significant political capital to protect their rights).
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which the courts will serve as a backstop to ensure that American Indians,
and possibly other Americans, are protected in their enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms. As constitutional scholar Jesse Choper has argued,
the accommodation model is generally problematic when courts abdicate
to the political process a traditionally perceived purpose of legislative
actions: to protect minority rights from majoritarian tyranny.633 To this
end, the Tenth Circuit’s broader approach to RFRA, as applied in the
district court’s Comanche Nation case, seems much more promising, if not
completely tested, at this point.
Whether under RFRA or RLUIPA—or perhaps new amendments to
the Indian religion statutes—Indian religious practitioners still need some
guarantee of judicial review if they are to enjoy meaningful religious
freedoms. This will require additional work by advocates and scholars.
RFRA and RLUPA are silent on American Indian issues, while the Indianspecific religion statutes have few substantive enforcement mechanisms.
Even as Congress has legislated in favor of “tribal” interests in religion and
courts have begun to assess the autonomy interests of religious
“organizations,” it remains somewhat unclear where exactly American
Indian organizations, tribal governments, the NAC—and perhaps even
certain non-Indian religious institutions and groups—fit under the Free
Exercise Clause or RFRA.634 By the same token, Congress has not exactly
clarified the extent to which it expects agencies to be bound by the new
Indian religion policies.635 Further work at the intersection of Indian law
and religious freedoms law could elucidate these questions.
Finally, the American Indian example suggests that all three branches
of government can treat issues of institutionalism and equality with nuance
toward a broader conception of religious freedom. Certainly, American
Indians may be unique entities in religious freedoms jurisprudence and
beyond. But they also crystallize the question of what religious freedom
means in our country. If religious freedom is about individual rights
construed in terms of formal equality and a limited judicial role, American
Indians will find themselves excluded from the promise of the First
Amendment and RFRA. But if religious freedom is about something
633
See Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Protections of Religious Liberty,
70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 685–88 (1991), cited in DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR. & MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 752
(2011).
634
See, e.g., Brett G. Sharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1220
(2004) (arguing that religious “autonomy” literature has three concerns, the autonomy of the church,
the state, and the individual).
635
For briefs in Te-moak Tribe of Western Shoshone v. United States, currently on appeal to the
Ninth Circuit regarding the BLM’s obligations to tribes at sacred sites, see Turtle Talk, Briefs in TeMoak
Tribe
et
al.
v.
Interior
(June
13,
2010,
2:06
PM),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/briefs-in-te-moak-tribe-et-al-v-interior/.
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more—perhaps pluralism and a courageous commitment to make space for
the religious beliefs that inspire both individuals and groups within our
nation—then its promise will encompass the first Americans as well as
those who followed.636

636
See BURTON, supra note 450, at 291 (linking accommodation of tribal religious practices to the
broader tradition of religious pluralism in the United States); see also THOMAS BANCHOFF,
DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM (2007) (examining views on religious pluralism,
including tolerance and accommodation).

